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ABSTRACT 
 
A NEW READING OF KANT’S THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
 
Robert R. Hoffman 
 
Paul Guyer 
 
 There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the traditional interpretation of 
Immanuel Kant’s writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that 
throughout his published writings on practical philosophy – and in particular in his 
Metaphysics of Morals – he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only 
be justified as a direct response to an individual’s act of wrongdoing, his status as one of 
the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this 
dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kant’s explicit support for retributivism 
directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue 
instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of 
punishment. In particular, I highlight Kant’s division of duties and his conception of the 
state to demonstrate that the idea of a political community retributively responding to 
moral desert is wholly incompatible with Kantian principles. In order to overcome these 
obstacles, I develop a new approach to Kantian deterrence – which I call Kantian 
Protective Deterrence – that grounds the state’s right to exercise coercive force against its 
citizens in what Kant understood to be its fundamental role of protecting each individual 
citizen from violations of her or his right to exercise external freedoms. 
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1  Kantian Protective Deterrence: An Introduction 
 
 Immanuel Kant is frequently hailed as the foremost philosopher of the 
Enlightenment. His work in moral philosophy has inspired a tradition of thinking that 
still stands as one of the dominant approaches to answering normative questions. The 
values of unconditional respect for human persons, strict commitment to inviolable 
rights, and the intrinsic worth of autonomy and agency – all hallmarks of the fragile but 
precious moral progress in modern times – find unequivocal support and foundation in 
his writings. The influence of Kant’s insight, originality, and breadth of thought is 
almost impossible to overstate. 
 His prominence and significance within the history of moral philosophy alone 
would warrant a careful consideration of Kant’s views on the subject of punishment. As 
it happens, however, there is additional reason to study his position: namely, Kant’s 
reputation as one of the central, foundational philosophers of the retributivist school of 
thought. Retributivism – the belief that punishment is justified as a response to the 
wrong actions and moral desert of the perpetrator – has persisted as one of the dominant 
theories of punishment, from the earliest points in human history to today. Kant, in turn, 
is regularly singled out as the first philosopher in modern times to provide a secular, 
rather than religious, basis for retributivism. So great is his identification with the 
retributive view that it is sometimes merely labeled the deontological approach to 
punishment. 
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 Kant’s reputation as a theorist of retributivism is well-earned. In his Metaphysics 
of Morals, he describes punishment as being justified only when it is an immediate 
response to an act of criminal wrongdoing: “Punishment can never be inflicted merely 
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society.  It 
must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime” (6:331).1 The 
state’s response to criminal wrongdoing is analytically necessitated (27:552) and should 
take the form of ius talionis (the law of retribution): an eye for an eye (6:332). Failure to 
respond in this way makes a state complicit in the act of wrongdoing, even in such an 
extreme condition as the state’s dissolution (6:333). These views are expressed 
throughout the Metaphysics of Morals, but also receive attention in his essay “On the 
Common Saying: That May Be Right in Theory but Not in Practice,” as well as in his 
lectures on moral and political philosophy. 
 There is ample evidence to demonstrate Kant’s commitment to retributivism. 
When it comes to how he defends his position, however, there is considerably less to be 
said. While Kant offers some support for his view, this support is insufficient for a 
variety of reasons, the most fundamental of which is a failure to ever demonstrate why 
the state is authorized to respond to the purported moral desert of its citizens. Kant’s 
retributivism ultimately comes unmoored from the rest of his practical views and 
threatens to cast them all into deep inconsistency. While I believe any such effort is 
                                                 
1 Kant, Immanuel. Practical Philosophy. Ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, and Lectures on Ethics. Ed. J.B. Schneewind and Peter Heath, trans. Peter Heath. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. All internal citations refer to the standard Prussian 
Academy edition, volume and pages. 
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likely to fail, one might respond to this looming contradiction by attempting to construct 
a new Kantian justification for retributivism. Instead, this project will show that a mixed 
theory of punishment with a deterrent justification is not only available to Kant, but it is 
more consistent with his underlying practical philosophy than any retributive theory 
could hope to be.2 
 In addition to uncovering the nuances of Kant’s views and critically assessing 
their consistency, this dissertation will also endeavor to say something about the nature 
of punishing itself. Put another way, this is a project both about historical interpretation 
and about our practices of punishing today. We live in a time and place characterized by 
hard questions concerning both the morality and the efficacy of our institutions and 
practices of punishing. While Kant is not the only theoretician in the retributivist camp, 
he provides one of its foremost philosophical foundations. By interrogating what it 
would take for Kant truly to be a retributivist – and what it would mean for 
retributivism if Kant cannot truly sustain the position – I hope to make a meaningful 
                                                 
2 Traditionally, the standard triumvirate of justifications offered for punishment consisted of 
retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Retributivism, characterized as a backward-looking 
justification, describes punishment as a response to the moral desert of an agent who had previously 
committed a wrong. Deterrence, characterized as a forward-looking justification, rose to prominence 
in the early modern period and led to substantial reforms to criminal justice systems across Europe 
and North America through the nineteenth century. According to deterrence, punishment is justified 
as a way of discouraging future acts of crime and thus promoting the general welfare. Rehabilitation, 
which justifies punishment as a means of correcting the deficiencies in the character of the person who 
committed the crime, was most prevalent among ancient Greek philosophers, and while many 
theories describe rehabilitation as an admirable goal, few defend it as a sufficient justification in its 
own right. In recent years, other efforts to justify punishment have been made, including appeals 
restitution, self-defense, and security. As Kant was only familiar with the traditional trinity, however, I 
will be confining the focus of this dissertation to retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
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contribution to the contemporary conversation about why and how we should and 
should not punish. 
 
1.1 A Changing Scholarship 
 The topic of Kant’s theory of punishment has received a growing and more 
critical quantity of attention in recent years. As Anglophone scholarship begins to take 
more seriously Kant’s later works on political philosophy – including primarily the 
Metaphysics of Morals, as well as “On the Common Saying” and “Toward Perpetual 
Peace” – the question of how Kant explains the state’s authorization to punish its 
citizens becomes an increasingly compelling and important one. Efforts to address this 
question have taken the form of numerous articles and chapters in books; to date, there 
are no monographs dedicated to the question of Kant’s theory of punishment. As such, 
there is some need for a more comprehensive analysis of the subject than is possible in 
the length afforded by an article or chapter. 
 Within the recent scholarship, there are three dominant trends that can be 
identified. The first and most prevalent trend is a move toward challenging the 
traditional narrative of Kant as the grandfather of retributivism. Instead, these works 
argue, there are strong themes and undercurrents of deterrence running throughout 
Kant’s political philosophy. I will be describing works of this sort as defending a 
‘Kantian deterrence’ view, for obvious reasons. Although Kantian deterrence enjoys an 
increasingly dominant place in Kant scholarship, there are still numerous varieties of 
deterrence and interpretative divisions within this group. The second major trend within 
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the recent literature on Kant’s theory of punishment is a move to defend the orthodox 
reading of Kant. Kant interpreters who are producing work with this aim and focus – 
what I will be calling ‘orthodox retributivism’ – are motivated by an interest in showing 
that Kant’s retributivism can respond to the challenges raised by the deterrence 
theorists. The third and final broad trend that can be identified in the recent literature is 
a small but important rejection of the possibility of a consistent Kantian position on the 
question of punishment. I will be referring to arguments and positions of this sort as the 
‘anti-theory’ view. According to the anti-theory view, all efforts to find in Kant or 
construct on his behalf a coherent theory of punishment are doomed to end in 
contradiction and failure. 
 The Kantian deterrence theorists are motivated by two primary considerations. 
First, Kant interpreters have recently begun exploring the ways in which deterrent 
elements are, in fact, built into Kant’s writings. Papers of this sort posit that strict 
interpretation of Kant can uncover enough evidence to conclude that Kant’s theory of 
punishment is, at least partially, deterrent. The foremost of those defending positions of 
this kind is Sharon Byrd, whose paper “Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its 
Threat, Retribution in Its Execution”3 is heralded by virtually all those working on Kant 
and punishment as the seminal reexamination of Kant’s views on punishment. Byrd’s 
model for incorporating both deterrence and retribution in a Kantian theory has been a 
strong inspiration for many, and any work on Kant’s theory of punishment will need to 
                                                 
3 Byrd, B. Sharon. “Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its 
Execution.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Aug., 1989), pp. 151-200 
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grapple with her paper (as mine does in chapter four). Other important interpreters who 
explore Kantian deterrence views in this vein include Paul Guyer,4 Allen Wood,5 Arthur 
Ripstein,6 Nelson Potter,7 Sarah Holtman,8 and, in some cases, Thomas Hill.9 
 The second major consideration motivating Kantian deterrence is a general sense 
among Kantians that the nature of retributivism is deeply at odds with other, more 
fundamental elements of Kant’s practical philosophy. This motivation can be seen in the 
work of Thomas Hill,10 Don Scheid,11 Arthur Shuster,12 Carol Steiker,13 and Matthew 
Altman.14 Unlike the group described above, these deterrence theorists take Kant to be a 
committed retributivist. Nevertheless, they argue that for reasons of consistency, he 
ought not to have embraced retributivism. Unlike the previous group, then, these 
Kantian deterrence theorists view deterrence as something that must be imputed to 
Kant, rather than uncovered within his writing. In spite of this, however, they consider 
                                                 
4 Guyer, Paul. Kant. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2014. 
5 Wood, Allen W. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
6 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
7 Potter, Nelson. “Kant on Punishment.” The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics. Ed. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 
London: Blackwell Publishing, 2009 
8 Holtman, Sarah. “Toward Social Reform: Kant's Penal Theory Reinterpreted,” Utilitas, 9 (1997), pp. 3-
21 
9Hill, Thomas E., Jr. “Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 
4 (Jul., 1999); and “Treating Criminals as Ends in Themselves.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik, Vol. 11 
(2003), pp. 30-31.  
10 Hill, Thomas E., Jr. “Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 
4 (Jul., 1999), pp. 407-441; “Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?” 
Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik: Annual Review of Law and Ethics 5, (1997), pp. 291-314 
11 Scheid, Don. E. "Kant's Retributivism." Ethics, 93 (1983), pp. 262-282. 
12 Shuster, Arthur. “Kant on the Role of the Retributive Outlook in Moral and Political Life.” The 
Review of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 3 (SUMMER 2011), pp. 425-448 
13 Steiker, Carol S. “No, Capital Punishment is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, 
and the Death Penalty.” 
14 Altman, Matthew C. “Subjecting Ourselves to Capital Punishment: A Rejoinder to Kantian 
Retributivism.” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 247-264. 
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deterrence to be compatible with Kant’s other moral and political positions. Although 
there is some overlap in their theories – for instance, in the work of Hill and Scheid – the 
main difference within the work of these interpreters is the form and nature of 
deterrence that they see as being ideally suited to the other aspects of Kant’s practical 
philosophy. The version of deterrence that enjoys the widest support in this group is one 
that grounds the state’s authorization to punish in the “hindering to a hindrance to 
freedom” argument. It is within this broad interpretative category that my position will 
ultimately rest. 
 Opposed to the Kantian deterrence views that have emerged recently are a 
smaller but no less forceful group of papers defending the orthodox retributivist reading 
of Kant. While some of these are efforts to explain the centrality and necessity of 
retributivism for Kant’s practical philosophy, 15 most others are direct responses to the 
deterrent challenges raised by Byrd, Hill, Ripstein, Scheid, and others. The foremost of 
the scholars working in this trend is Jeffrie Murphy. 16 Working within both history and 
philosophy of law, Murphy is an ardent defender of retributivism in general and Kant’s 
version in particular. Although Murphy has recently begun to express doubts about the 
feasibility of Kantian retributivism (discussed below), his earlier work still represents 
one of the strongest efforts to defend the traditionalist position.  
                                                 
15 Parrish, John M. and Tuckness, Alex S. “Kant and the Problem with Pardons.” Western Political 
Science Association, Annual Meeting. (March 31, 2010). 
16 Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kant: The Philosophy of Right.  Macon: Mercer University Press, 1970.; “Kant’s 
Theory of Criminal Punishment.” Retribution, Justice, and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 82-92; “Three Mistakes about Retributivism.” Analysis. Vol. 
31, No. 5 (Apr., 1971). 
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 Samuel Fleischacker responds to the challenges of the deterrence theorists in a 
different manner.17 Fleischacker articulates a reading of Kant that is still – in my view – 
retributivist, but it is a considerably more articulate, complex version of retributivism 
than the orthodox understanding of Kant. Unlike Murphy – who attempts to defend 
retributivism on legal and political grounds – Fleischacker bases his defense in Kant’s 
moral philosophy. In short, Fleischacker’s approach is to focus on the role of maxims 
and the Formula of Universal Law in grounding punishment retributively. In the fourth 
chapter of the dissertation, I will argue that Fleischacker’s approach still cannot solve 
Kant’s difficulties with the ‘hard problem’ of retributivism: namely, why the state is 
authorized to respond coercively to some – but not all – instances of the citizens’ moral 
desert. 
 The final major scholarly trend to consider is the denial that Kant has the ability 
to articulate and defend a coherent theory of punishment. I have described this as the 
anti-theory view. Support for the anti-theory stems largely from the same sources as 
Kantian deterrence, but for one crucial difference: it denies the claim that Kant has the 
resources to ground a deterrence theory. Instead, Kant’s retributivism fails as a coherent 
theory of punishment, and nothing is left to replace it. 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy example of an anti-theory pessimist is Murphy.18 
Although Murphy was previously one of the staunchest contemporary defenders of the 
                                                 
17 Fleischacker, Samuel. “Kant's Theory of Punishment.” Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 191-212. 
18 Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 
(Apr., 1987), pp. 509-53 
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retributivist Kantian orthodoxy, he cites the work of Byrd and others as raising decisive 
objections to such a position. He does not accept the deterrence position posited by the 
Kantian deterrence theorists however; instead, he argues that any such position is ruled 
out by the constraints imposed by the Formula of Humanity. This leads him to conclude 
that there is no ‘Kantian’ theory of punishment. 
 A second variant of theory pessimism can be found in a paper by Jean-
Christophe Merle.19 Although Merle begins his paper with a defense of sorts of Byrd and 
the deterrence readings of Kant, he ultimately expresses reservations about such 
readings and distances himself from them. While he does construct a theory with 
elements inspired by Kant’s practical philosophy, Merle does not think that Kant himself 
has the means to put together a consistent account of punishment. 
 The clashes between Kantian deterrence, orthodox retributivism, and anti-theory 
pessimism provide a rich and complex background for this dissertation. In working out 
a novel, distinct position, I will address many of the most prominent and influential 
views above. All three of the major trends will appear throughout the project, but the 
various versions of Kantian deterrence will play the most significant role. The challenge 
for my project will be to demonstrate 1) that Kantian practical philosophy can sustain a 
robust, consistent theory of punishment, 2) that the best version of such a theory will 
incorporate deterrent, retributive, and rehabilitative elements, but will ultimately rely on 
a deterrent justification, rather than a retributive one, and 3) that I have an original 
                                                 
19 Merle, Jean-Christophe. “A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment.” Law and Philosophy, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 311-338 
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approach to Kantian deterrence that avoids some of the potential difficulties facing 
other, existent deterrent theories.  
 
1.2 A New Direction 
 Broadly stated, I contend that the Kantian deterrence movement is correct: a 
theory of punishment with a deterrent justification is more consistent with the 
fundamental aspects of Kant’s practical philosophy. Although Kant himself was clearly 
a committed retributivist who rejected the moral permissibility of deterrence as a 
justification for punishment, he asserted this retributivism on unstable and indefensible 
foundations and overstated the dangers and difficulties of deterrence. His reliance on a 
relatively conventional liberal political philosophy commits him to a conception of the 
state and its purpose that leaves open the possibility of adopting a deterrent justification. 
Indeed, such a justification can be made compatible with his moral philosophy with 
relatively minor adjustments. 
 I do not intend, however, to merely defend the versions of Kantian deterrence 
that have been developed up to this point. Instead, I will articulate and defend a position 
that I call ‘Kantian Protective Deterrence.’ According to Kantian protective deterrence, 
the state’s purpose is to make determinate and preserve for its citizens an equal, 
maximally comprehensive scheme of rights and external freedoms. This purpose 
underlies the state’s permission to adopt certain measures, constrained by moral and 
political principles, to reduce and prevent any violations of the citizens’ rights and 
exercise of their external freedom. The threat and subsequent execution of punishment is 
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one of these measures. Unlike many of the dominant varieties of deterrence, which 
justify state punishment on the grounds that crime represents a threat to the civil order, 
the continued existence of the state, or the supremacy of the state’s authority, Kantian 
protective deterrence justifies deterrent measures – such as punishment – simply by 
reference to the state’s obligation to protect each individual citizen from violations of her 
or his rights. In this way, my position aligns itself less with distributive justice, and more 
with the tradition of commutative justice.20 Rather than justifying punishment by 
reference to some advantageous social arrangement or the intrinsic, non-instrumental 
value of the state, I will do so by reference to the rights of individuals.  
 Unlike some other deterrence views,21 Kantian protective deterrence is not 
primarily concerned with attempting to show that those who engage in criminal 
wrongdoing are not morally deserving of suffering. Although I think these arguments 
have some merit, Kantian protective deterrence is prepared to grant that wrongdoing 
might be analytically connected to moral desert. Even if this is the case, however, I 
contend that Kant is best served by a deterrent theory, in light of his failure and inability 
to provide any strong reason for why the state is authorized or required to respond to 
such moral desert. In making this argument, I will be responding primarily to the work 
of the orthodox retributivists. 
                                                 
20 The concept of commutative justice can be traced to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. As opposed to 
distributive justice, which concerns the arrangement of goods and resources within a society or state, 
commutative justice is focused solely on the interactions and rights of individual citizens. 
21 See, for example, Hill (1997) and Wood (2008). 
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 Another key feature of Kantian protective deterrence is its incorporation of both 
retributive and rehabilitative elements within a broadly deterrent framework. This 
approach marks it as what is called a ‘mixed’ theory of punishment in contemporary 
literature on criminal justice. I will say more about the nature of mixed theories and the 
precise way in which deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation are combined below, but 
for now suffice it to say that while the theory is committed to deterrence as the sole 
justification for punishment, the application and functioning of the institutions of 
punishment are constrained by retributive and rehabilitative interests. 
 Kantian protective deterrence also has the advantage of developing a full, 
comprehensive analysis of every aspect of punishment. The greater scope afforded by a 
project of this length allows me to explore not only questions of the justification of 
punishment and significance of ius talionis, but also a set of lesser explored questions 
surrounding Kant’s theory of punishment, including the role played by the division of 
duties Kant establishes in the Metaphysics of Morals, the permissibility of rewards, the 
methods of punishment that are and are not acceptable, the possibility of rehabilitation, 
the subject of international courts and punishment, and the possibility of morally 
permissible but legally punishable acts of civil disobedience. By exploring this 
comprehensive range of questions, I aim to show that not only is Kantian protective 
deterrence consistent with his underlying practical philosophy, but it can also do 
important work in answering practical questions in detail. 
 Throughout the dissertation, I employ an interpretative methodology that is 
broadly reconstructive and governed by two ordered principles. In describing my 
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approach as reconstructive, I mean to both convey a positive picture of the methodology 
of the project, as well as distinguish it from other alternative methodologies employed 
by those working within the history of philosophy. The dissertation aims at building a 
coherent, internally consistent theory out of Kant’s philosophy as it is expressed in his 
published works and the notes on his lectures preserved by his students. This effort, 
however, is not committed exclusively to uncovering the most faithful representation of 
all the details of Kant’s views. Instead, it seeks to select the most successful of these 
details and craft them into a unified view. In doing so, I hope to occupy a middle 
position between those engaging in strict interpretation and the kind of ‘Kantian’ view 
that takes its inspiration from some small set of Kantian principles but develops them 
independently of any historical concern for Kant’s own views. 
 This reconstructive project is guided by two interpretive principles: 1) examine 
and endorse Kant’s most foundational philosophical commitments; and 2) attempt to 
retain as many of his explicit statements about punishment as possible, where this does 
not violate the first principle. Although not all of Kant’s thoughts on punishment can be 
preserved by such an interpretive strategy, the ones that are excluded are ruled out on 
the basis of their inconsistency with Kant’s more basic writings on moral or political 
philosophy. The end result of this interpretation is a theory that, despite being different 
from Kant’s own, is still Kantian in the sense that it is constructed from within the 
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framework of his fundamental commitments and still endeavors to preserve as much of 
his original view as possible.22 
 
1.3 A ‘Theory’ of Punishment 
 In addition to the above interpretative methodology, this project is also guided 
by a specific theoretical framework that contributes to both the structure and content of 
the dissertation. Specifically, I analyze Kant’s writings on punishment under a very 
precise conception of what a ‘theory of punishment’ is. It is easy to focus so closely on 
the concept of punishment that one can lose sight of what it means for an account to be a 
theory of punishment at all. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will be taking a theory of punishment to 
be a philosophical account comprised of a determinate number of discreet elements. 
Any fully realized theory of punishment must include five components: a definition, a 
justification, principles of liability, specification of amount, and criteria for selecting the 
methods of punishment. Each component is an answer to a different question.23 It is my 
                                                 
22 The rationale behind this approach relies on a particular motivation for investigating the history of 
philosophy. While I am interested in investigating the ways that historical positions and arguments 
bear on current issues in philosophy, I hold that any value that these investigations will have for 
illuminating contemporary questions is entirely contingent upon a detailed and accurate grasp of the 
historical views in question. As such, my goal is to develop a Kantian theory that is robust enough to 
speak to contemporary concerns about the practice and institutions of punishment, while at the same 
time preserving the core of what is distinctive in Kant’s practical philosophy. I contend that the 
interpretive strategy I have outlined is the best way to achieve these goals. 
23 E.g., liability answers the question “Who should be punished?” while amount answers “How much 
punishment is appropriate?” 
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contention that Kant offers answers to each of these questions, and that Kantian 
protective deterrence can do the same. 
 There are many ways in which a position on or account of punishment can fail to 
be a proper theory. The absence of some elements would render a theory incomplete, 
while the absence of others would make it impossible to describe a position as a theory 
at all. Likewise, even a theory that contains all the necessary elements can still fail by 
arranging these elements in a contradictory, unsustainable way.24 While not all elements 
of a theory must aim at the same goods, concerns, or interests, they must be structured 
in an ordered, harmonious way. 
 These necessary elements of a theory of punishment are deeply inspired by HLA 
Hart’s division of punishment, outlined in his collection of essays, Punishment and 
Responsibility.25 Here, Hart defends the possibility of ‘mixed’ theories of punishment by 
separating a theory’s ‘general justifying aim’ from its ‘principles of distribution.’26 
According to Hart, any theory must offer a definition of punishment, must explain the 
aim that justifies the practice or institution of punishment, and must provide principles 
of distribution. This last category includes the liability and amount of punishment. In 
drawing distinctions in this way, he endeavors to establish the possibility of a theory 
justifying punishment according to one kind of aim, while specifying principles of 
distribution in accordance with some other.27 
                                                 
24 It is this particular failing that most of the ‘anti-theory’ advocates accuse Kant of. 
25 Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 
26 Ibid., p. 4. 
27 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
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 Although Hart outlines this conception of a theory of punishment almost two 
centuries after Kant’s writings on the subject, there is still room for Hart’s 
schematization to influence a project on Kantian punishment. Although it would be 
anachronistic to expect Kant to have conceived of a theory of punishment according to 
the kinds of divisions Hart defends, it is still possible for us to use them as a map of the 
conceptual space. Kant has something to say about each of the various elements, and 
although he does not always see them as separable in the way that Hart does, viewing 
them in this manner allows for us to understand the ways in which the various aspects 
of the theory interrelate. 
 In developing my own conception of the constitutive elements of a theory of 
punishment, I have made several modifications to Hart’s schema. In particular, I have 
added one additional component and divided another into two discreet parts. A full 
theory of punishment, then, is comprised of five distinct elements: a definition, a 
justification, principles of liability, specification of amount, and criteria for selecting the 
methods of punishment. 
 First, a theory of punishment must provide a definition of punishment. The 
definition spells out what the necessary and sufficient conditions are for an act of 
violence or coercion to be punishment. There are many kinds of justifiable violence, but 
not all of them can be understood as punishment; self-defense, for instance, is clearly not 
punitive. Harder cases can include the “punishment” of children by parents or the 
actions of a state during a civil war. The very same action might be justifiable as 
punishment but not justifiable as some other act, or vice versa. We need a definition of 
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punishment in order to know which kinds of actions can be grouped into this category. 
According to Kantian protective deterrence, Kant’s definition of punishment is a 
coercive action, undertaken against a citizen of a state by the legitimate executive, as a 
sanction for the violation of public law. 
 Second, a theory of punishment must offer a justification for punishment. The 
justification explains why the class of actions picked out by the definition is morally or 
politically permissible. This justification may make reference to some underlying moral 
or political principles, but insofar as we think that the category of punishment picks out 
some importantly distinct set of actions, we should consider the possibility that it is 
justified in a non-reducible way. In many respects, the justification is the most important 
element of a theory of punishment, as it explains the reason for all of the rest of the 
features of a theory. It is the justification that gives the organizing force to the rest of the 
theory. For instance, theories that justify punishment by reference to retribution, desert, 
and rehabilitation would be described as a retributive theory, deterrence theory, and 
rehabilitative theory, respectively, regardless of how the other elements of the theory are 
specified. It is for this reason that Kantian protective deterrence, despite including 
elements of retributivism and rehabilitation, can still be appropriately described as a 
deterrence-based theory. 
 Third, a theory of punishment needs to specify the liability of punishment. In 
other words, it needs to indicate who is an appropriate target of punishment. While one 
might think that this question is also answered by the justification a theory adopts, there 
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might well be other kinds of constraints that must be taken into account.28 A theory’s 
liability, then, is the specification of the appropriate targets of punitive actions, in light 
of all relevant details and constraints. I will argue that Kant’s original use of 
retributivism to fix the liability of punishment ought to be preserved within Kantian 
protective deterrence. 
 Fourth, any theory of punishment must specify the methods of punishment that 
are appropriate. The specification of the appropriate methods takes two forms. First, the 
theory must have some general class of acceptable methods of punishing. In establishing 
such a category, the theory would also necessarily rule out certain methods. We might 
imagine, for instance, a theory that identifies imprisonment, fines, and mandatory 
community service as acceptable methods of punishing, but rules out torture and 
execution as acceptable methods. Second, in specifying the methods of punishment, a 
theory must also provide some means of determining which method is fitting in 
particular instances of crime. It is possible that multiple methods are an acceptable 
response to a particular crime; we might think that either imprisonment or steep fines 
are fine ways of punishing an act of assault. As long as the theory can give some 
rationale for which methods are acceptable in a particular instance and which are not, it 
                                                 
28 For instance, take a theory with a retributive justification of punishment. Under such a theory, 
punitive actions are justified just in those cases where the target has committed a punishable action. In 
this case, we might think that a theory with a retributive justification would necessarily specify 
liability in a way that identifies all and only those who have committed punishable actions as 
appropriate targets of punishment. This, however, is not the whole story; there may be mitigating 
factors (such as mental health or extreme circumstances) that would exculpate one who is otherwise 
an appropriate target of punishment. Liability, then, must take into account any other constraints that 
play a role in determining which agents are appropriate to punish. 
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satisfies the need for a method of punishment. Kantian protective deterrence replaces 
Kant’s commitment to the traditional policy of ius talionis with rehabilitative means of 
determining the appropriate method of punishment. 
 Fifth and finally, a theory of punishment must offer a means of determining the 
appropriate amount of punishment.29 This is a difficult component for any theory, as 
quantifying the amount of punishment poses serious challenges. Most theories of 
punishment aspire to articulating an amount of punishment that is equal, proportionate 
to, or fitting the crime, but are either uncertain or unspecific about how such 
proportionality is to be measured and assessed. Some theories point to the harm 
caused,30 while others are more concerned with the rights that the crime violated. 
Despite the difficulties involved, any adequate theory must attempt to offer some fixed 
way to determine how much punishment is appropriate in any instance of crime. 
Although it is tempting to utilize rehabilitation to guide the means of specifying the 
appropriate amount of punishment, as I did with the method, certain asymmetries make 
deterrence a better standard for fixing the amount of punishment. 
                                                 
29 The amount of punishment and the methods of punishing are very closely linked. It is impossible to 
specify the amount of punishment a criminal should experience if there is not some specific method by 
which that punishment is to be administered already in mind. Conversely, however, part of the 
consideration of what makes a particular method of punishing appropriate might, in some cases, be its 
capacity for achieving the required amount of punishment (e.g., a judge might select a fine as the 
appropriate method of punishing some act of crime if the details of the crime make it such that any 
form of imprisonment, even for a short period of time, would necessarily be too great an amount of 
punishment). 
30 Even determining the amount of harm caused by a given crime can be incredibly difficult, if the loss 
of future prospects and freedom of choice is taken into account. This matter becomes even more 
complex in the realm of civil law, but as punishment is not involved, we need not attempt to solve 
those problems here. 
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 It is worth reiterating that although each of these elements is distinct, they are 
not all of equal significance for the theory. If a theory is justified by deterrent concerns, 
for instance, then the possible answers to questions of liability, method, and amount of 
punishment must all be ones that are at least consistent with the justification of the 
practice. There is some room for variety in the answers that can be given31 – they need 
not all aim to maximize deterrence – but it cannot be the case that a deterrent 
justification for punishment can allow for the other elements to be ones that actively 
undermine or diminish the deterrent efficacy of the institution of punishment. 
 In exploring Kant’s theory of punishment, then, this dissertation seeks to identify 
Kantian answers to each of these five elements. As I have described above, it is my 
intention to do so in a way that produces a consistent theory that respects the most 
foundational characteristics of Kant’s practical philosophy, while also preserving as 
many of Kant’s statements on punishment as possible. 
 
1.4 Outline 
 The foregoing schematization of what a theory of punishment entails does more 
than just map out the conceptual space of the dissertation. In addition, this division of 
the elements of theories of punishment will also serve to provide the core structure of 
the dissertation. Aside from a few exceptions, each chapter will be devoted to exploring 
                                                 
31 For instance, it is possible that a deterrent theory of punishment could specify the adoption of either 
retributive or rehabilitative methods of punishment if it were found that the first were more effective 
at deterring others from the commission of crime while the latter were better at preventing recidivism. 
In this way, both would be consistent with the justification for deterrence, although still governed 
independently – at least to some extent – by their own internal logics. 
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one element of Kant’s theory of punishment. This will enable each of the elements to be 
considered separately, while still situating them within the context of a sustained 
examination of Kant’s theory as a whole. 
 The next chapter of the dissertation, “A History of Violence: Punishment and the 
State in Early Modern Philosophy,” serves to situation Kant’s theory in its historical 
context. I explore several dominant trends in thinking about the purpose of the state and 
its authorization to use punitive force against its citizens. This historical analysis extends 
back to Hugo Grotius and includes such prominent political philosophers as John Locke, 
Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von Pufendorf, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui, Cesare Beccaria, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Adam Smith. By examining the prevailing opinions of 
Kant’s predecessors, I lay the foundation for the argument that Kant has foreclosed the 
possibility of a retributive theory by relying heavily on the traditional structure of 
political authority used by the natural law and social contract theorists. Although Kant 
strives for radical originality in his moral philosophy, his political philosophy is too 
heavily indebted to the liberal tradition to allow him radical free reign. Perhaps without 
intending to, Kant has endorsed a framework that limits the very intelligibility of a 
retributive theory of punishment. This traditional structure is developed in a way that 
almost necessitates a deterrent theory of punishment.  
 In the third chapter, “Defining Punishment: Coercion and Right,” I articulate and 
defend the definition of punishment that Kant employs in his theory. Specifically, he 
holds punishment to be a legal institution that is impossible without determinate, 
publically-articulated laws and an established executive authority with the power to 
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enforce such laws – a ‘rightful condition.’ Without a rightful condition, there might be 
morally permissible violence that looks like punishment, but it could not be genuine 
punishment. In order to defend Kant’s definition, I look to the division of ethical and 
juridical duties that he establishes in his Metaphysics of Morals. There is a long-standing 
debate between interpreters of Kant’s work over the exact nature of this division; I argue 
that the appropriate way to understand it is by categorizing ethical duties as those that 
cannot be enforced, while juridical duties are those that can. This distinction helps to 
ground the exact nature of punishment in Kant’s theory: the enforcement of juridical 
duties, which themselves can only exist in a state and under a rightful condition. The 
chapter concludes with a consideration of the role that reward could play as an incentive 
to perform one’s juridical duties. 
 The fourth chapter of the dissertation, “Justifying Punishment: Deterring Threats 
to Freedom,” takes up the question of the justification of punishment that Kant employs. 
In many respects, this is the core of the argument made over the course of the 
dissertation. Here, I examine the two arguments that Kant gives in favor of a retributive 
justification for punishment. I reject the first as untenable and at odds with the very 
definition that Kant has established. The second argument works, but functions only as a 
negative constraint rather than as a positive reason for adopting retributivism. If another 
kind of theory could satisfy this constraint, then Kant could give no reason for thinking 
that this alternative justification is impermissible. I attempt to show how a deterrent 
theory could satisfy this constraint in the next chapter. This chapter also explores and 
rejects the dominant version of Kantian deterrence – as represented by Byrd and 
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Ripstein – for being too state-focused. Instead, I propose Kantian protective deterrence 
as a more intuitive, individual-focused deterrent justification for punishment. 
 The second half of chapter four provides the positive argument for Kantian 
protective deterrence. The goal is to show how Kant’s own fundamental practical 
principles support a deterrent approach to justifying the state’s use of coercive force 
against its own citizens. By looking to the ‘universal principle of right,’ we can develop 
an account of how Kantian deterrence might work. This account relies heavily on the 
‘hindering of a hindrance to freedom’ argument and on the purpose of the state. 
 In the fifth chapter, “The Liability of Punishment: All and Only Those Who Have 
Done Wrong,” I turn to the question of how Kant’s theory specifies the appropriate 
targets or recipients of punishment. In particular, I take the challenge for a Kantian 
deterrence theorist to be explaining how a deterrence theory can still explain why we 
ought to punish all and only those who have committed crime. I offer two arguments for 
this limitation, one practical and one moral. I also demonstrate how many of Kant’s 
most retributive-sounding passages can be accommodated within a deterrence theory by 
structuring the liability in a broadly retributive manner. 
 The dissertation’s sixth chapter, “The Amount and Method of Punishment: Ius 
Talionis and the Formula of Humanity,” focuses on the appropriate amount and 
methods of punishment that Kant’s theory endorses. These two elements of the theory 
are addressed together for several important reasons. First, it is difficult to conceptualize 
either the amount of method of punishment without making reference to the other. 
Second, Kant offers the same basis for selecting the appropriate amount and methods of 
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punishment: ius talionis, the law of retribution. Kant holds that such determination must 
be made in accordance with as literal an equivalence as possible, writing, 
But what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice makes 
its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality…. 
Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the 
people, that you inflict upon yourself. (MoM 6:332) 
 
 This principle is expressed familiarly as punishing ‘an eye for an eye.’ In the 
chapter, I will argue that Kant’s adoption of ius talionis is deeply flawed, both in ways 
that he recognizes and in ways that he does not. For instance, there are a great many 
forms of crime for which there can be no equivalent in form or amount, for both moral 
and practical reasons. In all of these cases, ius talionis fails us. 
 Instead of ius talionis, I contend, Kant should look to his own fundamental moral 
principles for guidance on the appropriate amount and methods of punishment to 
employ in his theory. Specifically, the second formulation of the categorical imperative – 
the Formula of Humanity as an End, or FHE – is a better guide for Kant than ius talionis. 
This substitution would help Kant to capture many of the concerns that are underlying 
his embrace of retributivism – for instance, his fear that other forms of punishment use 
persons as a means to some end, like deterrence – but do so in a way that does not create 
just as many problems as it solves. 
 In the seventh chapter of the dissertation, “Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: 
Revolution and Punishing Rulers,” I consider some of the implications of Kant’s theory 
of punishment. In particular, I focus on questions of the permissibility of civil 
disobedience, revolution, punishing former leaders of a state, and international criminal 
courts. In the case of civil disobedience and revolution, Kant strongly rejects the legality 
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or morality of ever engaging in any such behaviors. The way in which he defines the 
sovereignty of the legislative branch and the authority to punish of the executive branch 
frames the issue in such a way that claiming a right for citizens to resist the power to the 
state is potentially incoherent. I argue, however, that while this may be the case for a 
legal right to revolution, Kant oversteps the limits of position when he claims that 
resistance is always immoral. Indeed, Kant’s own moral philosophy should incline him 
toward thinking that there is a special class of cases in which resistance is not only 
morally permissible, but indeed required of the citizens. With respect to the punishment 
of former leaders and the viability of international criminal courts, Kant’s position is 
slightly more complex. I analyze these issues and consider what conclusion we ought to 
draw, basing my analysis on his work Toward Perpetual Peace. 
 As becomes clear from the above outline, this project approaches Kant’s views on 
punishment from a number of different angles and vantage points. By utilizing this 
broad analytical lens, I hope to offer the most comprehensive account of Kant’s position 
on punishment to date. This exhaustive scope is not only useful for ensuring that no 
important details are overlooked, but also for guaranteeing that Kantian protective 
deterrence is consistent with Kant’s broader practical philosophy. 
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2           A History of Violence:  
    Punishment and the State in Early Modern Europe 
 
 In his practical philosophy, just as in his more speculative work, Kant strove to 
articulate a substantively innovative solution to the philosophical questions he 
addressed. His efforts to achieve originality of perspective, however, were not founded 
on an ignorance of or disregard for the work of previous philosophers; if anything, some 
of his characteristic innovations were envisioned as a synthesis of established, prevailing 
views. Any attempt to understand Kant in isolation, then, is able to capture only a part 
of the full picture. To truly understand his work, we need an understanding of his 
influences and the major contributors to the on-going discussion of his day and age. 
 This is especially true of Kant’s political philosophy. While his work on moral 
philosophy is framed largely by his opposition to previous ways of thinking, his 
positions in political philosophy draw heavily from the work of major figures in the 
history of western political thought. Although he introduces his own distinctive 
elements, there is no denying that his writings on civil society, the state, sovereignty, 
and law are inspired by the natural law, social contract, and British moral sense 
traditions that preceded them. 
 In this chapter, I will be exploring the work of a number of political philosophers 
from the 17th and 18th centuries. Not only are these all figures with whom Kant is known 
to have been familiar, but they also all exerted great influence on the general 
conversation about political authority and punishment and therefore deserve 
 27 
consideration independently of Kant’s acquaintance with their work. My primary aim is 
to determine each philosopher’s position on two matters: 1) the relationship between the 
state and punishment, and 2) the justification that each thinker offers for the state’s use 
of coercive force against its own citizens. Where possible, I will also pursue a secondary 
goal of outlining what, if any, specifics are provided or constraints are imposed to 
specify the appropriate recipients, amount, and method of punishment. Clearly, this will 
require careful consideration of the passages in which each thinker describes the 
sovereign’s executive powers and the state’s use of punishment. In addition, however, 
we must look at the views that the philosophers hold regarding the purpose and 
appropriate role of the state itself, as this often serves as an indication of what limits or 
constraints they place on punishment. If the state exists for a given reason, it is often the 
case the punishment will be justified in light of the same reason. 
 The conversation about the definition of punishment – that is to say, what criteria 
an act of violence must meet in order to be punishment – resolves into two broad 
categories. First, there are those that define punishment as a kind of natural right. 
According to philosophers who hold this view, punishment – and a right to punish – 
exists prior to or independently of states and human laws. Furthermore, any acts of 
punishment that do occur within civil society are connected to and based upon the right 
to punish that exists in the state of nature. Put another way, this category of thinkers 
holds that humans are capable of punishing one another for reasons that do not 
originate in the civil authority of the state. Given this claim, all members of this group 
justify punishment without reference to the role it plays in civil society or lawful states. 
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Although no one would deny that punishment can and does serve useful functions, they 
think that these functions are only possible given that punishment has already been 
found permissible. Additionally, they justify the state’s authorization to punish – that is, 
to utilize force against its citizens in the execution of its laws – by grounding such an 
authorization on these independent, pre-state considerations. Kant does not endorse the 
unifying claim defended by this school of thinkers, but it is worth exploring their line of 
thought in order to get a sense of the major disputes of the era. 
 Rather, Kant follows in the tradition of the second main category: those who hold 
the state’s right to punish to be different in kind from – and unconnected to – any act of 
violence that can take place in the state of nature. Some, like Kant, hold punishment1 to 
exist only in states with established law and a recognized executive that has authority to 
enforce the laws. Others might think that some form of punishment exists in the state of 
nature, but that this form and the one perpetuated by states are fundamentally different; 
the state’s authorization does not depend on the pre-civil right to punish. Within this 
broad category, I will be distinguishing between two important sub-groups. The first, to 
whom I will refer as the ‘strict contractarians,’ is committed to the idea that the state’s 
purpose is derived not from any prior normative facts about human kind, its natural 
rights or duties, or its ends, but rather from the act of contracting the state itself. The 
                                                 
1 Please note that when I refer to punishment, I mean human punishment. There are those who, despite 
viewing human punishment as a construction of states, nevertheless think that God might be able to 
punish humans in the state of nature. Arguably, this does not change their overall stance, as God 
punishes with the authority of a sovereign and on the basis of laws, simply not laws of a state 
constructed by humankind. I will not be considering this view in any great depth, as our focus here is 
on punishment by human beings and governments composed of human beings. 
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strict contractarians take it to be the case that people enter civil society for reasons of 
rational self-interest, and this same rational self-interest can explain what kind of state 
the contractors would agree to enter. The second sub-group, to whom I will refer as the 
‘normativists,’ holds that the existence of the state is not merely a neutral occurrence that 
arises from rational self-interest. Rather, the state is seen in a normative way; either 
citizens have some moral duty to enter the state, or else it is necessary for helping them 
achieve some end that carries normative force. As such, we do not derive the purpose of 
the state from the rational self-interest of the contractors, but rather from the normative 
reasons for the state’s existence. It is to this last sub-group that Kant’s political works 
belong.2 
 Throughout this chapter, I will repeatedly make the case that either explicitly or 
implicitly, almost all political philosophers during the early modern period – regardless 
of their association with either the natural right tradition, the strict contractarian 
tradition, or the normativist tradition – held theories of punishment that, while mixed to 
various degrees, nevertheless utilize an ultimately deterrent justification for 
punishment. A truly, deeply retributive theory of punishment of the sort that has 
historically been ascribed to Kant would have been a dramatic departure from the broad 
consensus of the age. Furthermore, in all cases the adoption of a deterrent view was not 
a matter of mere coincidence; rather, it was necessitated by the details of the position’s 
                                                 
2 Note that these categories and sub-groups do not represent any kind of official affiliations or 
regimented schools of thought that existed during the 17th and 18th centuries.  While the thinkers in 
question make clear their support for the views that I utilize as unifying principles for the various 
groups, these distinctions are solely meant to draw out important differences in the ways in which 
early modern political philosophers approached punishment and its connection to the state’s purpose. 
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answer to questions regarding the origin of punishment and the purpose of the state. 
Put simply, the common views of the ends of civil society in 17th and 18th century Europe 
required widespread consensus on the deterrent grounds for punishment. 
 
2.1 Punishment as a Natural Right 
 Throughout the early modern period, a number of philosophers and political 
theorists endorsed the idea that punishment was not merely an invention of states, but 
rather a natural right belonging to human beings independently of their association with 
any state or civil society. In one way or another, each of these thinkers based this claim 
on the idea of natural law or laws of nature; such laws exist independently of states, 
their existence enables punishing occur outside of state institutions, and their 
violation—or the prevention thereof—serves as the justification for punishment. By 
looking at three of these philosophers individually, one can get a sense for what 
elements were shared by members of this tradition. Specifically, the works of Grotius, 
Locke, and Burlamaqui, although different in many respects, grant to humans a natural 
right to punish on the basis of transgressions of the law of nature, legislated by God and 
knowable through the exercise of human reason. These laws, in turn, were authored 
with the specific goal of improving the lives of human beings, securing our well-being, 
or leading to our highest individual happiness, and as such our interest in following and 
promoting the observance of these laws is both a duty to God and a matter of self-
interested prudence. 
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Grotius 
 Hugo Grotius is frequently taken as the starting point of works on natural law 
theory in the modern period. There is a rationale behind this approach: his work takes 
steps away from a strict reliance on revelation with an eye toward establishing a secular 
basis for natural law. Indeed, he is cited by later natural law theorists such as Pufendorf 
and Barbeyrac as the father of modern natural law theory.3 These steps aside, however, 
Grotius still shares much with the medieval way of approaching philosophy. A quick 
perusal of his masterpiece The Rights of War and Peace shows his continued reliance on 
the scholastic habit of appealing to authority. There has been a long-standing debate 
regarding the degree to which his work is secular,4 in light of the view that his 
traditional, conservative form of writing merely allows Grotius to progress toward his 
original, secular goal with less opposition from the religious and intellectual 
establishment of the 17th century. Whatever the case may be, his efforts to incorporate 
the received wisdom of centuries of jurisprudence lead to a certain amount of tension in 
his work. Despite the pains he takes to weave together biblical citations with passages 
from Greek philosophers, Roman jurists, and medieval scholastics, unsurprisingly he 
cannot fully avoid some conflicts. Among the other areas of tension, Grotius’s position 
on punishment tries to unite several different ways of thinking without a clear 
description of how these disparate views are to be reconciled. A charitable reading of the 
                                                 
3 Irwin, Terence. The Development of Ethics: Volume II: From Suarez to Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. p. 322. 
4 Haskell, John D. “Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism, 
Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and Denial.” Emory International Law Review, Vol. 25, 
No. 1 (2011). 
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end result reveals a kind of mixed theory, albeit one that does not fully explain the way 
in which the mixed elements interact with one another. What is clear, however, is his 
commitment to the view that punishment exists in the state of nature as a natural right. 
 Before addressing the issues that he faces with justification, let us turn to 
Grotius’s discussion of the definition of punishment. His first, most general statement on 
the subject of punishment is too broad to indicate much about his theory.  He writes, 
“Punishment taken in its most general meaning signifies the pain of suffering, which is 
inflicted for evil actions.”5 There are certain retributive elements hinted at by the final 
clause, and the description of punishment as “pain of suffering” might tell us something 
about the method of punishment, but we are nevertheless not much closer to 
understanding what kinds of acts of violence are counted as punishment and why such 
acts are justified. 
 We can get a better sense of what Grotius takes to be the nature of punishment 
by examining what he says with respect to who has the right to punish wrongdoers. 
Grotius is clear that punishment can only be inflicted by one who has a right;6 violence 
by one who lacks a right to punish, even if it is directed at one who has done wrong on 
the basis of her or his wrongdoing, cannot be rightful punishment. As for who he takes 
to have such a right to punish, the matter is more complicated. He holds that the 
question of who has the right to punish offenders is not one determined by a fixed law 
of nature (although the necessity of punishment is itself determined by the law of 
                                                 
5 Grotius, Hugo. The Rights of War and Peace. Washington: M. Walter Dunne, 1901. p. 221. 
6 p. 222 
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nature).7 He lays out all that we can gain from a well-reasoned consideration of the 
issue: 
It is deemed most suitable for a superior only to be invested with the power 
of inflicting punishment. Yet this demonstration does not amount to an 
absolute necessity, unless the word superior be taken in a sense implying, that 
the commission of a crime makes the offender inferior to every one of his own 
species, by his having degraded himself from the rank of men to that of the 
brutes, which are in subjection to man.8 
 
 In other words, the violation of laws of nature renders one deserving of 
punishment – or, at least, demonstrates that one so deserves. Reason, our source of 
knowledge about the laws of nature, cannot tell us what specific person or persons are 
authorized to punish such violators. Grotius takes it as a matter of self-evident 
rationality, though, that the punisher ought to be a superior. The only way to make 
sense of this in the state of nature, he argues, is to take what will later become the 
standard natural law position: by violating the law of nature, the violator proves to be of 
an inferior sort, like an animal or a ‘brute.’ A human might not have the right to engage 
in violence against her or his equal, but there is no question in Grotius’s mind that she or 
he does possess such a right against animals. If wrongdoers are like animals in their 
inability to act in accordance with law, then they are also vulnerable to abuse at the 
hands of other humans. This means that all law-abiding persons, insofar as they are 
human, are now naturally superiors and can therefore punish the wrongdoer. 
                                                 
7 p. 223 
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 This account of punishment in the state of nature is well supported by what he 
has to say on the subject of war between states.9 As Grotius’s focus was on establishing 
rightful conditions of war that would, in turn, allow for peace to exist between nations, 
much of his book is given over to considerations of the various kinds of justifiable 
conflict. One form of international violence that he takes to be potentially justifiable is 
war motivated by an interest in punishing another nation for inappropriate actions. The 
relationship between nations is parallel to the situation of persons in the state of nature, 
meaning that if punishment is possible in the former case, it would also be possible in 
the latter. Presumably, the rationale is also similar; if a nation engages in behavior that 
gives others a claim of superiority, then it is punishable by these other states.10 
 If punishment is warranted in the state of nature due to the inferiority of one 
who would violate a natural law, what kind of basis can there be for punishment in civil 
society? After all, Grotius does not think that just anyone in a state has the right to 
punish violators of the state’s laws. This power belongs exclusively to the sovereign.11 
The reason given for the sovereign’s exclusive claim to the use of force in executing the 
laws and punishing violators also has to do with superiority. In this case, the sovereign 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 75 
10 Although Grotius does not discuss limitations on punishments that can be inflicted against 
individuals who violate the laws of nature, we might find evidence that he envisioned such limitations 
by considering what he says on the subject of war. Given the parallel between states and individuals in 
the state of nature, the fact the he argues in favor of limiting what acts a state can engage in during 
warfare (for instance, he prohibits   ), would suggest that he favors similar kinds of limitations on 
individual punishment in the state of nature. 
11 Grotius allows for the possibility of a division of powers, in which case there might be a designated 
executive authority who is distinct from the person or body that holds supreme sovereign authority.  
In such a case, however, the executive is still merely an agent of the sovereign; any power that he or 
she wields is itself legitimate only because it is a function of the sovereign’s power. 
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is superior by virtue of her or his position in two senses. On the one hand, the members 
of the state have agreed to give such power to the sovereign. Grotius believes the 
governed give their consent, thus imbuing the sovereign with all the authority that he or 
she needs. On the other hand, the sovereign, as the one who creates laws, also has the 
power to enforce the laws—the same way that God is the only one who automatically 
enjoys the kind of superiority necessary for enforcing the laws of nature. 
 Grotius explicitly connects the right to punish that all persons outside of the state 
enjoy with respect to violators of the law of nature with the right to punish that the 
sovereign has with respect to the citizens of her or his state. The latter power is merely 
the extension of the former into a new situation. There are not two kinds of punishment, 
but rather a single kind that can occur in rather starkly different situations.  It is 
reasonable, then, to expect that all punishment – whether in the state of nature or civil 
society – would be justified in the same way. 
 What kind of justification is this, then?  Unfortunately, this is where The Rights of 
War and Peace is weighed down by the amount of extant “authority” with which it must 
harmonize. Indeed, there are elements of all three of the traditional triumvirate of 
possible grounds for punishment: retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. While there 
is nothing inherently contradictory about trying to incorporate elements of these three 
different views of punishment into a single position, Grotius does not give us a perfectly 
picture of how they are meant to fit together. 
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 He indicates an affinity for retributive theories when he claims that “it is right for 
everyone to suffer evil proportioned to that which he has done,”12 or “when we say that 
punishment is due to anyone, we mean nothing more than it is right he should be 
punished.”13 In these and related instances, he defends the kind of analyticity of the 
relationship between wrongdoing and punishment that is characteristic of retributive 
theorists. Whether these retributive concerns are sufficient to justify punishment on their 
own, however, remains unclear. 
 There is good reason, I believe, to think that the view he is proposing is not 
merely retributive. To start with, he writes that the mentality that “the pain of an enemy, 
considered solely as such, is no benefit to us, but a false and imaginary one.”14 This 
seems to undermine his former retributive inclinations, or at least cast them in a 
different light. While moral desert is essential for justified punishing, it is not alone 
sufficient to justify such action. To be motivated solely by an interest in causing 
suffering, however deserved, is to pursue a “false and imaginary” benefit. 
 Grotius also argues that in some cases, punishment can be mitigated for reasons 
of mercy.15 The possibility of clemency does not directly contradict the use of a 
retributive justification for punishment, but it does complicate the picture. It is not clear 
if mercy truly is the motivation for clemency, though, given that he then states that this 
mercy is often the most effective means of causing a criminal to reevaluate her or his 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 221 
13 Ibid., p. 222 
14 Ibid., p. 225 
15 Ibid., p. 224 
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actions and refrain from future crime. While I think that it is possible to understand this 
line of thinking as ultimately aimed at deterrent goals – and will give an argument to 
that effect below – there is also a decidedly rehabilitative sound to his claims. 
 These are not the only rehabilitative elements in Grotius’s theory, though; he 
goes so far as to describe rehabilitation of the criminal as a justifiable end of punishment. 
“The power of inflicting the punishment, subservient to this end [rehabilitation], is 
allowed by the law of nature to any one of competent judgment, and not implicated in 
similar or equal offences.”16 He goes on to add that in civil society, we must establish 
particular individuals as competent judges, but it is worth noting that in this quotation 
we see an additional instance of Grotius stating that punishment is possible in the state 
of nature, carried out by one who has not committed a similar offense and is thus a 
superior, independent of laws or an established sovereign with executive authority. 
 Alongside these rehabilitative (and retributive) elements, Grotius also makes 
claims that could easily be viewed as grounding punishment on deterrence. He writes, 
“In punishments, we must either have the good of the criminal in view, or that 
advantage of him whose interest it was that the crime should not have been committed, 
or the good of all indifferently.” 
 With enough effort, we might find a way to render these statements all consistent 
with one another, most likely by subsuming some of his retributive and rehabilitative 
interests under a general drive for deterrence. Likewise, all of the other elements of 
                                                 
16 Ibid., p. 226 
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Grotius’s theory of punishment could conceivably be incorporated into a coherent 
whole. Like every other philosopher described in this chapter, Grotius is concerned with 
establishing a certain kind of equivalence between punishments and the crimes to which 
they respond. The exact nature of this correspondence is left ambiguous, however, and I 
will not take the time here to try to sort out what kind of equivalence he might have in 
mind. 
 Instead, I will conclude this section by focusing on the lasting impact that 
Grotius’s way of approaching the issue of punishment had on early modern political 
philosophy. By connecting the state’s authority – and its right to punish – with an 
individual, natural right to enforce the normatively significant laws of nature, Grotius 
was able to provide an explanation for the state’s legitimate authority that did not rely 
on divine selection, shaky metaphors to paternal power, or simple might. Although 
some later thinkers would rely solely on the social contract and the consent (actual or 
hypothetical) of the governed, Grotius’s introduction of rights, knowable through reason 
and normatively powerful, served as a basis for at least some later political 
philosophers. As well will see, Locke and Burlamaqui both relied heavily on the kind of 
secular option that Grotius first posited. 
 
Locke 
 Although Grotius is the first philosopher of the early modern period to make the 
case for punishment as a natural right, this position is perhaps most commonly 
associated with the political philosophy of John Locke, as laid out in his Two Treatises of 
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Government. Indeed, the possibility – and even requirement – of extra-state punishment 
is one of the most distinctive features of Locke’s conception of the state of nature. In 
order to assess the other features of Locke’s theory, we must know why he holds 
punishment to be possible in the state of nature and why he argues in favor of viewing it 
as a universal right. 
 Let us turn to what Locke has to say on the subject of punishing. For Locke, the 
subject comes up much earlier than it does for most other social contract theorist or 
natural law thinkers. In describing humanity’s situation in the state of nature and what 
rights individuals hold in such a condition, he writes:  
 But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license…The 
state of nature has a law to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, 
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, liberty, or 
possessions. 
 And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and 
from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which 
willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of 
nature is, in that state, put into every man’s hand, whereby every one has a 
right to punish the transgressors of that law.17 
 
 Unlike his predecessor Hobbes (who I discuss below), Locke does not take the 
state of nature to be morally neutral. Instead, it is given a normative character by the 
existence of the laws of nature, which are discernible through the use of reason. There is 
some ambiguity in the passage above about the origins of these laws; given his 
language, we might be tempted to conclude that the laws are merely a product of 
                                                 
17 Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. 1690. Ed. C.B. Macpherson. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1980.  Pp. 9-10. 
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human reason. To conclude this, however, would be to ignore other important 
quotations that offer support for a different view. I will return to this point shortly. 
 One other important point in the passage quoted above that warrants 
consideration is his claim that all people hold this executive right to punish. This leads 
to one of Locke’s more unique arguments for leaving the state of nature: the practical 
necessity of consolidating this executive right of punishment.18 Instead of everyone 
attempting to punish violators of the laws of nature individually (and potentially 
allowing personal feelings to illegitimately influence the amount of punishment 
applied), civil society allows for the designation of a single individual or group as 
responsible for any and all acts of punishment that need to occur. While this is not the 
only reason Locke gives for individuals’ move from the state of nature to an established 
and lawful state, the fact that he includes it only reinforces the centrality of punishment 
in his political philosophy. 
 Like Grotius, Locke thinks that the sovereign’s ability to punish in a state is an 
extension of this executive right in the state of nature. He conceives of the state as 
limited in its possible powers to those that the individuals who comprise the state had 
themselves prior to joining the state.19 There is no other source of state power or 
authority, and so any ability to punish must be based on the individual right that exists 
in the state of nature. Rather than concluding that the omnilateral, reciprocal agreement 
of all members is what gives rise to the that state’s authorization to punish, as some later 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 12 
19 Ibid., p. 70 
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social contract theorists posit, Locke holds that this agreement is merely a consensus to 
allow a specific individual or body to be the sole party to act on the universal executive 
right that all possess. 
 Moving on from the definition of punishment that Locke offers, let us consider 
the justification he offers for this universal executive right to punish enjoyed by all 
people in the state of nature. On the surface, it is clearly a direct response to an act that 
violates the laws of nature. Violence against one who has not violated the laws of nature 
cannot be punishment, and the mere commission of an act that contradicts the law of 
nature serves as appropriate grounds for punishment. After a quick reading, then, this 
seems to be an open and shut case of retributive thinking. 
 Before we conclude this, though, we should return to the question I set aside 
earlier: namely, from where do the laws of nature come? Locke is clear that these laws 
are the product of God’s will.20 In order to avoid a contradiction, then, we should not 
take his claim that reason is the law of nature to mean that the prescriptions contained in 
the law are merely the products of reason. Rather, reason is a necessary and sufficient 
tool for understanding the contents of the laws of nature, which are given by God. He 
writes, “In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by 
another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set 
to the actions of men, for the mutual security.”21 
                                                 
20 Ibid., pp. 10-13 
21 Ibid., p. 10 
 42 
 This last quotation is important. The laws of nature, given by God and 
intelligible through reason, are not arbitrary. Rather, they have a specific set of tangible 
goals that they are meant to produce: human security. When describing the motivation 
for punishing those who have violated the law of nature, Locke’s focus on the purpose 
of the laws of nature comes out very clearly: 
Every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter 
others from doing the like injury…by the example of the punishment that 
attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a 
criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God 
hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath 
committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be 
destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men 
can have no society nor security.22 
 
 Despite any initial temptations to view Locke’s natural, universal right of 
punishment as grounded in a retributive manner, it is clear from what he says above 
that he views punishment as justified for deterrent reasons. No mention is made of 
desert, but rather only of security and making an example so that others might learn 
vicariously. Even the motivation he describes is not one that sounds classically 
retributive; we punish criminals as we would wild animals, not because they deserve it, 
but because it is the only way to prevent them from future acts of wrongdoing. 
 This also gives us a clear answer on the question of what Locke takes to be the 
proper liability of punishment. We should punish those who have done wrong, as they 
are the ones who have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted in the future. As a 
secondary benefit to the general deterrence of crime, others who have yet to prove 
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themselves untrustworthy may still be convinced to follow the law by witnessing what 
happens to those who do not. In this way, Locke fixes the recipients of punishment 
retributively, as we have seen is common even among those with a deterrent 
justification for the government’s use of force against its citizens. This kind of mixing of 
the elements was prevalent among early modern jurists precisely because it enabled 
their deterrent theories to still capture some of the strengths of retributive and 
rehabilitative theories. As we will see, this same kind of mixing represents the best way 
for Kant to solve some of his difficulties with punishment. 
 As for other aspects of Locke’s theory of punishment, he lays out his position on 
the appropriate amount in the following way: “I answer, each transgression may be 
punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain 
to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like.”23 
Unsurprisingly, given his commitment to a deterrent justification for his theory of 
punishment, Locke suggests a way of fixing the amount of punishment that relies 
entirely on deterrent reasoning. Again, this understanding of the appropriate amount of 
punishment was cited more frequently than any other during the early modern period, 
and we have already seen other thinkers who hold something quite similar. 
 The last important consideration in the amount of punishment that Locke holds 
to be justified also provides some insight into his limited thoughts on the appropriate 
method of punishment. Although he does not have much in the way of a positive view 
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of what particular forms of punishment are best or appropriate, he does consider 
objections to one special kind of punishment: death. Given that the appropriate amount 
of punishment is fixed in accordance with what is necessary to have deterrent effect, it is 
likely that lesser punishments can often satisfactorily deter crime, meaning the death is 
often unnecessary.24 Nevertheless, should it be the case that death is what is needed, 
Locke has no objections to its use as a form of punishment. 
 In many ways, Locke best represents the great influence and deep roots of the 
natural law position on punishment. Despite his affiliation with the social contract 
tradition, his commitment to the normative laws of nature ultimately leaves him with a 
view that is remarkably similar to Grotius’s. By accepting the basic framework for 
justifying punishment provided by Grotius, Locke ultimately functions as one of the 
clearest examples of a kind of deterrent justification for punishing criminals, in light of 
their inability to live in accordance with the rationally intelligible laws of nature. 
 
Burlamaqui 
 Burlamaqui does not have much of a reputation among historians of philosophy 
as an innovative philosopher, jurist, or natural law thinker. His work is often cited as 
having had a substantial readership among the framers of the Constitution of the United 
States, but was nevertheless not known for originality. Instead, he is frequently seen as 
borrowing heavily from Barbeyrac, the noted commenter on and popularizer of 
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Pufendorf’s work. It is clear from his work The Principles of Natural and Politic Law that he 
holds Barbeyrac in the highest regard. In at least one respect, however, Burlamaqui 
departs from the Pufendorf-as-interpreted-by-Barbeyrac orthodoxy: namely, he 
introduces a strong positive and teleological component to natural law. Rather than 
merely preventing humans from harming one another as his predecessors in the natural 
law tradition had held and as Locke had argued, natural law is, according to 
Burlamaqui, imposed by God to help human beings achieve their natural end of 
happiness. It justifies punishment in the state of nature, and it leads the state to adopt 
practices and institutions of punishment that are structured and grounded in a deterrent 
manner. 
 Burlamaqui’s stance on the definition of punishment is not particularly 
complicated, but it is worth working through how he sets it up. He offers a clear 
enumeration of what he takes to be punishment’s necessary features, but he notes that 
his definition only applies to punishment in civil society. How he relates this technically 
precise definition to the possibility of punishment outside of civil society lays the 
foundation for his justification as well. I will first lay out the definition he gives, 
followed by sketching out how this understanding of state punishment is grounded on a 
right to punish in the state of nature. 
 Punishment, according to Burlamaqui, is “an evil, with which the prince 
threatens those who are disposed to violate his laws, and which he really inflicts, in a 
just proportion, whenever they violated them, independently of the reparation of the 
damage, with a view to some future good, and finally for the safety and peace of 
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society.”25 Burlamaqui covers quite a bit in this admirably clear sentence, touching on 
everything from the definition to the appropriate liability and amount of punishment. 
Given the space constraints of this chapter, I will be focusing exclusively on the issues 
raised in the second and third clause: namely, that the prince is the one responsible for 
threatening and inflicting punishments on those who violate the laws. 
 This focus on the sovereign as the only one who is capable of punishing, as well 
as the description of those who are punished as those “who are disposed to violate 
laws,” might give the impression that Burlamaqui should properly be understood as 
holding punishment to be a construction of states, impossible without a sovereign and 
laws. He makes it clear, however, that this is not the case. “Not that every punishment in 
general supposes sovereignty, but because we are here speaking of the right of 
punishing in society, and as a branch of supreme power.”26 This statement, then, 
indicates that there is some form of punishment which can occur without sovereignty 
and outside of society. 
 Just what would this extra-social form of punishment look like?  It is essentially 
the same as Grotius’s and Locke’s accounts: 
Whoever violates the laws of nature, testifies thereby, that he tramples on the 
maxims of reason and equity, which God has prescribed for the common 
safety; and thus he becomes an enemy of mankind. Since therefore every man 
has an incontestable right to take care of his own preservation and that of 
society, he may, without doubt, inflict on such a person punishments capable 
of producing repentance in him, of hindering him from committing the like 
crimes for the future, and even of deterring others by his example.27 
                                                 
25 Burlamaqui, Jean-Jacques.  The Principles of Natural and Political Law. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2006.  p. 418 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 417 
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 Punishment in the state of nature can be inflicted by anyone. While I will 
consider the specifics of why such a universal right to punish is justified shortly, for now 
it suffices to say that it is the violation of natural law that opens one up to punishment 
from her or his fellow humans. Another point worth mentioning is that Burlamaqui 
takes this right to inflict coercive force against the perpetrators of crimes against the laws 
of nature to be the same as the right of war.28  
 So, we have seen then that Burlamaqui holds punishment to be possible in the 
state of nature, as a right held by all against those who violate the laws of nature. He 
also describes it as occurring in states, under much more limited and constrained 
circumstances. What is the relationship between these two kinds of punishment? He 
answers this question clearly: 
The right of executing the laws of nature, and of punishing those who violate 
them, belongs originally to society in general, and to each individual in 
particular; otherwise the laws which nature and reason impose on man, 
would be entirely useless in a state of nature, if no body [sic] had the power 
of putting them in execution, or of punishing the violation of them….By 
following these principles, it is easy to comprehend that the right of a 
sovereign, to punish crimes, is no other than that natural right which human 
society and every individual had originally to execute the law of nature, and 
to take care of their own safety; this natural right has been yielded and 
transferred to the sovereign, who, by means of the authority with which he is 
invested, exercises it in such a manner, as it is difficult for wicked men to 
evade it.29 
 
 As with Grotius and Locke, the right of the state to implement a system of 
punishment and carry out specific coercive acts against its citizens is based on natural 
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rights held by individuals in the state of nature. The sovereign may use force for the 
same reasons that individuals can outside of civil society. The only question that 
remains, then, is whether this universal right to punish in the state of nature, and the 
executive right it gives rise to in civil society, is justified in a retributive or deterrent 
manner. 
 Like the other natural rights theorists, it is perfectly plausible that Burlamaqui’s 
view – which holds punishment to be warranted a response to the violation of natural 
law – could be retributive; the proponents of this theory would need merely to argue 
that the natural law, as God’s will, is of such a nature that its violation makes one 
deserve to suffer; the state, in turn, has a moral imperative to bring about this end. Like 
Grotius and Locke, however, Burlamaqui does not go down this road, choosing instead 
to depict punishment – both in the state of nature and in civil society – as justified for 
deterrent reasons. 
 The introduction of happiness as the end of human life has some major 
consequences for the ways in which Burlamaqui approaches the social contract and the 
state – and therefore for the way in which he justifies the state’s right to punish. As we 
will see, the reason given by the strict contractarians for the contractors willingness to 
give up some liberty and join a state was essentially security. For Burlamaqui, though, 
the contractors are not interested solely in the freedom from violence and theft that civil 
society affords, but rather they see a state as a necessary tool for maximizing their own, 
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personal happiness.30 He sums this up in the following way: “Civil society is nothing 
more than the union of a multitude of people, who agree to live in subjection to a 
sovereign, in order to find, through his protection and care, the happiness to which they 
naturally aspire.”31 
 If the citizens of a state have entered it with a positive goal in addition to 
protection from harm, then the state must be viewed as having the purpose of bringing 
about this goal. Whatever the state does, then, should be aimed at increasing the 
individual happiness of its citizens. By including his egoistic view of human nature and 
motivation, Burlamaqui precludes the possibility of the state acting to promote general 
happiness in a highly unequal way; given that they are motivated to maximize only 
their own happiness, they would not consent to policies that regularly sacrifice 
individual happiness for the good of the general public. Some inequality would no 
doubt be compatible with egoistic contractors, but Burlamaqui gives us no indication 
that he has an opinion on what quantity of inequality would be the maximal acceptable 
amount. 
 Since the positive end of promoting happiness motivates the state’s policies, it is 
not surprising that Burlamaqui justifies the state’s authorization to use coercive force 
against its citizens in generally deterrent language. After all, the prevention of crime 
                                                 
30 We should note that Burlamaqui holds human motivation to be strictly egoistic. There is no interest 
in the good of others or in happiness in general. This allies him with Hobbes, but puts him at odds 
with Pufendorf and Beccaria, whose consequentialism takes more of a utilitarian character.  
31 Ibid., p. 276 
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before it happens does more to ensure and guarantee happiness than does the 
punishment of criminals after the crime has occurred. He writes,  
The principle end of punishment is therefore the welfare of society; but as 
there may be different means of arriving at this end, according to different 
circumstances, the sovereign also, in inflicting punishments, proposes 
different and particular views, ever subordinate, and all finally reducible to 
the principal end above-mentioned.32 
 
 There is little question, then, that Burlamaqui follows the general trend of 
endorsing a deterrent view of punishment’s purpose and justification. Despite the 
differences between his work and that of Grotius and Locke, he nevertheless proposes a 
very similar picture of punishment: a natural right of all persons in the state of nature, 
possible in civil society only in light of this natural right, and justified in a broadly 
deterrent manner. 
 
2.2 Punishment as a State Construction: The Strict Contractarians 
 As we have seen, early modern political philosophy saw a strong tradition of 
natural law theorists asserting the existence and propriety of punishment outside of, or 
at least independently of, the state and its laws. In addition, the thinkers of this tradition 
were prone to positing specific, normative purposes of these laws, originating in the 
author of these laws—God himself. At the same time, however, other philosophers 
proposed a different understanding of the origins of punishment. In particular, they saw 
punishment as a construction of states; as a result, punishment by definition became 
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impossible without codified laws and an established authority whose job it was to 
enforce these laws. 
 Within this broad group of philosophers who saw punishment as a state 
construction, I will be drawing a significant division. On the one hand are those who 
view all of the purposes, ends, and features of states – including the institution of 
punishment – to be derived entirely from the social contract and the rational self-interest 
of the contractors themselves. On the other hand are those who hold the state to have 
some normative role, and, as such, it has specific ends that any ideal state must meet. In 
the following section, I will be focusing on the first group: the strict contractarians. 
 
Pufendorf 
 The first example of the strict contractarian view that I will be discussing is 
Samuel von Pufendorf. Pufendorf was an extremely prominent and influential jurist and 
political philosopher whose work in the natural law tradition directly inspired much of 
the work of later natural law and social contract theorists. Although his work On the 
Duty of Man and Citizen slightly postdates Hobbes’s masterpiece Leviathan –the next text I 
will be discussing – I think there is good reason to consider Pufendorf first: namely, his 
views are more clearly in line with traditional ways of thinking about natural law and 
the state. While Hobbes’s views are undoubtedly revolutionary in a number of ways, 
Pufendorf’s more closely resemble those I analyzed above. His break from the view that 
punishment is a natural right, therefore, is decidedly more nuanced and can be seen as 
symbolically linking the positions of Grotius and Hobbes.  
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 Pufendorf is clear that the state of nature is not a morally neutral world. Rather, 
it is one in which humans are still bound by a great number of obligations. These 
obligations can be directed at oneself, one’s fellow humans, or God, but all obligations in 
the state of nature, regardless of to whom they are directed, originate from God. This is 
owing to Pufendorf’s claim that obligation requires a superior who has both just 
authority over us and the power to punish when that authority is ignored.33 In the state 
of nature, no one has either of these necessary powers over us other than God. As such, 
punishment of human beings by human beings is impossible. Although it is likely that 
individuals would still engage in coercive or violent actions with the goal of ‘punishing’ 
the target of their actions, these behaviors would not constitute proper, justified 
punishment. 
 It is important to note, however, that among the obligations humans have in the 
state of nature, there is no duty to enter into civil society or to found a state. True, 
Pufendorf thinks that there are very good reasons for us to enter a state; without it, we 
are helpless and powerless to prevent others from violating their oaths and betraying 
us.34 These prudential reasons, however, are the only ones he offers for the reason why 
persons or communities give up their natural liberty and join into lawful states. 
Remaining in the state of nature, while foolish, would not be in violation of a moral 
duty. He writes, 
It is not enough to say here that man is drawn to civil society [societas civilus] 
by nature herself, so that he cannot and will not live without it. For man is 
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34 Ibid., p. 130 
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obviously an animal that loves himself and his own advantage in the highest 
degree. It is undoubtedly therefore necessary that in freely aspiring to civil 
society he has his eye on some advantage coming to himself from it.35 
 
 He continues, 
Therefore the true and principle cause why heads of households abandoned 
their natural liberty and had recourse to the constitution of states was to build 
protection around themselves against the evils that threaten man from 
man….Respect for that law [of nature] cannot guarantee a life in natural 
liberty with fair security.36 
 
 Although natural law should regulate the behavior of human beings in their 
natural state of liberty, it cannot be relied on to do so. Part of the reason that it cannot 
properly constrain our action, Pufendorf holds, is that natural law cannot truly be 
enforced. As we saw above, in the state of nature no one has the appropriate authority to 
enforce the law of nature except God. Unfortunately, any punishments that God hands 
down come after death, and therefore are not effective at deterring humans from 
violating the law. Likewise, there are great obstacles to trusting others given that no one 
has the ability to punish those who break their word and betray others’ trust. 
 For pragmatic reasons – the advantages of peace and security from harm – we 
must have a sovereign capable of enforcing the law and compelling individuals to 
follow through on their agreements and contracts. The method of this enforcement is 
punishment and the threat thereof.37 
 To summarize, then, Pufendorf holds that people agree to leave the state of 
nature and enter civil society for the purpose of ensuring the security of their persons 
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and property. The method by which the state accomplishes this end is through the 
threats of punishment and the actual performance of such punishment when the 
necessary conditions are met. This punishment – violence committed by the sovereign 
against the citizens – is justified on the grounds that the original contractors would 
consent to it as a necessary means of achieving the state’s purpose.38   
 We can look to other passages in which Pufendorf confirms that punishment is 
justified as means of ensuring the benefits of civil society. “Just as penalties should not 
be imposed except in the public interest, so the public interest should govern the extent 
of the penalties. In this way the citizens’ sufferings will not outweigh the state’s gain.”39 
He also states that when punishing, the state must consider “not only what evil was 
done, but also what good may come from its punishment…. The real aim of punishment 
by human beings is the prevention of attacks and injuries.”40 Punishment can satisfy this 
aim in multiple ways. It can change the individual criminal by making her or him less 
likely to commit future crimes (either through reformation of the criminal’s character or 
– as is more likely what Pufendorf intended – by showing the criminal that she or he 
cannot get away with such wrongdoing); it can effectively deter other potential 
criminals from engaging in illegal activity, for fear of suffering a similar fate; and it can 
protect the general welfare by removing (either temporarily or, in the case of capital 
punishment, permanently) a threat from the populace. All three of these goods can be 
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achieved simultaneously, and all three are specifically deterrent motivations for 
punishing criminal activity. 
 Are there any indications that Pufendorf might have included some retributive 
elements in his theory of punishment? He does include as a criterion of punishment the 
following: “A Punishment is an evil one suffers, inflicted in return for an evil one has 
done; in other words, some painful evil imposed by an authority as a means of coercion 
in view of a past offense.”41 This passage has a clearly retributive character, but before 
we conclude that Pufendorf’s position is an incoherent mixture of different justifications, 
let us pause to examine what exactly his statements entail. He says that punishment is 
“inflicted in return for an evil one has done.” The best way to make sense of this is not as 
a justification for the use of force, but as a specification of in what situations or against 
whom the use of force is appropriate. By interpreting this passage as a statement about 
who is liable for punishment, we are capable of accommodating the backward-looking 
components of Pufendorf’s view without contradicting the largely forward-looking 
nature of his position and the arguments he gives in support of it. 
 Pufendorf, then, seems to offer the following theory of punishment. Coercive 
force is justified on the part of the state on deterrent grounds. The appropriate target of 
punishment – who is liable – is fixed retributively, while the amount of punishment 
seems to depend on deterrent considerations. Pufendorf has nothing to say on the 
subject of the method of punishment, but given natural law theorists’ pervasive use of 
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“proportionality” to mean eye-for-an-eye style lex talionis, it would not be surprising if 
the method of punishment should emulate the crime committed, up to a point. If this is 
correct, it would imply a retributive means of fixing the method of punishment. Despite 
being grounded on a purely contractarian foundation, Pufendorf’s theory of punishment 
ends up resembling a popular option from the natural law tradition discussed above: a 
mixed theory with a deterrent justification. 
 
Hobbes 
 Roughly contemporaneous with Pufendorf’s work, Thomas Hobbes published 
his masterpiece in social contract political theory, Leviathan. 42 In many ways, Hobbes 
represents the clearest early modern example of the strict contractarian position, 
although the position he stakes out on the subject of punishment is decidedly unique. 
His pure focus on rational self-interest, coupled with his rejection of any kind of 
normativity outside of the state, means that he does not recognize the need to justify the 
sovereign’s use of coercive force in the way that other political philosophers do. 
 Despite his prevalence within the natural law tradition, Pufendorf still advocated 
a version of the strict contractarian view. This comes from his unorthodox view that 
natural law, though existent and normative, does not confer to humans any right to 
punish. Hobbes, on the other hand, starts out by taking the very concept of a natural law 
much less literally than his peers. While he uses some of the language, he is not 
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committed to many of the core positions that are customarily associated with the natural 
law tradition. 
 In Leviathan, the concept of a law of nature is dramatically different from the way 
it is used by thinkers like Grotius, Locke, and even Pufendorf. While these other natural 
law theorists hold such laws to be a normative, Hobbes takes laws of nature to be little 
more than the products of human, prudential reasoning.43 Given that we all have certain 
basic needs, he argues, and given the state of nature’s rather unpleasant character, it is 
merely a matter of empirical fact that all humans would prefer to live in a state. In order 
for that to happen, certain conditions must be met. Reason, conceived of as a tool for 
means-ends calculations, tells us what these conditions are and how to meet them. This 
last step – how to meet the necessary conditions for escape from the state of nature – are 
Hobbes’s laws of nature. They are purely a product of the human mind. 
 Given these commitments, it is not difficult to see why Hobbes views the 
purpose of the state to be determined merely as a matter of rational self-interest. We 
come to the state as a means of satisfying personal needs to security. The only reasons 
why the contractors agree to give up some of their liberty and create a state are self-
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interested ones. While one could dispute the empirical claims that Hobbes makes about 
the nature of human motivation or what specific policies the contractors would agree to 
in order to achieve security, it is clear that he envisions the state as containing nothing 
that does not arise from the actual process of the social contract. 
 When it comes to the subject of punishment, however, Hobbes’s position is not 
dramatically different from Pufendorf’s. He also holds that punishment is only possible 
in a state with a recognized sovereign;44outside of the state, any attempt to punish is 
merely violence. Given his weaker stance on natural law, there is nothing morally wrong 
or unjust with such violence;45 it merely cannot, as a matter of definition, be construed as 
punishment. 
 Punishment, then, requires a sovereign, which in turn requires a state. On what 
grounds is the sovereign justified in the use of violence against the citizens of the state? 
Again, Hobbes’s answer closely resembles the one provided by Pufendorf: the 
contractors gave their consent to such acts of punishment in the hopes that this would 
secure a greater degree of safety of person and property than they had in the state of 
nature. The purpose of the state is to remedy the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short”46 character of human life in the state of nature. 
 Although Hobbes does not use all of the terms and language that have become 
familiar in our analysis of early modern theories of punishment, it is the case that he 
employs a version of the standard deterrent justification. His stance is quite similar to 
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Pufendorf’s: the sovereign is authorized to punish on the grounds that the contractors 
gave him this right in order to limit – and if possible, prevent – the kind of agreement 
violations that become crimes in a state. Although the sovereign is meant to punish only 
those that violate contracts, the motivation is not retributivist; the existence of 
punishment makes possible agreements, on account of the deterrent effect of the threat 
of punishment. Hobbes is clear that the contractors have no reason to care about 
retributive concerns, for if we are betrayed by another, there is a good chance we will be 
dead and unconcerned with retribution. Instead, the contractors want to prevent such 
defections from occurring in the first place. Although there are objections that could be 
made to the argument he gives, it is clear that such arguments make Hobbes’s 
justification deterrent. 
 In all other aspects of his theory, though, Hobbes differs quite dramatically from 
everyone else in this chapter. Given his commitment to absolutism and his belief that, in 
addition to punishment, justice is a construction of states, Hobbes essentially holds that 
any and all uses of violence by the sovereign are justified. There is nothing wrong with 
the sovereign’s use of force against those who have not done wrong. There are no limits 
that can conceivably be set with respect to what degree or method of punishment the 
sovereign can employ. Hobbes does hold that a good sovereign will not mismanage her 
or his state; after all, to do so would be to weaken her or his own position, thus opening 
the door to attack from other states. This, however, is merely a descriptive claim, not a 
normative one. 
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 Given that Hobbes essentially takes any and all violence by the sovereign to be 
legitimate acts of punishing, it might seem that his theory does not employ any specific 
justification. This conclusion, however, fails to account for the origin of the sovereign’s 
authorization to use force. The contractors do not hand over such authority without 
reason, nor do they hand it over out of a desire to see wrong-doers punished. Rather, the 
contractors give this limitless power to punish to the sovereign in the interest of security 
and the prevention of crime (construed here primarily as refusing to honor one’s side of 
a bargain). Even if the sovereign is not confined to using force in a deterrent manner, his 
or her authorization to use it in the first place arises for deterrent reasons. 
 
Beccaria 
 This tradition of strict contractarian reasoning on punishment reaches perhaps its 
most compelling statement in the work of Cesare Beccaria. He does not employ much of 
the language of the natural law tradition, as Pufendorf did, and therefore does not need 
to determine whether or not the existence of natural law could give rise to punishment 
in the state of nature. Unlike Hobbes, he does not embrace an absolute sovereign, and as 
such favors a much more constrained use of coercive force. His short, focused book On 
Crimes and Punishments, written with the aim of encouraging the Austrian Lombard 
rulers of Milan to reform their penal system, lays out a clear case for a deterrent theory 
of punishment and the limitations that go along therewith. His account is progressive, 
unabashedly consequentialist, empirically-minded, and, like the ones discussed above, 
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ultimately rooted in and driven by a specific conception of what the state is and what 
purposes it fulfills. 
 In describing the state, Beccaria uses language quite similar to the other social 
contract thinkers of his time. 
Wearied by living in an unending state of war and by a freedom rendered 
useless by the uncertainty of retaining it, they sacrifice a part of that freedom 
in order to enjoy what remains in security and calm.  The sum of these 
portions of freedom sacrificed to the good of all makes up the sovereignty of 
the nation, and the sovereign is the legitimate repository and administrator 
of these freedoms.47 
 
 The sovereign’s right to punish, then, is authorized as the necessary means to 
protect this repository of freedoms, for in surrendering their freedom, the contractors 
would have seen fit to give the sovereign the power to protect it. Any punishment that is 
not aimed at protecting the repository of freedoms is clearly an unjustified use of force. 
Beccaria goes beyond this, however, to claim that any punishment that is not necessary 
for or efficient at producing the protection of this repository is also entirely unjustified 
on the grounds that the citizens would never have agreed to give up such freedoms to 
the sovereign when making decisions about the social contract. The citizens, as 
contractors, would only have consented to the state’s use of the most effective and least 
restrictive means of ensuring the protection of the ceded liberty. In order for a 
punishment to be legitimate, then, it must satisfy conditions of appropriate end and of 
empirically demonstrable efficiency. 
                                                 
47 Beccaria, Cesare. On Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings. Ed. Richard Bellamy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 9. 
 62 
 What the contractors-turned-citizens have agreed to, Beccaria holds, is not that 
the sovereign has the right to use force against members of the state merely in light of an 
effort to violate the law (in Beccaria’s language, to steal from the repository of 
freedoms). They have contracted instead that the sovereign is to protect this repository, 
full-stop. If we are to punish someone for having violated the repository, it is only on the 
grounds that doing so is necessary to protect it from future incursions (or, where 
possible, to restore what has been taken, or both). Punishment, then, is justified solely by 
the claim that it will have the effect of deterring any future crime. 
 Beccaria writes, 
The purpose [of punishment], therefore, is nothing other than to prevent the 
offender from doing fresh harm to his fellows and to deter others from doing 
likewise.  Therefore, punishments and the means adopted for inflicting them 
should, consistent with proportionality, be so selected as to make the most 
efficacious and lasting impression on the minds of men with the least torment 
to the body of the condemned.48 
 
 While Beccaria mentions the need for punishment to be consistent with 
proportionality, the way in which he conceives of proportionality is quite different from 
a literal interpretation of equivalence between crime and punishment. He does not, for 
instance, endorse the idea that a punishment ought to be roughly equivalent to the crime 
committed in a vague, eye-for-an-eye sense. Instead, Beccaria argued that the 
appropriate amount of punishment was simply that which was required to outweigh 
whatever good was gained from the commission of the crime. “If a punishment is to 
serve its purpose, it is enough that the harm of punishment should outweigh the good 
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which the criminal can derive from the crime…Anything more than this is superfluous 
and, therefore, tyrannous.”49 
 In this way, he captures some of the same desire for literal proportionality that 
other, more eye-for-an-eye thinkers might advocate, yet there are some important 
differences that carry noteworthy implications. For Beccaria, the most severely punished 
crimes will not necessarily be those that are most terrible in the traditional sense of 
causing the most damage or harm. Instead, the crimes that will need the greatest 
penalties are those that confer the greatest good on the criminal and are therefore the 
most tempting. Of course, such an account has its own issues; for instance, how reliably 
must a punishment be able to deter criminals? How do we determine the relative 
attractiveness or temptingness of certain crimes? 
 While these are clearly issues that a state implementing Beccaria’s view of 
punishment would need to address, they are not insurmountable problems. Take, for 
instance, the problem of how much punishment is necessary to deter crime. We might 
ask: are criminal behaviors not already punished in Beccaria’s time? And yet, despite 
penalties, people engage in such criminal activity. Clearly, the punishments are not 
suitably effective at deterrence. Should we continue to make the punishments harsher, 
on the grounds that not everyone is deterred? But if this is the solution, then is it 
possible that we run the risk of going beyond what is justified, since the punishment is 
harsher than what is necessary to deter the average person? Beccaria’s response to these 
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set of problems focuses on modifying punishment, but not by making it harsher. 
Instead, he argues, we need only to increase the certainty and regularity of punishment. 
He writes, “One of the most effective brakes on crime is not the harshness of its 
punishment, but the unerringness of punishment….The certainty of even a mild 
punishment will make a bigger impression than the fear of a more awful one which is 
united to a hope of not being punished at all.”50 
 In addition to revising the justification and amount of punishment in a more 
deterrent and, he hoped, humane direction, Beccaria also tackled the subject of what 
kinds of punishments were permissible for state use. In other words, unlike Pufendorf 
and Hobbes, he does comment directly and extensively on the method of punishment, 
even if his comments are merely the imposition of a few limitations on what methods of 
punishment the state can employ. While most natural law thinkers had not commented 
on this issue beyond simple calls for proportionality between crime and punishment, 
Beccaria devoted significant energy to arguing against the use of capital punishment, 
torture, and excessively harsh physical or corporal punishments. As we will see, each of 
these arguments ultimately derives its force from his use of deterrence as the general 
justification for the state’s use of coercive force against its citizens. 
 On the subject of capital punishment, Beccaria gives several arguments. The first 
argument is one that goes back to the heart of Beccaria’s strict contractarianism: no 
contractor would agree to give up the power to end her or his life to the sovereign. In 
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one sense, he seems to be claiming the right to life to be inalienable: no one is capable of 
waiving such a fundamental right, meaning that the state cannot claim to have such a 
power. Not content with this claim, however, he also offers support in the form of a kind 
of rational choice theory argument: people enter civil society with the aim of collecting 
security of person and possessions, and no one would be foolish enough to give up his 
or her life in order to obtain such security.51 
 Based on this argument, Beccaria concludes that if the state executes an 
individual, it must be an act of war.52 The citizen must commit a crime of such a nature 
as to remove herself or himself from the state, or else one that threatens the very life of 
the state by its commission. In such a case, the state no longer executes a citizen, but 
instead engages in an act of war against an external enemy. This solution is not available 
in most cases, however; once again, we can look to the contractors to see that they would 
not consent to most crimes being ones that resulted in a loss of citizenship, thereby 
making execution a permissible crime. 
 He expresses a similar worry when arguing against the use of harsh physical 
punishments. He has in mind here particularly back-breaking labor or punishments that 
involve mutilating the criminal in some way. Not only does the use of especially harsh 
penalties for violating the law cause a society to itself become more violent,53 but they 
are not even effective. Recall the quotation provided above, concerning the relative 
effectiveness of harsh punishments versus extremely regular and reliable punishments. 
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Put simply, risk takers will still violate the law if they think there is a chance they will 
not get caught. Further, the institution of particularly harsh punishments will cause 
criminals to commit further crimes in their desperation to avoid capture and 
punishment. All harsh punishments do is increase suffering and violence without any 
demonstrable benefit, an outcome that is unacceptable to Beccaria’s consequentialist 
outlook. 
 Finally, he argues against the use of torture on similarly pragmatic grounds. The 
practice of torturing criminals, he holds, fails to achieve any desirable end. Not only 
does it fail on the same grounds as harsh physical punishments, but it also fails to 
achieve the special goal that was frequently given as a justification: the acquisition of 
information. When torture is used to gain confessions, admissions of involvement in 
past crimes, or accusations against other wrongdoers, Beccaria argues, the information 
received is highly unreliable. Those being tortured will say anything to make the pain 
stop. 
 Of all the thinkers examined thus far, Beccaria is the clearest and most self-
conscious example of deterrence. While many make retributive sounding claims despite 
their justifications, which rely on deterrent arguments, Beccaria approaches the subject 
of punishment with the goal of scientific precision. There is no difficulty reconciling 
various aspects of his position, and there is a great deal of internal consistency in the 
way in which he approaches practical methods of punishment. He demonstrates that as 
long as one is willing to accept the premises of the strict contractarian position, there is a 
perfectly workable way of constructing a theory of punishment available. 
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2.3 Punishment as a State Construction: The Normativists 
 The strict contractarians, however, are not the only tradition of thinking about 
punishment as a construction of states. There is a second sub-group of philosophers that 
also holds punishment to be possible only in the context of laws and executive authority, 
but maintains that we can know at least some of the features the state must adopt 
independently of considerations of what contractors would agree to. In some cases, the 
state’s purpose is set by human teleology: humans have a specific end, the state exists as 
a necessary tool to help humans achieve this end, therefore the state must be designed in 
such a way as to guarantee its effectiveness at aiding in the attainment of humankind’s 
end. In other cases, human beings have a moral duty to enter the state, as such a set of 
institutions are the only way to guarantee moral or rightful conditions, and therefore 
any state must have the right kind of makeup to ensure the  creation, promotion, and 
protection of these conditions. What both of these kinds of views share is their basic 
commitment to the idea that there are normative reasons for the state to exist and for 
humans to enter and remain in it. These normative reasons, in turn, tell us what kind of 
state we have a duty to create. 
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Rousseau 
 One of Kant’s most significant influences in political theory,54 Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau developed an account of the state and political legitimacy that emphasized the 
role that hypothetical, rational consent plays in determining the . While earlier social 
contract thinkers like Hobbes, Pufendorf, and Locke had never truly thought of the 
social contract as a document to be signed, Rousseau introduced in his On the Social 
Contract an additional degree of abstraction, according to which the social contract 
becomes more explicitly a deliberative standpoint to be occupied by political agents.55 
His approach – and, in particular, the concept of the ‘general will’ – not only contributed 
to Kant’s own views in political philosophy, but it has also continued to inspire theorists 
through to today. 
 Given the shorter, more focused nature of On the Social Contract and his primary 
focus on combatting inequality, Rousseau’s views on punishment are less fully and 
carefully detailed than are some of the other views we have explored. Nevertheless, 
there is enough material to situate him within the framework that I have been 
developing. While his theory faces some internal difficulties, its broad contours are 
similar enough to the ones we have previously explored: a strong deterrent justification 
underlies and supports his arguments for the permissibility of the state’s use of 
punishment. 
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 For Rousseau, the state of nature is not characterized by morally obligatory 
natural laws, promulgated by an authoritative God. He does suggest that justice flows 
from God, but that we are incapable of understanding it without the mediation of states 
and laws.56 Without them, he believes, like Hobbes, that a person in the state of nature 
has “a right to everything that tempts him and he can reach,” and that it is only after 
entering civil society that justice becomes a reality.57 This is not to say that Rousseau 
believed that the state of nature was a fully amoral condition, like Hobbes. Rousseau’s 
version of natural normativity might not include the concepts of duty-laden and law-
like constraints, but he does outline a perfectionistic ethics that direct human behavior 
toward the development of certain characteristic capacities and talents.58 Rousseau is 
also relatively unique for his time in holding that these capacities are largely socially 
nurtured. This is the reason I have classified Rousseau as a ‘normativist;’ his belief that 
only certain kinds of societies can provide their citizens with the necessary social 
conditions to achieve (or, at least, approach) the perfection that he holds to be the 
highest good of human life indicates his commitment to the view that the appropriate 
form and purpose of the state is guided by more than just the rational self-interest of the 
contracting agents. 
 Given that Rousseau’s conception of morality in the state of nature does not 
include ‘laws’ and strict obligation, it is no great surprise that he does not conceive of 
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punishment as being a natural phenomenon. Punishment might arise between 
individuals living in an inegalitarian, non-contractual society – of the sort that Rousseau 
discusses in the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality59 – but this kind of punishment 
would be inherently unjustified. Those punishing would be truly engaging in an act of 
self-defense or war, not punishment. As Rousseau states when discussing the supposed 
‘right of the strongest,’ the power to use force does not confer upon anyone a moral 
permission to do so.60 Given his concerns about the dangers that result from the loss of 
one’s independence, even submitting to the will of another for rational, prudential 
reasons does not confer upon them the right to use force to punish. 
 It is only be the specific, reciprocal process by which the social contract is created 
that individual people are capable of entering into the kind of social arrangement 
wherein real punishment becomes possible.61 Rousseau keenly points out that if the 
social contract requires that a people must give consent to political authority, this 
implies that the people exist, as a community, prior to the institution of political 
authority.62 The social contract, then, is not the establishment of a ruler, form of 
government, or even political constitution; rather, the social contract is the agreement by 
which disparate individuals become a political community together. Only such a 
community has the power to create a constitution or government, and it is only through 
such self-legislation that coercive authority can be exercised. When it comes to the extent 
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of the permissible use of coercive force, Rousseau’s answer closely follows Hobbes’s. 
Rousseau argues that only the “total alienation of each associate, together with all of his 
rights, to the entire community”63 can ensure that independent individuals can come 
together as a unified body politic. What this means, however, is that there are no strong 
checks – no inalienable rights – to keep the actions of the sovereign in check. True, the 
sovereign is governed by the general will, which aims unfailingly at “public utility.”64 
All this means, however, is that the state cannot adopt policies that cause useless harm. 
Besides this, the state has “an absolute power over all its members”65 It can, and indeed 
must, sacrifice the minority for the majority when doing so promotes the general 
welfare. 
 It is for this reason that Rousseau’s justification for punishment is best 
characterized as deterrent. The state punishes so as to decrease the number of future 
crimes against the general welfare. The sanctions imposed on any particular criminal are 
merely the acceptable costs of achieving this result. If a person cannot be rehabilitated, 
they can at least be made an example of, so as to decrease the likelihood of others 
engaging in wrongdoing.66 It is also worth noting that Rousseau includes an interesting 
statement about the appropriate amount or limitations of punishment. While he believes 
that the death penalty is not inherently problematic, he does suggest that it can only be 
used when the criminal “cannot be preserved without danger.”67 This indicates that 
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while deterrence is the central justification for Rousseauian punishment, it is also 
constrained by strong rehabilitative elements as well.  
 Rousseau does have a small amount of additional material on punishment; 
unfortunately, it introduces some significant problems for his account. In several key 
passages, he indicates that the commission of any crime, regardless of how small, is a 
violation of the social contract and grounds for the expulsion of the perpetrator. After 
this point, the state responds to the banished member as it would a foreign enemy who 
seeks to make war on the commonwealth. In effect, this position ultimately entails the 
elimination of the entire institution of punishment; all that remains is the state’s power 
to wage war. 
 This power is manifested in the way in which Rousseau envisions “punishment” 
as being carried out in civil society. He writes, 
Every malefactor who attacks the social right becomes through his 
transgressions a rebel and a traitor to the homeland; in violating its laws, he 
ceases to be a member, and he even wages war with it. In that case, the 
preservation of the state is incompatible with his own. Thus one of the two 
must perish; and when the guilty party is put to death, it is less as a citizen 
than as an enemy. The legal proceeding and the judgment are the proofs and 
the declaration that he has broken the social treaty, and consequently that he 
is no longer a member of the state.68 
 
 Although he uses the term punishment elsewhere in On the Social Contract, in this 
passage Rousseau reveals that he does not leave any conceptual room for any institution 
of punishment. Clearly, finding a citizen guilty of crime is sufficient for revoking that 
individual’s citizenship.69 If punishment is understood as the use of coercive force 
                                                 
68 Ibid., p. 159 
69 There is some ambiguity as to what Rousseau takes to be the cause of the loss of membership in the 
body politic. One possibility, which we can call the ‘revocation reading,’ is that the perpetrator of 
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against citizens in response to some violation of positive law, then it is clear that no such 
thing can occur in Rousseau’s vision for the state. One cannot be both a citizen and an 
appropriate subject of punishment; while one is a citizen, punishment would be 
inappropriate and undeserved, and once punishment is appropriate and deserved, the 
target is no longer a citizen. Instead, the violence visited upon the criminal is not 
conceptually different from the force the state would use against an enemy. 
 Rousseau’s theory of punishment is undermined by his premise that every 
violation of law is also a violation of the social contract. While he is not alone in making 
this kind of error, it is not an issue that Kant faces in his own political writings. The idea 
that every violation of positive law is sufficient to revoke one’s membership in and 
obligation to a state or community is not among the many Rousseauian elements that he 
incorporated into his views. Nevertheless, Rousseau is still yet another of Kant’s 
primary influences in practical philosophy who supported a deterrent justification for 
punishment.  
 
Smith 
 Aside from Kant, the eighteenth century philosopher most frequently associated 
with the retributive school of thought is Adam Smith. This is not without good reason: 
                                                 
crime has her or his citizenship revoked when she or he is found guilty of committing a criminal act. 
In this case, the loss of membership occurs as an official function. The other possibility, which we can 
call the ‘recognition reading,’ is that the criminal loses her or his membership as soon as the crime is 
committed. In this case, the court does not revoke a criminal’s citizenship; it merely recognizes that it 
has already been lost.  
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Smith’s theory of moral sentiments clearly establishes that violence is morally justified 
as punishment when it is met with or motivated by the appropriate retributive feelings 
from others adopting the perspective of the impartial spectator. This, however, is not all 
that he has to say on the subject; indeed, he also introduces another class of punishments 
that do not meet the criterion of an appropriately sharable sentiment of resentment. The 
sovereign can, according to Smith, make blamable and punishable those offenses that do 
not, in and of themselves, generate the requisite kind of affective state in the individual 
or others adopting the perspective of the impartial spectator. The sovereign has this 
power as it is necessary for the stable functioning of the state – essentially, for the sake of 
utility. I will argue, following Knud Haakonssen, that the tension between the 
retributive and deterrent elements in Smith’s theory of punishment are resolvable by 
demarcating the categories of individual, moral behavior and the just actions of states. 
 Briefly, the traditional account of Smith’s theory of punishment is focused on the 
sentiment of resentment. As opposed to other negative, hostile sentiments – like hatred, 
for instance – resentment is what we feel toward one who has done us wrong.70 Smith 
describes actions that cause us to feel resentment as having the quality of demerit – that 
is, of deserving punishment. Violent acts that are not motivated by resentment cannot be 
truly or accurately described as punishment. 
 Simply feeling resentment is not enough; the resentment must also be 
appropriate. In order for resentment to be morally appropriate, it must pass the same 
                                                 
70 Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. p. 69 
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test as all of Smith’s other sentiments: namely, it must be one that can be shared by 
another agent who adopts the perspective of the ‘impartial spectator.’71 While fully 
fleshing out all the details of the impartial spectator would take more space than this 
chapter can allow, for our purposes it is enough to understand that Smith describes the 
impartial spectator as a hypothetical perspective we take on when considering how we 
would view an action or situation that did not personally affect us in any significant 
way. Once abstracted away from our personal commitments, we would all have similar 
affective responses to the same kinds of behaviors or situations. To bring this back to 
resentment, Smith would argue that my feelings of resentment toward a person who 
attacked me without provocation would be the kind of resentment that anyone viewing 
the situation from the perspective of the impartial spectator could share. If I resented 
someone for accidentally and faultlessly stepping on my toe as I rushed carelessly 
through the street, then this would not be a sharable sentiment. The person in question 
would not deserve to be punished, unlike my attacker from the last example. 
 It is important to note before moving on that the above justifications for 
punishment do not take into account the utility that the punishment generates for 
society. While Smith does claim that the system of retributive punishing based on 
sentiments of resentment leads to a highly beneficial state for human beings,72 he 
explicitly rejects the idea that it is utility which justifies the punishment in the first place. 
He writes, 
                                                 
71 Ibid., pp. 17-19 
72 Ibid., p. 86 
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And with regard, at least, to this most dreadful of crimes [murder], Nature, 
antecedent to all reflections upon the utility of punishment, has in this manner 
stamped upon the human heart, in the strongest and most indelible 
characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and 
necessary law of retaliation.73 
 
 Here, Smith is claiming that our resentment is anterior to any considerations of 
utility. Presumably, then, an individual would still experience resentment, the impartial 
spectator would still approve of it, and punishment would still be justified even if 
resentment toward and punishment of a given wrong-doing were in opposition to the 
greatest possible utility. Smith has already established that our passions can run counter 
to utility.74 
 In addition to this resentment-based, Smith also offers another view of 
punishment that seems to conflict with his prior statements. Although it is true most of 
the time that there can be no punishment without the passion of resentment, this does 
not hold toward the end of Smith’s writings on punishment in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. In the clearest example of this alternative approach, he claims “When a 
sovereign commands what is merely indifferent, and what, antecedent to his orders, 
might have been omitted without any blame, it becomes not only blamable but 
punishable to disobey him.”75 
 This complicates the picture that Smith has been depicting. Up to this point, 
Smith’s view of violence held it to be only justified as punishment when it met the 
                                                 
73 Ibid., p. 71 
74 Ibid., p. 35 
75 Ibid., p. 81 
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affective standards that I have described above. Now, he seems to be claiming that the 
sovereign has the ability to declare an action deserving of punishment, regardless of 
whether or not it previously elicited such feelings. He offers an example of a situation in 
which the sovereign renders an action punishable: a soldier who falls asleep while on 
watch duty. The soldier’s inability to stay awake likely causes no direct harm, and no 
other individual can claim to be wronged by it. To put this into Smith’s language: there 
is no one who could claim to have the right kind of retributive affective response (i.e. 
one that others adopting the perspective of the impartial spectator would share) to the 
solder’s having fallen asleep on duty. We might feel some kind of disapprobation for the 
soldier’s actions, but not the kind that Smith has previously identified as being the basis 
for justifiable punishment. Nevertheless, he holds the sovereign as able to punish such 
an action. 
 What is at work in this separate class of cases? Smith offers us a clue when he 
claims that the traditional punishments founded on retributive sentiment and these 
special cases are “far from being founded upon the same principles.”76 Although he does 
not state directly what the principle underlying these politically necessary cases of 
punishment, I submit that Haakonssen’s account is essentially correct: the principle of 
utility justifies the punitive actions of states, as opposed to the sentimental, moral 
principles that guide the behavior of individuals.77 As such, there are actually two 
separate kinds of actions being described. Despite the fact that we call them both 
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 91 
77 Haakonssen, Knud. The Science of a Legislator. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp 114-
123. 
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punishment, the legal form of punishment bears no relation to and is not founded upon 
the punishment that is conceivably possible in the ‘state of nature.’ 
 First, we saw above that it is an essential feature of individual punishing that it 
be motivated by resentment. Furthermore, part of what makes resentment a discreet 
sentiment, distinct from hatred, is that when I experience resentment toward another, I 
want to be the cause of this other’s suffering. While my hatred can be satisfied if he or 
she merely meets with an unhappy accident, this does nothing to placate my 
resentment. Resentment can only be satisfied if I bring about his or her suffering. 
Similarly, if I share in another’s resentment, then I want her to be the cause of her 
target’s suffering. 
 This, however, is decidedly not how punishment occurs in a state. Indeed, the 
state exists in part to prevent this personal method of delivering suffering to others who 
have done us wrong. Instead, the sovereign is now directly and solely engaged in the 
process of punishment. All victims, regardless of how sympathetic their resentment is, 
must watch the state be the cause of the wrongdoers’ suffering. If state punishment were 
founded on the same principle that governs individual punishment, this would not be 
possible. There would be no state punishment. 
 The second clue we have to what different principles could be motivating the 
state’s different use of punishment is observable in the ‘laws of police.’ These are the 
kind of pedestrian policies regarding maintenance of the state that are clearly necessary 
for the smooth functioning of civil society, and yet are not the sort of laws that 
commonly strike one as concerning matters of justice. The only way to make sense of 
 79 
such policies, argues Haakonssen,78 is by conceding that the state functions on a separate 
system, independent of what the morality of individuals requires or allows. The state is 
not, contra the natural law theorists, a ‘moral person’” and is incapable of experiencing 
sentiments; thus, it is guided exclusively by an interest in the common good or utility. 
 These different principles also explain why Smith does not belong with the first 
group I considered, the natural rights theorists. Recall that this group holds 1) 
punishment is possible for individuals in the state of nature and 2) the justification for 
the state’s use of punishment is the same as the individuals’ in the state of nature. 
Although Smith seems to suggest that 1) is the case, he does not endorse 2). Punishment 
in the state of nature is justified by reference to the appropriate kind of moral 
sentiments. Punishment in civil society, however, is justified by its necessity in achieving 
the utilitarian ends of the state. As such, the kind of punishment that the state employs 
is itself a construction of state authority; individuals cannot legitimately punish on the 
same kind of basis that the sovereign uses. 
 This is true of not only the definition, but the justification as well. Given the 
affective requirements of appropriate individual, pre-civil punishing, we might 
conclude that such cases are indeed justified in a retributive manner. The interest of the 
state, however, is clearly a deterrent one. This aligns with the sentiments the impartial 
spectator has with respect to the sleeping sentry: we do not blame or think the sentry is 
deserving of punishment, but we recognize that the state has an interest in preventing 
                                                 
78 Ibid., p. 116. 
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such behavior. Insofar as this dissertation is focused on the institution of punishment as 
it occurs in states, it is this latter form of punishment that matters most for our purposes. 
And in this respect, Smith is clearly among those who hold punishment to be justified by 
deterrent concerns. 
 
Conclusion 
 Throughout this chapter, I have made the case that political philosophy of the 
17th and 18th centuries advanced a number of defenses of the state’s use of coercion and 
violence against its citizens. Broadly, I have divided these different strategies of 
grounding the right to punish into two main categories, distinguished by one feature of 
the definition of punishment they offer: namely, whether or not punishment requires a 
state. Despite the differences present in these two major positions, they are both united 
by a common theme: they employ a specific conception of the state that in turn requires 
their use of some form of deterrent justification of the institution of punishment. This 
deterrence is then buttressed by a variety other retributive and/or rehabilitative 
constraints and interests. 
 The dominance of this deterrent form of justifying punishment was a relatively 
recent development. While ancient Greek philosophy had been characterized by a 
number of rehabilitative justifications and the theologically-driven medieval period had 
favored retributive theories, the early modern period saw the rapid emergence and 
development of deterrence. This shift was largely inspired by new ways of thinking 
about the role of government and the separation of political and moral spheres. In the 
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face of rampant religious and sectarian wars, philosophers and jurists sought forms of 
political organization and justification that could place the state on stable, peaceful 
foundations. In the search for a version of civil society that could be reasonably accepted 
by all, these thinkers turned to states that refrained from explicit moral evaluations of its 
citizens. This new paradigm virtually entailed a shift toward preventive, efficiency-
oriented punishment. 
 Where does Kant fit into this picture? I have claimed that he belongs to the 
normativist tradition within the school of thought that holds punishment to be a 
construction of states. I will aim to prove this claim in the following chapter, but if it is 
granted for the time being, then we can already see that Kant fits roughly within the 
broad trends of his time. The originality of Kant’s practical philosophy exists within this 
framework; at no point does he attempt to develop a wholly new or radical approach to 
understanding, forming, or justifying the state and its relationship with its members. 
 In fitting in with the basic contours of his predecessors, Kant takes on more 
substance than one might think. The move toward secular, liberal states that unites the 
natural law theorists, the social contractarians, and the early consequentialists includes a 
shared assumption that states are not in the business of evaluating and responding to 
the moral character of citizens. Rather, states exist in order to preserve security, promote 
the happiness of their members, or establish conditions under which the members can 
develop as moral, progressive beings. In all cases, these aims are furthered by the 
effective prevention of instances of crime. The view that the state would have an interest 
in or even an authorization to respond to moral desert is both alien to this tradition and 
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highly difficult to accommodate. While Kant will want to make such an argument 
himself, it seems as though he has underestimated the degree to which the basic 
elements of political philosophy that he has adopted from his predecessors have closed 
the door on such a possibility.  
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3            Defining Punishment: Coercion and Right 
 
 The first task for any theory of punishment is to establish a definition of 
punishment. This will enable the theory to pick out which acts of violence or coercion 
count as punishment and which do not. While the justification offered for punishment 
will always be the most significant aspect of any theory, it is still crucial that we have a 
firm understanding of what kinds of actions, practices, policies, and institutions the 
theory is aiming to justify. In order to achieve a greater understanding of the 
philosophical issues pertaining to punishment, we must first have a clear picture of the 
phenomenon in question. 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Kant’s predecessors and influences defined 
punishment in a wide range of different manners. Some saw punishment as a coercive 
response to the violation of natural law, while others viewed it as a state-constructed 
institution that could not exist outside of civil society. Although Kant is occasionally 
identified as a natural law theorist,1 at least in this respect he differs from the standard 
natural law view; according to Kant, punishment is neither possible in the state of 
nature, nor based directly upon a power or right held by individuals in the state of 
nature. Rather, he consistently uses punishment to refer exclusively to an executive 
power of states that is only possible under specified civil conditions.2 
                                                 
1 See Mulholland, Leslie. Kant’s System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Pp. 10-
15. 
2 I also claimed that Kant belongs to the ‘normativist’ camp, meaning that he holds there to be specific 
normative requirements that necessitate the existence and shape the structure of the state. This aspect 
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 The goal of this chapter is to fully examine the conditions that must be met for an 
instance of punishment to occur. For Kant, this is a relatively high standard, as 
punishment can only take place within an institutional framework. I contend that Kant 
defines punishment as a coercive action, undertaken against a citizen of a state by the 
legitimate executive, as a sanction for the violation of public law. 
 In the first section of this chapter, I work through the various components of 
Kant’s definition, highlighting their textual support and any technical nuances in usage. 
Given that Kant does not offer a specific definition for punishment, this section aims to 
put together the various pieces that he leaves scattered throughout his work. I provide 
further support for this definition in the second section of the chapter. Here, I consider 
the division between duties of right and duties of virtue that Kant establishes in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. As I argue, the basis for this division centers squarely on the 
possibility of punishment for failure to perform duties of right. Finally, in the third 
section of the chapter, I investigate the subject of using rewards instead of punishments 
to incentivize behavior. Kant rejects this prospect – which he calls allurement – on the 
grounds that he conceives of law as coercive. As I show, he lacks a substantial basis for 
rejecting the use of reward to incentivize external compliance with the law. Instead, he 
should accept such a possibility as justified on the same grounds as punishment. 
                                                 
of his practical philosophy, however, will not play an important role until the next chapter. For more 
on why Kant is a normativist, rather than the more voluntaristic ‘strict contractarians,’ see Kersting, 
Wolfgang. “Kant’s Concept of the State.” Essays on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Howard Williams, ed. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 147-148. 
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 Regardless of his inconsistency on the issue of reward, Kant’s definition of 
punishment is clear, robust, and consistent with his underlying practical philosophy. He 
connects it up to his fundamental political and legal positions in a way that is both well 
supported by them and, in turn, mutually reinforcing of them. By focusing on 
punishment as a legal institution, deriving its authority from the general legislative will, 
Kant is able to situate punishment prominently as one of the distinctive features of the 
authority characteristic of liberal republics. 
 
3.1 Kant’s Definition of Punishment 
 At no point in his published writings on practical philosophy does Kant give a 
clear, direct definition of punishment. He does, however, give numerous indications of 
the primary criteria of the possibility of an act of punishment. Additionally, he has 
several more explicit statements in his lectures that are worth considering. Altogether, 
these elements paint a relatively clear picture of how Kant is using the term 
‘punishment’: a coercive action, undertaken against a citizen of a state by the legitimate 
executive, as a sanction for the violation of public law.  
 This definition has several discreet elements, each of which deserves 
consideration in turn. To begin, then, we need an account of what Kant means by the 
term coercive action, or more generally, coercion. In its traditional usage, coercion is 
associated with one party compelling another’s performance (or non-performance) of a 
particular action through the use of force, threats, or other non-rational means of 
compulsion or persuasion. Although coercion need not necessarily force the target to act 
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contrarily to her will, it has the capacity to do so. For instance, I might have been 
predisposed to perform action x prior to someone coercing me to perform action x. In 
such a case, I would still be coerced, and what would have been a freely chosen action 
prior to the coercion becomes unfree in some important respect. For this reason, coercion 
is typically thought to diminish the patient’s freedom (with Hobbes representing a 
notable exception to this dictum), and as such coercive acts are pro tanto wrongful.3 
 Kant’s view on coercion is in keeping with these traditional definitions, albeit 
characterized by his own specific understanding of freedom and the will. According to 
Kant, “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a 
universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with 
everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (6:320). This is what he calls the 
Universal Principle of Right (UPR), and it guarantees the right of each individual to 
exercise her or his external freedom in a way that does not violate any other’s right to do 
the same. This entitlement to the use of our own external freedom is the only right that 
individuals hold in the state of nature; all other rights are either derived from UPR or 
are legal creations of states. 
 Kant understands this external freedom as our capacity to set and pursue ends. 
By ‘set and pursue ends,’ Kant has in mind more than simply the ability to wish that 
                                                 
3 For more detailed accounts of coercion, see Gorr, Michael. “Toward a Theory of Coercion.” Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy. Volume 16, Number 3, Sept. 1986, pp. 383-406; Nozick, Robert. “Coercion.” 
Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel. Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, 
and Morton White, eds. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969, pp. 440–472; Pallikkathayil, Japa. “The 
Possibility of Choice: Three Accounts of the Problem with Coercion” Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 11, No. 
16 (November 2011), pp. 1-20; and Pettit, Philip. A Theory of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001. 
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something were the case. In order to truly describe a person as free to do x, it must be 
within his power to. While Kant holds this external freedom to be less significant than 
the radical, inner freedom that we all possess as beings with a noumenal dimension, it is 
far simpler to successfully appraise the manner in which it is used. As we will see in the 
next section of this chapter, whatever role metaphysical freedom plays in Kant’s moral 
philosophy, his political philosophy concerns itself with external freedom. 
 Arthur Ripstein argues that, for Kant, coercion should be understood as any 
action that limits freedom.4 He defines freedom as “independence from being 
constrained by the choice of another person,”5 and this is indeed the way in which Kant 
describes freedom at times (6:237). This definition works well in situations characterized 
by social interactions between persons. There are potential difficulties with this 
definition, however, that should be addressed. For instance, my capacity to set and 
pursue ends might very well be constrained by another making perfectly appropriate, 
permissible choices. This is a problem that Ripstein anticipates, and he has a very simple 
solution available: freedom is independence from being constrained by the non-rightful 
choice of another.6 When my neighbor choses to remove a tree from her property, her 
actions are in accordance with UPR and therefore rightful. Thus, even if my will is 
constrained – I can no longer sit in its shade, perhaps – my freedom is not interfered 
with or diminished.  
                                                 
4 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. P. 54. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 55 
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 Nevertheless, I think there are reasons for considering Ripstein’s definition as too 
limiting. Given that he has defined coercion as always involving the choice of another 
person, he is unable to classify a wide range of potentially constraining external 
conditions as destructive to one’s freedom. Imagine a case in which a person falls into a 
deep hole and is unable to escape.7 In such a case, the agent might well not be 
constrained by the choice of another, yet it seems strange to describe her as free. 
Alternatively, we might describe a legal or bureaucratic institution as coercing a person, 
even if no particular person ever constrains her choice. Being independent of others’ 
arbitrary choices might be a necessary condition for freedom, but I submit that it is not a 
fully sufficient way to characterize Kantian freedom. Instead, we ought to employ a 
more positive conception that focuses less on the arbitrary wills of others and more on 
the conditions for autonomy of the agent in question. This more fundamental definition 
would describe of freedom as the capacity to set and pursue ends, as it is this capacity 
with which being subject to the will of others interferes. This more basic definition also 
has the additional advantage of being able to accommodate the kinds of cases in which a 
person is coerced without having her choices subjected to the arbitrary will of another. 
 Coercion, then, is the action of another that constrains one’s external freedom by 
interfering with her ability to set and pursue her own ends. Presented in this light, it 
might appear that all instances of coercive action are wrong, as they violate another’s 
autonomy and most fundamental right. We should avoid this conclusion, though, as the 
                                                 
7 This example is inspired by Raz’s “man in a pit” case. See Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. 
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right we have to the exercise of our external freedom is only guaranteed provided that 
our action can coexist with everyone else’s external freedom, according to some 
universal law. If I choose to act in some non-universalizable way (e.g., I attempt to rob 
another by force), then anyone who prevents my action coerces me. This coercion, 
however, is justified in Kant’s eyes, on the grounds that coercion used to prevent 
coercion is perfectly consistent with the UPR. He writes,  
Resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and 
is consistent with it….If a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to 
freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is 
opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with 
freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is 
connected with right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to 
coerce someone who infringes upon it. (6:231) 
 
 There are, according to Kant, many forms of justifiable coercion and violence that 
take place between individuals, either within a state or in a hypothetical, pre-civil 
condition. Instances of self-defense, for instance, are appropriate ways of coercing 
another’s respect for one’s own external freedom – or, to put it another way, it is a 
hindrance to the hindering of one’s freedom. Among these instances of justifiable 
violence, there are even some that appear to be punitive. Consider two examples. First, 
imagine the case of a parent imposing some penalty on his child in response to the 
child’s impermissible behavior. Second, imagine the case of one or more individuals 
using violence to subdue and neutralize a person who has been harming others. In both 
these cases, some use of coercion interferes with a person’s freedom in response to a 
specific act. While the ends, motivations, and maxims of the ‘punishing’ parties might be 
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different, the actions seem to fall under the same general description. In light of this, we 
might be highly tempted to describe each case as an instance of punishment. 
 To call these examples instances of punishment, however, would be to deviate 
from the standard Kantian view. Although they are coercive, they are lacking in the 
other necessary attributes of punishment. For instance, in the case of both the parent and 
the vigilantes, the authority that is being exercised is fundamentally different from the 
kind of authority that a state holds over its citizens; it is this latter kind that is necessary 
for the existence of punishment. To fully understand the difference between a parent’s 
authority over his or her child and the kind of authority that enables punishment, we 
need to examine Kant’s concept of a ‘rightful condition.’8 Kant does not directly define 
the rightful condition, but he explains that it is the state of affairs that a functional legal 
system is designed to bring about (6:311). The term rightful condition can be interpreted 
in several ways, but throughout the dissertation I will be using it in its minimal sense, to 
mean the necessary circumstances for individuals to have duties of right, or legal duties, 
to their peers. While a perfectly just state would clearly be a rightful condition, less just 
states might possibly be rightful as well. There is no definite line between rightful states 
and those that are not, but we can nevertheless point to features that the former must 
have or almost always have. 
                                                 
8 For a full treatment of the rightful condition in Kant’s political philosophy, see Byrd, B. Sharon and 
Hruschka, Joachim. Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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 One of the key conditions of the possibility of a rightful condition, according to 
Kant, is the existence of a general legislative will (6:320). Although there are many 
possible forms of legislative arrangement within a civil society, Kant writes that 
“legislative authority can belong only to the united will of the people” (6:313). This does 
not mean that all legislative decisions must be made democratically, but rather that all 
laws – and the process that creates them – must be consistent with the rational wills of 
each and every citizen. This imposes certain constraints on the legislative arrangement 
and the kinds of laws it can produce; for instance, a true legislative authority lacks the 
power to create a law to which even one citizen could not rationally consent (8:304; 
6:329-6:330). In order for a rightful condition to possibly exist, there must be public laws, 
and in order for such laws to exist, there must be a legislative authority that arises from 
the general, united will of the people.9 
 All of this indicates that any laws passed by the united legislative will of a people 
must have several characteristics. First, they will be general. The generality of law is one 
of the features that distinguish it from an edict or decree. While a despotic king can pass 
limited, individual judgments on particular cases, a law must apply broadly. This 
generality of law has two distinct senses. On the one hand, these laws will be general in 
the sense that they must apply to all persons or classes of persons (e.g., citizens or non-
                                                 
9 There is some evidence to suggest that any state, regardless of its legislative makeup, will come 
closer to the ideal of a fully general legislative will than the conditions in the state of nature. Kant 
seems to support such thinking in his writings on the impermissibility of revolution – a subject to 
which I will return in chapter seven of the dissertation. Even if we were to grant that any state is 
better than no state, this still does not demonstrate that any form of legislative power is sufficient 
to guarantee the existence of a rightful condition. 
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citizens) without exception. No law can be made that only applies to specific 
individuals. On the other hand, public laws must be general in the sense that they apply 
in all circumstances. The law, by definition, cannot have exceptions or instances in 
which it does not command with authority. 
 In addition to their generality, public laws must also form a consistent system. It 
would not be possible, in other words, for an action to be permitted by one law and 
forbidden by another. For such a contradiction within the content of the law to be 
possible, the laws would necessarily have originated from a will that was not rational or 
governed by the right considerations. A true legislature, then, can only create laws that 
are wholly consistent with one another. 
 Third, it is a necessary feature of law that it be publicly known. There cannot be 
laws that are made in secret, compelling or forbidding unaware citizens from 
performing certain actions. The fact that one or more citizens might be unaware of the 
existence of some law does not invalidate it, but its having been legislated in secret does. 
It is possible that secret laws could still be rightful, but they could not obligate citizens 
with a duty to obey. 
 Finally, all public laws must carry with them a specified sanction for violation of 
the law. While contemporary legal philosophy is hardly united in its stance on 
relationship between law and sanction,10 Kant clearly expresses the view that law is 
analytically connected to the concept of coercion and sanction (6:219). As such, any law 
                                                 
10 For an example of the view that laws without sanctions are a conceptual possibility, See Hart, HLA. 
The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962. Pp. 20-25. 
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passed by the legislative authority must specify the sanction to be imposed for its 
violation. A state that had only laws and no sanctions would, according to Kant, be no 
state at all. 
 Having a general legislative will and the laws that are produced by it, however, 
is not enough alone to guarantee a rightful condition and therefore the possibility of just 
punishment. Even if the laws all contain sanctions, these sanctions are meaningless 
without an executive power with the authority to enforce them. Although Kant’s 
republican separation of powers clearly holds the executive to be subordinate to the 
legislative (6:313), he holds that there must be a separate executive figure to enforce the 
law (6:317). If the legislative sovereign also took responsibility for directly punishing, the 
governing authority would have descended into tyranny.11 While Kant is very clear that 
such a government must still be obeyed by its citizens, it would no longer represent a 
rightful condition. Although there would still be the appearance of punishment, it is 
possible that such executive actions on the tyrant’s part would not be true punishment, 
but rather merely the exercise of certain pragmatic rights of war against the citizens. 
 In addition to the need for a distinct executive, Kant also holds that the executive 
must be appropriately authoritative. Executive authority has two primary components. 
                                                 
11 In making this claim, Kant largely adheres to the traditional position in favor of mixed governments. 
He does not fully utilize the familiar arguments of this view, however; instead, suggests that the 
sovereign and the executive cannot be the same person, as the executive is “put under obligation 
through the law of another, namely the sovereign” (6:317). This claim only explains why the two must 
be separate, though, if Kant is granted the additional, unstated premise that the executive must be 
under legal obligation. The legislator is already either a) under no obligation, or b) under its own 
obligation. It is not clear, just from Kant’s statement, why the executive could not also be in either of 
these two conditions. While there are good reasons Kant could give for the necessity of keeping the 
legislative and executive separate, this one appears circular. 
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First, executive power must be wielded by an officially designated person or office. This 
might seem obvious, but it rules out the possibility of vigilante enforcement of the law 
as punishment. Only the legislative has the capacity to designate the individual or 
institution that will be responsible for imposing sanctions for the violation of law. 
Second, executive authority must be unified and strictly hierarchical. Kant thinks that 
there must be a single executive power, from which all other executive officials derive 
their authority. This is both practically necessary (to prevent conflict and civil strife) and 
conceptually necessary. Only a single executive figure will prevent an infinite regress of 
appeals from occurring (6:319). 
 As we have seen, Kant defines punishment as a coercive action, undertaken 
against a citizen of a state by the legitimate executive, as a sanction for the violation of 
public law. While a perfectly just state might not be required in order for these 
conditions to be met, they are only possible within a state that can, at the least, establish 
a rightful condition. Without such a rightful condition, there is no possibility for duties 
of right. In the next section, I fully explore the concept of these duties of right and their 
connection to punishment. As we will see, the very concepts of punishment and duties 
of right are inextricably intertwined. 
 
3.2  Coercion and the Division of Duties 
 The Metaphysics of Morals is famously divided into two major sections: the 
Rechtslehre, or Doctrine of the Right, and the Tugendlehre, or Doctrine of Virtue. On one 
level, the distinction between the two is easy to understand: the Doctrine of Right 
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corresponds roughly with what we now call political or legal philosophy, and the 
Doctrine of Virtue corresponds to ethics. This simple description overlooks a number of 
complicating factors, including what is—for the purposes of this chapter—a key issue: 
duty. Both the Doctrine of Right and Doctrine of Virtue include references to duty, and 
each describes duty in a different way. Duties of right, or juridical duties, require us to 
perform—or prohibit us from performing—a specific action, and we are liable to be 
punished if we fail to satisfy these duties. On the other hand, ethical duties12 are often – 
but not always – less specific about the particular actions that are required of us,13 and 
we are not liable for punishment from the state if we fail to satisfy these duties. 
 There are different ways of understanding how Kant draws the division between 
these two kinds of duties, each based in particular passages from the Metaphysics of 
Morals. I will be arguing in favor of dividing juridical duties from ethical duties on the 
grounds of a duty’s incentive: juridical duties allow for the possibility of external 
incentive, while ethical duties do not. Along with the other supporting reasons I will 
detail below, this reading of Kant is bolstered by the fact that this strategy for dividing 
the duties is the first one that he offers when introducing the concept of Right and 
Virtue. This strategy is in contrast with other traditional views that hold the division of 
duties to ultimately turn on the content of the duty. There are two possible kinds of 
                                                 
12 The term ‘ethical duties’ is frequently used synonymously with ‘duties of virtue.’ I am avoiding 
using these two terms interchangeably. Following Paul Guyer, I will be using ‘duties of virtue’ to refer 
to a specific subset of ethical duties. See Guyer, Kant. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2014, p. 279. 
13 As we will see, it is a mistake to think that ethical duties are always more open-ended (i.e., that they 
are imperfect duties). Some ethical duties – specifically, perfect duties to oneself – require specific 
actions. More on this below. 
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content that might be relevant to this distinction, and I will address them each in turn. 
Finally, there is a fourth approach to the question of the division of duties, represented 
by Leslie Mulholland’s work. According to this view, the appropriate way to separate 
juridical and ethical duties is to distinguish those duties that are associated with a 
correlative claim right from those duties that are associated with no such right. 
 The four possible positions on how Kant divides the duties—the one I will be 
defending as well as the three alternatives—all have a basis in Kant’s own words. As 
such, rejecting any position will require me to either explain why the view misconstrues 
what Kant says or dismiss some of Kant’s own claims as unsubstantiated. While the first 
strategy is preferable, it will be necessary at times for me to conclude that Kant has made 
a claim that he cannot support and that should be discarded. In these cases, I will be 
making such assessments in light of other passages in Kant’s work that either directly 
contradict the problematic claims or are, at least, strongly in tension with these 
problematic claims. While we might be tempted to find a way to render all four views 
consistent and coextensive, this simply is not possible given the material in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. 
 Kant first addresses the division of the doctrine of right and doctrine of virtue in 
the general introduction of the Metaphysics of Morals. He writes in Section IV (“On the 
Division of a Metaphysics of Morals”), 
All lawgiving can…be distinguished with respect to the incentive (even if it 
agrees with another kind with respect to the action that it makes a duty, e.g., 
these actions might in all cases be external). That lawgiving which makes an 
action a duty and also makes this duty the incentive is ethical.  But that 
lawgiving which does not include the incentive of duty in the law and so 
admits an incentive other than the idea of duty itself is juridical. It is clear that 
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in the latter case this incentive which is something other than the idea of duty 
must be drawn from pathological determining grounds of choice, inclinations 
and aversions, and among these, from aversions; for it is a lawgiving which 
constrains, not an allurement, which invites.14 (6:218-219) 
 
 Subsequently, he refines and clarifies this picture: 
 The doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are therefore 
distinguished not so much by their different duties as by the difference in 
their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with the law. 
 Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be external) is that which 
cannot be external; juridical lawgiving is that which can also be external. 
(6:220) 
 
 In the two passages above, Kant specifies a decisive difference between juridical 
duties and ethical duties. Here, we see Kant suggesting that the distinction is based on 
the possibility of external motivation to satisfy the duty in the case of juridical duties 
and its impossibility in the case of ethical duties. The reason for a division of this sort 
comes from the nature of what the duties require of us. Juridical duties require persons 
to use—or refrain from using—their external freedom in a particular way, namely in 
accord with the universal principle of right. Ethical duties, on the other hand, require 
persons to use their internal freedom in particular ways; in other words, to will in 
accordance with maxims that satisfy the conditions necessitated by the categorical 
imperative. Failing to will in the way that duty requires does not infringe upon the 
freedom of others, and as such a failure to will the right maxim is not a violation of the 
universal principle of right. Only those actions whose omission would violate the 
universal principle of right can be coercively enforced. 
                                                 
14 Kant’s rejection of ‘allurement’ as a potential motivation for compliance with juridical obligations is 
not particularly well defended here. I will return to this passage in the third section of the chapter, 
wherein I will argue that Kant gives us no reason why allurement and a comprehensive system of 
rewards could not be instituted along with a system of punishment.  
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 There is also a secondary, practical reason for limiting the use of coercion. The 
use of external force or coercion can be effective at bringing about compliance with 
juridical duties, but the same cannot be said with respect to ethical duties. Since ethical 
duties call for willing to be motivated by a particular maxim, no amount of external 
coercion can ensure that one’s will is appropriately motivated. As we will see shortly, 
prioritizing this reason for the possibility of coercion, rather than considerations of 
external freedom, results in a different background justification for the division of 
duties. 
 According to the view that I am defending, then, the duties are distinguished by 
their possible incentives. While ethical duties can only be satisfied by one incentivized 
by duty itself, juridical duties can be satisfied simply by the performance of a specific 
action; the motive of the actor is irrelevant. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
agent who satisfies her juridical duties simply to avoid punishment acts with moral 
worth. Although this class of duties are ‘satisfied’ merely if we perform the requisite 
action, they are still Kantian duties. As such, the agent who satisfies her juridical duties 
out of respect for the moral law still acts in the only way that is characterized by moral 
worth. This position is supported by a number of Kant interpreters, including Mary 
Gregor,15 Paul Guyer,16 and Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hrushka.17 Kant offers additional 
                                                 
15 Gregor, Mary J. Laws of Freedom: A Study of Kant's Method of Applying the Categorical Imperative in the 
Metaphysik der Sitten. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1963. 
16 Guyer, Paul. Kant. New York: Routledge, 2006. 
17 Byrd, B. Sharon and Hruschka, Joachim. Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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evidence for prioritizing the role that incentive plays in the introduction to the Doctrine 
of Right: 
Right need not be conceived as made up of two elements, namely an 
obligation in accordance with a law and an authorization of him who by his 
choice puts another under obligation to coerce him to fulfill it. Instead, one 
can locate the concept of right directly in the possibility of connecting 
universal reciprocal coercion with the freedom of everyone. That is to say, just 
as right generally has as its object only what is external in actions, so strict 
right, namely that which is not mingled with anything ethical, requires only 
external grounds for determining choice; for only then is it pure and not 
mixed with any precepts of virtue….Right and authorization to use coercion 
therefore mean one and the same thing. (6:232) 
 
 So far, I have presented quotations that clearly highlight the role that the 
possibility of external incentive plays in distinguishing juridical from ethical duties. 
These three passages are not the only ones that make this point, and I will be presenting 
more as I refute some of the alternative views of the division of duties. While I think that 
the incentive-focused view takes the best account of the whole of what Kant says, it is 
important to note that the above passages from the general introduction to the 
Metaphysics of Morals and introduction to the Doctrine of Right are not Kant’s last word 
on the division of duties. In the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant offers two 
related, yet distinct, explanations of how juridical and ethical duties differ. These two 
explanations correspond to the two content-focused alternative interpretations of how 
Kant divides the duties. I will present each of the content-focused views in turn, 
discussing how they relate to each other and why the incentive-focused view I have 
discussed is a better fit with the text than either of these alternatives.  
 The first passage from the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue that grounds an 
alternative, content-focused view first appears in section II: 
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[Ethics] cannot begin with the ends that a human being may set for himself 
and in accordance with them prescribe the maxims he is to adopt, that is, his 
duty; for that would be to adopt maxims on empirical grounds, and such 
grounds yield no concept of duty, since this concept (that categorical ought) 
has its root in pure reason alone.  Consequently, if maxims were to be adopted 
on the basis of those ends (all of which are self-seeking), one could not really 
speak of the concept of duty. – Hence in ethics the concept of duty will lead to 
ends and will have to establish maxims with respect to ends we ought to set 
ourselves, grounding them in accordance with moral principles. (6:382) 
 
 He goes on to elaborate further in section VI: 
Only the concept of an end that is also a duty, a concept that belongs to 
exclusively to ethics, establishes a law for maxims of actions by subordinating 
the subjective end (that everyone has) to the objective end (that everyone 
ought to make his end).  The imperative “You ought to make this or that (e.g., 
the happiness of others) your end” has to do with the matter of choice (an 
object).  Now, no free action is possible unless the agent also intends an end 
(which is a matter of choice).  Hence, if there is an end that is also a duty, the 
only condition that maxims of actions, as means to ends, must contain is that 
of qualifying for a possible giving of universal law.  On the other hand, the end 
that is also a duty can make it a law to have such a maxim, although for the 
maxim itself there mere possibility of agreeing with a giving of universal law 
is already sufficient.  (6:389) 
 
 These quotations, taken together, form the basis for what I will call the ‘ends vs. 
actions’ variety of the content-focused interpretation. According to this view, Kant 
distinguishes between juridical and ethical duties on the basis of what the duty requires 
of us. Juridical duties require us to perform or refrain from a certain action, while ethical 
duties require us to will a specific maxim or hold a specific end. According to this view, 
our juridical duties are determined by the universal principle of right, and the ends that 
are required by ethics are determined by the categorical imperative; we can only satisfy 
these obligations by being motivated to do our duty for the sake of the moral law. 
 There is a fair amount of overlap between the ends/actions view and the 
incentive-focused interpretation I am defending. For instance, it is clearly the case that 
one cannot be coerced into holding a specific end, and therefore any such duty to adopt 
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a specific end would belong to the Doctrine of Virtue. We can, however, be coerced into 
performing an action. On these grounds alone, then, it might appear that the ‘ethical 
duties as ends’ view is coextensive with – because it explains – the incentive-focused 
view. As we will see, however, there are noteworthy background differences between 
these two ways of dividing the duties, rendering it necessary for us to choose one or the 
other as the fundamental criterion for selection of duties into one group or the other. The 
ultimate criterion of selection will be the view that best fits with the body of Kant’s work 
and best provides the theoretical tools to make sense of the system of punishment that 
he erects. 
 This view – that ethical duties are duties to hold a certain end – is defended by, 
among others, Allen Wood.18 Wood begins his discussion of the division of duties by 
arguing directly against the position that I am defending. He offers what he sees as a 
compelling reason for thinking that the possibility of external incentive is not the correct 
site at which to draw the distinction between kinds of duties: not all duties of right are, 
in fact, coercible. He cites the so-called duties of equity and duties that a ruler owes to 
her people as examples of juridical duties that are nevertheless unenforceable and, 
therefore, incoercible.19 He writes, 
[Kant] thinks the relevant duties of right [duties of equity and duties a ruler 
owes to his people] are valid even when there are no enforcement 
mechanisms.  We therefore misunderstand the Kantian conception of “right” 
if we think of it as merely a philosophy of law and the state.  Instead, right is a 
system of rational moral (sittliche) norms whose function is to guarantee the 
                                                 
18 See Wood, Allen. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, and Wood, 
Allen. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
19 Wood, 2008: pp. 161. 
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treatment of humanity as an end in itself by protecting the external freedom 
of persons according to universal laws.20 
 
 Since there are duties of right that do not allow for the possibility of an external 
incentive as the motive for satisfying the duty, Wood argues, this cannot be the 
appropriate understanding of the grounds for the division of duties. 
 After making these negative arguments, Wood is left with the task of providing 
some kind of positive account of where we ought to draw the line between juridical and 
ethical duties. Part of the support for his positive account arises directly from his 
negative critique; if he has successfully demonstrated that the incentive-focused view is 
incorrect, then this gives more weight to the above passage from the introduction to the 
Doctrine of Virtue. In addition to these arguments, he offers a basis for his view by 
positing that ethical duties arise exclusively from the second formulation of the 
categorical imperative, the formula of humanity as an end in itself (FHE). The formula of 
universal law, he maintains, can only provide a formal “CI-procedure.”  In order to find 
any positive ethical duties, we must look to the FHE, which commands us to hold 
certain ends (i.e., our fellow human beings). He writes, 
The law that goes beyond the merely formal principle of duty has to do with 
the ‘matter of choice,’ namely with its ends.  In other words, the foundations 
of a Kantian theory of ethical duties are teleological.  The theory is based not 
on the inherent ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of actions but on which actions 
promote certain obligatory ends (our own perfection and the happiness of 
others).21 
 
 The ends that we are obligated to have are collected under the general heading of 
ethical duties, and they are ultimately reducible to obligations to treat the rational 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 162. 
21 Ibid, 166. 
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personhood in ourselves or in others with love and/or respect. Juridical duties, on the 
other hand, are not obligations to hold an end of respecting humanity, but rather an 
obligation to act in a certain manner.   
 I will address Wood’s negative arguments before moving on to his positive case. 
In the case of duties of equity, Wood seems to have misconstrued Kant’s position. It is 
true that Kant addresses the subject of equity in the appendix to the introduction to the 
Doctrine of Right. It is even true that he says of equity that it “admits a right without 
coercion” (6:234). We should not, however, conclude anything from this quotation alone. 
To do so would be to miss the fact that Kant’s aim in this appendix is to sort out the 
ambiguity that arises from the term ‘right.’ The idea of right to equity—or the right of 
necessity, which is also included in the same appendix—arises out of a ‘wide’ 
understanding of right, he says (6:234). This stands in contrast to the more narrow 
understanding that corresponds with law and the possibility of enforcement. Kant 
describes the ambiguity surrounding the two possible understandings of the term right 
in the following way: 
One sees that in both appraisals of what is right (in terms of a right of equity 
and a right of necessity) the ambiguity (aequivocatio) arises from confusing 
the objective with the subjective basis of exercising the right (before reason 
and before a court).  What someone by himself recognizes on good grounds 
as right will not be confirmed by a court…for the concept of right, in these two 
cases, is not take in the same sense. (6:236) 
 
 It is not difficult to see why Wood reads this section as supporting certain 
juridical duties as incoercible and therefore unenforceable. If one takes Kant to be saying 
that the wider conception of right is correct, then Wood would be right. It is not clear 
from this passage or even the appendix as a whole, though, whether Kant is endorsing 
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the wider or narrower understanding of right. Given this ambiguity, I think there is 
good reason to take Kant as saying that the wider conception of right captures 
something, but not a juridical duty; only the narrower conception actually corresponds 
to duties of right. After all, Kant repeatedly emphasizes the connection between right 
and coercion throughout the Metaphysics of Morals. For example, he states, “What 
essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right is that external constraint 
to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the former is based only on self-
restraint” (6:383). In this brief quotation, Kant describes duties of right as involving right 
in the narrow sense. In accepting Wood’s view that Kant is supporting the wider 
understanding of right, we would be forced to reject all of the passages in which Kant 
explicitly endorses a more narrow interpretation of right. If we followed this route, we 
would be left without a clear definition of what Kant takes right to be or the nature of its 
connection to coercion. This seems like a far more foundational aspect of Kant’s position 
than is its ability to fully address the nature of the ‘rights’ or equity and necessity. The 
preponderance of evidence, then, suggests that the appropriate way to understand the 
ambiguity surrounding the so-called duties of equity is as something other than duties 
of right. If they are not duties of right, then their incoercible and unenforceable nature 
poses no problems for the incentive-focused view I am defending. 
 If we accept that Wood is mistaken that duties of equity represent incoercible 
juridical duties, then he must rely on the ruler’s obligation to her people to make his 
negative case. As we will see, though, this example is also not as straightforward as 
Wood presents it. Based on his citation, we can see that Wood reads Kant’s Theory and 
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Practice as grounding the claim that a ruler has duties to his subjects that cannot be 
coercively enforced. First, it is important to note that there is a certain degree of 
ambiguity surrounding the term ‘ruler.’ Typically, when Kant speaks of a ruler, he has 
in mind the executive head of the state, rather than the legislative body.22 Whether Wood 
means the executive or the legislative, however, it does not seem that he can point to any 
clear instance in which Kant describes authority as having duties directly to the citizens 
of the state. In Theory and Practice, Kant seems more concerned with working out the 
limitations of the state’s legislative power. Indeed, he holds that any legislature that 
enacts a law that the citizens could rationally object to has overstepped its authority 
(8:297). This limitation, though, arises from what kind of power the state has been 
granted by the citizens, rather than specific duties owed to them. The state does not have 
the power because it cannot be given, not because the citizens exercise rights to 
constrain legislators. 
 Turning to the Metaphysics of Morals, however, we see that the idea of incoercible 
duties owed by an executive ruler to her people is even harder to defend. Given that 
Kant’s discussion of the division of duties occurs within the Metaphysics of Morals, it 
makes better exegetical sense to look here for Kant’s position on duties of a ruler to his 
subjects. Rather than taking no clear stand on the issue, as he does in Theory/Practice, 
here Kant clearly rejects the idea of executive obligations. “Now, from this principle 
follows the proposition: the sovereign has only rights against his subjects and no duties” 
                                                 
22 For examples, see 6:316-317 and 6:320-321. 
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(6:319). The very reason why there are no duties owed by a sovereign to his subjects is 
that no one has the authority to coerce the sovereign into the performance of such 
duties.23 
 In the case of equity, then, we saw the Wood adopts a particular reading of an 
ambiguous section. There are no other passages that support his reading, but a 
significant number that support the reading that there are no unenforceable duties, such 
as equity. While it is not possible to say that his reading is obviously mistaken, the 
preponderance of evidence appears to tell against him. On the subject of a ruler’s duty to 
his citizens, the outlooks are even worse. The closest Kant comes to endorsing anything 
like such duties is positing the view that the legislative body is limited in its authority 
and is only justified in passing laws of a certain form (i.e., those to which all citizens 
could hypothetically consent). It appears, then, that Kant is not committed to incoercible 
or unenforceable duties of the kind that Wood discusses. Without these unenforceable 
duties, Wood’s negative case against the incentive-focused view collapses. 
 With Wood’s negative case against the incentive-focused view undermined, we 
return to his positive arguments in favor of the view that duties are divided according to 
their content: specifically, ethical duties are duties to adopt a certain end. As we saw in 
the above passages, cited from the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, there is good 
reason to see Kant as making some version of this claim himself. Furthermore, without 
                                                 
23 This is not to suggest that the executive authority cannot behave impermissibly. If she refuses to 
carry out the laws passed by the legislative body, then the executive has so behaved and can be 
replaced. This is not a wrong in the technical sense, though, as it is not one that can be enforced or 
punished, and as such Kant rejects the idea that she has violated a duty. 
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the negative cases as contrast between the incentive-view and the ends/actions view, the 
two positions begin to appear perfectly coextensive. Instead of interpreting the principle 
of division in a way that leads to significant differences in classification, these two 
positions end up appearing to do little more than focus on different aspects of the same 
division of duties. 
 Nevertheless, there are several reasons for thinking that the possibility of 
external incentive is still playing a more fundamental role, even if both methods of 
division produce seemingly identical results. The first reason for rejecting Wood’s 
content focused view is that he construes all ethical duties as duties of virtue proper. 
While all duties of virtue are ethical, Kant is clear that “not all ethical duties are thereby 
duties of virtue” (6:383). Duties of virtue represent a specific subset of ethical duties in 
which the content of the duty is an end in itself. As Guyer writes, “The term ‘duties of 
virtue’ should be reserved for those duties that involve the promotion of the two 
necessary ends, but the term ‘ethical duties’ should be used for the broader class of all 
duties that may not be coercively enforced.”24 Wood, in other words, succeeds in 
dividing duties of virtue from all juridical duties and the broader class of ethical duties. 
If our aim, though, is to divide juridical duties from all ethical duties, then his account 
does not succeed. 
 Drawing this distinction more carefully allows us to better account for the 
otherwise perplexing presence of some of the duties that Kant offers in the Doctrine of 
                                                 
24 Guyer, p. 279. 
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Virtue. Specifically, Kant includes in the Doctrine of Virtue certain duties that have the 
appearance of prescribing actions. The duty not to commit suicide and the duty to 
refrain from ridiculing others are two good examples that the ends/actions view cannot 
adequately handle.25 These are still ethical duties, in that adherence to them is not 
coercively enforceable. They are not, however, duties of virtue. 
 The second reason for prioritizing the possibility of external incentive over the 
content of the duties in dividing juridical from ethical duties is purely textual. Wood has 
the passage from the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue to support his view, but 
nowhere else does Kant explicitly endorse this position. Indeed, there is even a little 
evidence to suggest that he does not conceive of ethical duties first and foremost as 
duties to hold a specific end. He writes, “Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be 
external) is that which cannot be external; juridical lawgiving is that which can also be 
external” (6:220, emphasis mine). By raising the possibility of ethical duties whose 
content is external, Kant seems to be suggesting that there are, or can be, ethical duties 
that are not merely internal duties to hold a specific end. 
 In contrast, the incentive-focused view is supported in the general introduction, 
the Doctrine of Right, and even in the Doctrine of Virtue. Again and again, we see Kant 
making statements such as “The Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue are 
therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties as by the difference in their 
lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with law” (6:220). He uses 
                                                 
25 Guyer, pp. 277-286 
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descriptions of this kind when first introducing the concept of juridical and ethical 
duties, giving us additional reason to think that this means of dividing the duties is truly 
the most important and fundamental. Given the weight of the textual support, it seems 
that the incentive-focused position is simply the stronger of the two. Coupled with the 
fact that such a position distinguishes between duties of virtue and ethical duties 
generally and can therefore better account for some of the duties included in the 
Doctrine of Virtue, this preponderance of textual evidence carries the day for the 
incentive-focused view. 
*** 
 The next major, alternative reading of Kant maintains that the division between 
juridical and ethical duties lines up perfectly with another important division of duties: 
that of perfect and imperfect duties. This view, which I will call the perfect/imperfect 
view, holds that all duties of right are perfect26 and all duties of virtue are imperfect. The 
categories of perfect and imperfect duties appear first in the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals (henceforth, the Groundwork).27 Perfect duties are those that we 
must satisfy, because their violation cannot be willed without contradiction; specifically, 
attempting to will the violation of a perfect duty results in a contradiction in conception, 
meaning that they are conceptually self-contradictory. Willing the violation of an 
imperfect duty is not self-contradictory in this way, but attempting to will in this way 
                                                 
26 Specifically, this view characterizes duties of right as perfect duties to others. 
27 Kant, Immanuel.  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Practical Philosophy.  Mary J. Gregor, Ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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still leads to a contradiction. In these cases, the contradiction is known as a contradiction 
in willing, and it arises out of a conflict between willing the immoral maxim and other 
ends that we all have as a result of the principle of rational willing. 
 Perfect and imperfect duties take on a slightly different character in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Here, Kant seems less concerned with the question of the kind of 
contradiction that results from failing to act in accordance with the duty. Instead, he 
focuses more on the specificity with which the duty prescribes the obligation we are 
under. Perfect duties, in this case, take on the character of obligating us to perform a 
specific action; there is no room for interpretation, and he claims there will never be a 
conflict between duties of this sort. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, prescribe a more 
general obligation that could potentially be satisfied in a number of ways. There is 
potentially some tension between various imperfect duties, and as such it is up to us to 
determine in what way we will satisfy all of our different imperfect duties. 
 Proponents of the perfect/imperfect view maintain that these categories are 
coextensive with juridical and ethical duties. Once again, the basis for this reading is 
clearly articulated in the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue.  Kant writes, 
 If the law can prescribe only the maxims of actions, not actions 
themselves, this is a sign that it leaves a playroom (latitude) the free choice in 
following (complying with) the law, that is, that the law cannot specify 
precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action 
for an end that is also a duty….The wider the duty, therefore, the more 
imperfect is a man’s obligation to action; as he, nevertheless, brings closer to 
narrow duty (duties of right) the maxim of complying with wide duty (in his 
disposition), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. 
 Imperfect duties alone are, accordingly, duties of virtue.  (6:390) 
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 Here, we see Kant rather clearly drawing the parallels between juridical duties 
and perfect duties on the one hand, and ethical duties and imperfect duties on the other. 
There is no doubt that, in this passage at least, Kant intends to demonstrate that these 
two different ways of dividing duties are equivalent or coextensive; there is, however, 
reason to doubt that this is what he should have said. As we will see, by making this 
parallel, he commits himself to the claim that all perfect duties are duties of right and all 
imperfect duties are duties of virtue. This claim is one that is contradicted by what he 
himself says elsewhere in the Metaphysics of Morals and in other published works. I will 
argue that there is good reason to believe his other statements, rather than to accept the 
proposed equivalence between the two kinds of division of duties. 
 Before examining this issue closely, we should pause to consider whether this 
reading is, in fact, a different view than the content-focused position that ethical duties 
are duties to hold ends. As I articulated in the introduction above, both of these two 
views take the content of a duty to be what determines whether it is juridical or ethical. 
Also, given that Kant lays the groundwork for the perfect vs. imperfect view 
immediately after spelling out the details of the ethical duties as ends view, it is 
reasonable to conclude that he meant these two criteria to be connected. Indeed, it is 
clear that in most cases, the two are directly related. The fact that juridical duties require 
or prohibit a specific action does not leave much room for interpretation or play; 
likewise, the fact that ethical duties require only that we adopt a specific maxim or end 
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tends to leave room for us to act in a number of possible ways while still fulfilling our 
duty. 
 To suggest that the perfect/imperfect view and the ethical duties as ends view are 
actually one position, however, would be to ignore important differences. For instance, 
one can imagine a wedge case that demonstrates the difference between the ends/actions 
view and the perfect/imperfect view. Consider perfect duties to self. As we will see, 
perfect duties to self –such as the duty not to commit suicide – are listed by Kant as 
ethical duties. The perfect/imperfect view cannot allow that there are these sorts of 
duties, whereas the ends/actions view conceivably can. In order to do so, Wood would 
merely need to argue that I do not truly satisfy my duty not to commit suicide if I 
desperately wish to do so but refrain merely from fear of the pain I will experience; 
satisfaction of such a duty requires me to hold myself as an appropriate kind of end. 
Given that these two views come apart in this case, it is reasonable to conclude that they 
are distinct and should be considered individually. 
 Having established the distinctiveness of the two content-focus views, I now turn 
to demonstrating the problems with the view that juridical duties are synonymous with 
perfect duties and ethical duties with imperfect duties. While my arguments against 
Wood and the ethical duties as ends view ultimately depends, at least in part, on a 
disagreement over how to interpret the textual evidence, the case against aligning the 
division of duties with the perfect/imperfect split is more straightforward. Specifically, a 
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few examples clearly demonstrate that this approach simply carves up the conceptual 
space incorrectly. 
 The first wedge case that demonstrates the problems with this view is that of 
perfect duties to self. The example of perfect duties to self that Kant offers in the 
Groundwork is the duty to refrain from committing suicide. Under this view, that would 
mean that the prohibition against suicide (and any other perfect duties to self) would be 
a duty of right. Such a classification, however, is textually contradicted by the catalogue 
of duties of virtue that Kant offers only pages later in the Metaphysics of Morals. The 
perfect duty owed to oneself not to commit suicide is literally the first kind of duty of 
virtue that he discusses. Given that this and other perfect duties to self are clearly 
included in the Doctrine of Virtue, it is fair to say that any strict equivalence between 
perfect/imperfect duties and juridical/ethical duties would require us to reject broad and 
explicit classifications on the grounds of a single passage. This kind of move would be 
interpretively irresponsible and thus cannot be maintained. 
 The second kind of case that indicates there are problems with the 
perfect/imperfect view is less clear cut, but still worth noting. Recall that the Groundwork 
introduces the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as a matter of what kind 
of contradiction arises out of willing the violation of a given duty; willing the violation 
of a perfect duty results in a contradiction in conception, and willing the violation of an 
imperfect duty results in a contradiction in willing. Most cases of violence – those that 
are not in self-defense – are prohibited by juridical duties, not ethical ones. It does not 
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appear, however, that willing violence against another person truly results in a 
contradiction in conception. It might clearly lead to a contradiction in willing, but this 
would only make it an imperfect duty. As such, the perfect/imperfect view would 
classify this kind of duty as a duty of virtue, despite the fact that it is clearly a duty of 
right.28 Focusing on the possibility of external incentive in determining how to classify a 
particular duty does not result in this problem. 
 Based on these objections, we can conclude that the perfect/imperfect view 
overlooks and is contradicted by important textual evidence. Although such a view 
might be grounded in the passage from the introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue, to 
take it seriously would require us to then dismiss the actual taxonomy that Kant offers 
only a few pages later. Even if we were tempted to do so, though, the issue of duties 
prohibiting violence would still spell trouble that the perfect/imperfect view cannot 
resolve. While it is seemingly true that all duties of right are perfect duties, it is not the 
case that all perfect duties are juridical or that all imperfect duties are ethical. 
*** 
 The third major view on what separates different kinds of duties from one 
another that I will be addressing focuses on a new feature of duties: claim rights. Instead 
of focusing on the incentive of the duty, as I do, or on the content of the duty, as Wood 
does and as a supporter of the perfect/imperfect position might, this third view is 
                                                 
28 This argument is similar in nature, yet different in conclusion, than one made by Allen Wood. See 
Wood, 1999: pp. 98-100. 
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essentially relational and holds that duties of right are those that involve a correlative 
claim right, whereas ethical duties do not involve any such correlative right. This is the 
position developed and championed by Leslie Mulholland. As we will see, this is a 
robust view that nevertheless ultimately reduces to one of the preceding three positions. 
While I think that his position most plausibly reduces to a variation of the incentive-
focused view, both of the content-focused views remain distinct possibilities for other 
versions of the claim rights view. 
 In describing his own position, Mulholland explains the nature of a claim: 
 Claims about rights are made to insist that one person may not 
interfere with the actions or conditions of another, without the other having 
performed a deed that, because of a law, allows interference.  This kind of 
demand cannot be made in a context governed by social interest or the 
common good….A system of rights requires that rules govern the 
interrelations of persons as equals, rather than promote the common good.29 
 
 A juridical duty, then, is one in which a citizen may be compelled to perform the 
duty by another citizen making a claim of the sort that is described above. An ethical 
duty, on the other hand, carries with it no correlative right; no one can insist that I carry 
out my ethical duties. 
 This manner of dividing duties appears at first glance to be quite distinct from 
the other three we have examined. When considering the question of why specific duties 
have claim rights associated with them, however, we begin to see that perhaps this 
approach is not as distinct as it first appears. After all, there are multiple ways in which 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 141. 
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we might conceive of why some duties are associated with claim rights and why others 
are not. 
 In the first instance, we might posit that juridical duties are associated with claim 
rights in virtue of the fact that it is possible to insist of others that they behave in a 
specific way. There are no claim rights associated with ethical duties, in this case, 
because it is not possible to insist that others have a certain end. As we see, then, this is 
an approach to the claim rights view that ultimately grounds rights in something akin to 
Wood’s ends/actions position. While others’ actions are the kinds of things about which 
we can have claim rights, others’ ends simply are not. 
 In the second instance, a variation of Mulholland’s claim rights view might 
achieve its support by relying on the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. In 
this case, the reason for the presence or absence of claim rights would be linked to the 
kind of obligation that the duty imposes on us. Given that a perfect duty specifies a 
particular action that ought to be performed, it is possible to make a claim in these cases; 
because imperfect duties prescribe only a more general disposition or group of possible 
actions, we cannot make a claim on another. If there is no clear act that an individual is 
obligated to perform, we cannot clearly claim a right that impels him to perform his 
duty. 
 Although the above reductions are possible for a claim rights view, there is 
reason to think that Mulholland’s own view collapses into an incentive-focused view of 
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the kind that I am defending.  In two passages that seem to support such a reduction, he 
writes, 
1) To determine what rights persons have, it is necessary and sufficient to 
determine which wrong actions it would be right for others to coerce anyone 
to omit and which wrong omissions it would be right to coerce others to 
avoid.30 
 
2) To mark off the class of duties corresponding to rights, Kant provides a test 
through which we can determine whether a duty is of this kind.  Such a test 
will also be a test for rights.  I put the principle which enables us to determine 
whether a person has a right as follows: A person has a right to something if, 
and only if, his having it or doing it is a condition under which the will of one 
person can be united together with the will of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom.31 
 
 In the first passage, Mulholland seems to clearly align his interpretation of Kant 
with the incentive-focused view. In the second passage, he goes further to connect his 
position with the interest in freedom that underlies and supports the incentive-focused 
view.   
 It might appear to be a strength that some version of the claim rights view is 
more or less consistent with the three different readings of Kant’s division of duties that 
I previously discussed. However, we should avoid this conclusion. The ambiguity that 
enables the claim rights view to appear consistent with the other three alternatives also 
makes it difficult to determine what kind of fundamental commitments the position has. 
Although it ultimately appears that Mulholland is relying on the incentive-focused 
approach that I am defending, the fact that his position needs the support of another 
                                                 
30 Ibid, 142 
31 Ibid, 143 
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indicates that dividing the duties on the grounds of their association with claim rights 
does not capture the fundamental difference between the kinds of duties. 
 All three alternative views, then, have significant textual or conceptual 
difficulties.  Although they are largely grounded in passages from the Metaphysics of 
Morals, we should consider the text as a whole when deciding how to weigh any 
individual passage. When we attend to the full body of the work, it is clear that the 
preponderance of evidence supports the view that duties of right and duties of virtue 
are distinguished by whether or not they allow for a duty to be satisfied by an agent 
with a motive other than respect for the moral law. 
 
3.3 Allurement and Reward 
 In the last section of this paper, I argued that the incentive of a duty is the 
appropriate grounds for deciding whether the duty belongs to right or to virtue. Ethical 
duties allow for no incentive other than the concept of moral law and duty itself. If we 
are motivated by anything else, we have failed to actually behave morally, thus failing to 
satisfy the obligation. Duties of right, on the other hand, can be satisfied when motivated 
by a wider range of possible incentives. Specifically, external incentives of aversion and 
allurement are admitted as permissible motivation. 
 Kant, however, is quick to argue that the only appropriate kind of external 
incentive is coercion.  He writes,  
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It is clear that in the latter case [duties of right] this incentive which is 
something other than the idea of duty must be drawn from pathological 
determining grounds of choice, inclinations and aversions, and among these, 
from aversions; for it is lawgiving, which constrains, not an allurement, which 
invites.  (6:219) 
 
 His claim, then, is that aversive incentive is the only external form of incentive 
that can permissibly motivate us to the performance of duties of right. The reason for 
this claim, though, is not as clear. The only justification he offers in this brief passage is 
that the nature of lawgiving is inherently constraining, and as such it should not 
motivate us through allurement. It is my aim in this section to examine this claim. 
Ultimately, I show that there is no good basis for positing a strict difference between 
incentivizing by aversive coercion and by allurement. Instead, we should recognize that 
the state could justifiably offer rewards for the performance of duties of right, so long as 
there were still punishments in place should one fail to obey the law. 
 Kant’s only argument on this point in his published works is the above quotation 
from the Metaphysics of Morals. Lawgiving, he says, is the kind of thing that constrains. 
We might reject his whole ‘argument’ by questioning this claim on its face; after all, the 
moral law is seen as no constraint on our will, as it flows from our own rational 
personhood. In the same way, the law is meant to flow from the rational personhood of 
the citizens of a state; no law is just if any citizen could object to it, qua rational citizen. 
As such, it is possible to envision a Kantian claim that the law of a state in the rightful 
condition is also not, by its nature, constraining. Rather, we are at our most free when 
we act in accordance with a law we give ourselves. 
 120 
 
 For the moment, however, let us accept Kant’s view: there is an analytic 
connection between lawgiving and constraint. The particular way in which the law 
constrains is by creating new duties where none previously existed. In other words, it 
constrains by imposing new limitations on the ways in which we may use our external 
freedom. Even given that the law is inherently constraining in this fashion, though, it is 
not clear that this tells in favor of the conclusion Kant draws – that legal allurement is 
forbidden. In what way does the threat of punishment constrain? While a sanction might 
force compliance with the law, the means by which it constrains is by modifying the 
expected outcome of one’s actions. In other words, the threat of punishment appeals to 
one’s inclinations in order to constrain. This understanding of ‘constraint’ differs from 
the way in which law constrains. While the latter constrains by creating new duties and 
obligations that are consistent with reason – just as the moral law constrains – the former 
constrains by altering the projected costs and benefits of a given course of action. In this 
respect, reward and punishment are identical. Just like punishment, reward aims to 
modify the expected gains and losses of a given course of action so as to bring about a 
specific result. While we typically think of it as being easier to forgo a reward than to 
accept a punishment, this is merely a difference in degree, not a difference in kind. 
  We might reject these parallels, however, and maintain that law is analytically 
connected to punishment in an inseparable way. Juridical law, unlike the moral law, 
might be presumed to necessarily have an associated punishment, as a matter of 
definition. Even still, it is still not clear why the use of legal reward for compliance with 
the law should be prohibited. The necessity of a sanction for every law does not entail 
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that reward for compliance is impossible; all it entails is that reward alone cannot meet 
the criterion of lawgiving. Provided that there is still a system of punishment in place 
that provides the necessary constraint as a last resort, his argument gives us no reason to 
think that there could not be an additional scheme of rewards for successfully obeying 
the law. Allurement, in other words, could be an acceptable incentive for the 
performance of our duties of right, but it could not fully replace punishment as the sole 
means of enforcing the law. 
 Turning from Kant’s published works, there are two passages from Vigilantius’s 
notes from Kant’s lectures on moral and political philosophy that indicate Kant was not 
always committed to the view that reward was an inadmissible motivation in the 
performance of duties of right. First, when discussing the various species of pathological 
motivation, he discusses two main categories: 
a. per placentia, sive per illecebras, though compulsion by something that 
pleases Is not in fact called compulsion; e.g., because it tastes so good. 
b. per minas, in regard to all disagreeable consequences. (27:522) 
 
 Nowhere in or around this taxonomy does Kant suggest that only the second 
kind of pathological motivation is appropriate for motivating us to perform our juridical 
duties. Rather, both are presented as essentially interchangeable with respect to their 
role in incentivization. At §38, however, he offers a similar taxonomy of the forms of 
pathological motivation, and this time he remarks on the different roles that these two 
forms play in motivation. In this second passage of note, he writes, 
The nature of duty does not allow of being coupled with the idea of reward.  
So reward can never be the motive of a moral act of duty, since the latter must 
be presented through the law itself.  On ethical principles, therefore, an action 
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undertaken in the hope of reward could never have morality, though it might 
well have legality.  (27:548) 
 
 If we are not careful, we might read the first sentence of this passage as 
supporting the claim that reward is incompatible with the concept of law. This reading, 
however, is misconstruing the terms being used. In this passage, Kant is speaking of 
ethical duty; acting out of an interest in reward is incompatible with morality. He clearly 
states, however, that such a motivation is not at odds with legality. As duties of right are 
concerned with legality and not morality, then this passage is further evidence that at 
one time Kant conceived of reward as a possible motivation to perform duties of right. 
Given that he wrote the Metaphysics of Morals after the delivery of these lectures, it is 
possible that he changed his mind on this issue. If his only reason for changing his 
position was the above argument about lawgiving constraining, however, then my 
analysis of that argument shows we ought to give preference to his earlier views. He 
simply offers no substantial basis for ruling out allurement as an acceptable form of 
external incentive. 
 Even if we accept that rewards of this kind would be permissible, however, it is 
important to note that the state cannot rely solely on them, to the exclusion of 
punishment. Kant famously describes his goals for conceiving of an ideal political 
system as constructing a state that even a race of (rational) devils could inhabit 
peacefully and rightfully (8:366).32 Even if devils might be inclined to satisfy duties of 
                                                 
32 Kant, Immanuel. Toward Perpetual Peace. Practical Philosophy. Mary J. Gregor, Ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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right in the interest of receiving rewards, it is certainly conceivable that in some 
instances, one could benefit more from crime than from the reward for obeying the law. 
In such instances, any purely self-interested individual would have no reason not to 
violate the law. If our goal is to ensure that even these immoral but rational beings could 
exist in a rightful condition, then, we must include a system of punishment in order to 
prevent them from violating the rights of others. 
 We might ask, then, what the use of reward is. If we still need to have a 
comprehensive system of threats and punishments conjoined with all of our laws, what 
reason is there for rewarding those who follow the law? The answer to this question is 
two-fold. The first answer is the more minimal of the two: my aim in this section has 
been to show that reward is a possible external incentive for the performance of duties of 
right, not that we must or even should have such a system of rewards. In the passage I 
quoted at the beginning of the section, Kant states that allurement is contrary to the 
nature of law; it has been my aim to show that, at the very least, allurement is consistent 
with the law in the presence of a system of punishment. 
 I think, however, that we can show more than the mere permissibility of 
allurement. Indeed, there is good reason to think that Kant ought to find that the 
addition of some system of reward for obeying the law would be morally and politically 
desirable. To make this case, however, I will need to gesture toward material that will 
not be fully unpacked until next chapter.  
 According to Kant, the state has an interest in promoting freedom. While he does 
not consider the use of coercion against the freedom of wrong-doers problematic, Kant 
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would have to agree that the commission of crime is undesirable in light of the 
hindrance of the victim’s freedom that it entails. It would be better from the perspective 
of protecting the freedom of citizens, all things considered, if fewer crimes were 
committed. A system of rewards for performance of one’s juridical duties would help to 
accomplish exactly such an end. While some would undoubtedly still resort to crime 
and still receive punishment from the state as a result, the amount of coercion the state 
would need to impose would decrease dramatically. The threat of punishment is meant 
to reduce the commission of criminal actions, but the addition of a second source of 
deterrence would only improve legal compliance. In addition, punishment represents 
two impositions on freedom: the crime violates the victim’s freedom and is wrong 
according to the universal principle of right, and the punishment of the criminal, 
although consistent with the universal principle of right and justified by its role in 
deterring future hindrances of freedom, is nevertheless still a hindrance of freedom 
itself. With a comprehensive system of rewards in place, both of these hindrances of 
freedom could be avoided. The would-be criminal would refrain from hindering the 
victim’s freedom out of an interest in being rewarded, and therefore the state would not 
be required to hinder the criminal’s freedom through the imposition of coercive 
punishment. 
 As a final point in favor of the use of a system of reward to incentivize the 
performance of one’s duties of right, Kant makes some noteworthy psychological claims 
in Collins’s lecture notes. He writes that, compared with the threat of punishment, 
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Rewards are in better accordance with morality, since I do the action because 
its consequences are agreeable, and will be able to cherish the law which 
promises me reward for my good deed; but I cannot so love the law which 
threatens punishment. Love, however, is a stronger motivating ground for 
doing the action. (27:288) 
 
 Although following the law out of hope for reward is no more a moral 
motivation than doing so out of fear of punishment, Kant takes it to be a psychological 
truth about human beings that constraining our actions in order to avoid punishment 
will eventually give rise to feelings of resentment toward the law itself (ibid). This 
phenomenon will not occur, however, when we constrain our actions to secure a 
reward; instead, such a case will cause in us feelings of gratitude toward the law. 
Resentment will make it harder for us to obey the law in the future, whereas gratitude 
will make it easier. Although this psychological claim might be open to empirical 
investigation and rejection, it at least indicates that Kant saw legal reward as not only 
permissible, but even desirable. 
 
Conclusion 
 Kant’s definition of punishment is well incorporated into his fundamental 
positions in practical philosophy. It reflects both his deep division of the spheres of 
moral and political philosophy, as well as the ways in which the latter is founded upon 
the former. By defining punishment as only possible as the product of an institutional 
arrangement within a rightful condition, Kant builds in strict limits to what counts as an 
instance of punishing. This enables him to identify a very specific phenomenon as 
punishment, which in turn makes it much easier to construct a coherent, unified theory 
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of punishment. As we will see in the next chapter, this specificity will be both a cause of 
innumerable difficulties and the source of the solution. 
 While we have reached an understanding of what Kant takes punishment to be, 
it still remains to be seen why he thinks that the government has the power to engage in 
the use of coercion of this kind. This question – the justification of punishment – will be 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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4                Justifying Punishment: 
        Deterring Threats to Freedom 
 
 Why does a state have the authority to punish its citizens? Immanuel Kant 
famously answers this question in a starkly retributive manner: the only permissible 
grounds for punishing is the immediate response to a prior act of wrongdoing, and 
justice is best served when the penalty resembles the crime as closely as possible (6:331).1 
Indeed, his strong support for a retributive justification for punishment has had such a 
sizeable influence on the history of punitive theory that Kant’s name has been, for much 
of the past two centuries, nearly synonymous with backward-looking, retributive 
punishment. The textual evidence that Kant held this view seems overwhelming; the 
available support for it within Kant’s practical philosophy, on the other hand, is deeply 
lacking. The few arguments Kant does provide demonstrate neither that retributivism is 
necessarily the state’s justification for punishment, nor that this justification would even 
be consistent and compatible with the fundamental, distinctive elements of his practical 
philosophy. In short, Kant cannot coherently defend a retributive theory without 
abandoning one or more significant tenets of his practical philosophy. 
 For Kant, the state is neither simply a means of securing individual rights set 
forth by transcendent laws of nature, nor merely formed according to the conditional, 
pragmatic choices of the self-interested contracting agents. The state is necessitated by 
                                                 
1 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. All internal citations refer to the standard Prussian Academy edition, volume and pages. 
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contingent facts about the world we occupy,2 but given this, its nature is partially fixed 
by the moral personality of its citizens. The state can create new rights and obligations, 
but it must do so in accordance with the basic moral obligations that individuals owe to 
one another, qua rational agents. Whatever justification Kant can offer for punishment, it 
needs to ground a theory that can reasonably subsist within his overarching conception 
of the purpose and role of the state. As I will argue, retributivism does not and cannot fit 
within this conception. 
 Rather than abandon the possibility of a truly Kantian theory of punishment, 3 I 
contend that Kant has the necessary resources to construct a theory that relies on 
deterrence for its justification. Specifically, the state’s function of determining and 
preserving the external right of its citizens requires the active prevention of future 
violations of such freedoms. At the same time, certain retributive constraints – such as a 
prohibition against punishing the innocent – can be incorporated as practical policy 
guidelines for the implementation and application of this deterrent institution. This 
approach, which closely resembles a Hart-style ‘mixed theory,’4 has both the ability to 
fully cohere with Kant’s practical philosophy and the virtue of preserving many of 
Kant’s explicitly endorsed claims regarding the nature and requirements of punishment. 
                                                 
2 For instance, we occupy a planet with finite space, limited resources, etc. Had we occupied a different 
kind of world or possessed different physical forms, the need for a civil state might be diminished or 
eliminated. 
3 This is the conclusion supported by Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” 
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Apr., 1987), pp. 509-553. 
4 Hart, H.L.A. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 
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 I am not alone in arguing that a mixed theory that ultimately relies on deterrence 
for the justification of the institution of legal punishment is the most feasible and 
internally consistent option available to Kant. This school of thought has gained 
increased prominence among Kant’s interpreters in recent years, owing to dissatisfaction 
with the arguments he gives and the tension they sense between retributivism and some 
of the most distinctive elements of Kant’s moral theory – in particular, the Formula of 
Humanity.5 The contours of Kantian deterrence were shaped largely by Sharon Byrd’s 
influential paper on the role of deterrence and retribution in Kant’s theory of 
punishment.6 Her argument – that the state’s interest in preserving itself provides a 
deterrent basis for the threat of punishment, which is subsequently carried out in a 
retributive manner – has inspired significant respect and a healthy following among 
those who study Kant’s practical philosophy. Arthur Ripstein features prominently 
among these followers, albeit with several slight adjustments.7 Although there are many 
sub-varieties of Kantian deterrence, those who justify punishment by reference to the 
state’s right or duty to preserve itself occupy a prominent position. 
                                                 
5 Examples include Hill, Thomas E., JR. “Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and 
Retribution?” Annual Review of Law and Ethics 5, (1997), pp. 291-314 and “Treating Criminals as Ends in 
Themselves.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik, 11 (2003): 17-36; Holtman, Sarah. “Toward Social Reform: 
Kant’s Penal Theory Reinterpreted,” Utilitas, 9 (1997): pp.  3-21; and Merle, Jean-Christophe. “A 
Kantian Critique of Kant’s Theory of Punihsment.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No.3 (May, 2000), pp. 
311-3338; Scheid, Don. E. "Kant's Retributivism." Ethics, 93 (1983), pp. 262-282; and Wood, Allen W. 
Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
6 Byrd, B. Sharon. “Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, Retribution in Its 
Execution.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Aug., 1989), pp. 151-200. 
7 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. 
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 Despite broad areas of agreement, I find this tradition of Kantian deterrence to be 
unsatisfying. By framing punishment as necessary for the preservation of the state, Byrd, 
Ripstein, and others expose Kantian deterrence to a number of difficulties. As I will 
show, by routing the justification for punishment through the preservation of the state, 
this standard approach to Kantian deterrence views all crimes as equally significant, 
diminishes the value of individual citizens – victims and criminals alike – and loses sight 
of the original purpose of the state. My own approach – Kantian protective deterrence – 
avoids these problems by highlighting the value of individual autonomy and the state’s 
role in protecting each citizen from any and all infringements of her or his right to 
external freedom. 
 
4.1 Kant on Retributivism 
 Despite Kant’s staunch commitment to retributivism, he spends surprisingly 
little time defending it. The standard accounts of Kant on punishment usually highlight 
either some Kantian conception of moral desert or Kant’s belief that a deterrent system 
of punishment would necessarily use criminals unjustifiably as a means to an end.8 As I 
read Kant, both moral desert and concerns about using persons as means play important 
roles in his justification, functioning together as interlocking arguments. His argument 
supporting moral desert is positive – meaning it is meant to demonstrate that 
retributivism is not only acceptable but morally required – while the second argument, 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Kant’s Theory of Criminal Punishment.” Retribution, Justice, and 
Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 82-92. 
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concerning the use of criminals as a means, is purely negative – meaning it attempts to 
show that no other justification for punishment can be morally permissible. While Kant’s 
positive argument fails on the grounds that it runs afoul of his foundational divide 
between the doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue, his negative argument is more 
successful. On its own, however, it does little to show that retributivism is justified. 
Indeed, it is even possible that the constraint imposed by this argument could be 
accommodated by non-retributive theories of punishment. 
 In his first argument, Kant makes the positive claim that punishment must be 
retributively justified. He does this by connecting the authorization to punish and the 
determination of the appropriate amount of punishment with the inner moral worth of 
the character of the criminal agent. Thomas Hill calls this view the “intrinsic desert 
thesis,” and I will follow suit.9 According to the intrinsic desert thesis, “Acts of certain 
kinds have as an intrinsic property that it is fit, appropriate, or ‘called for’ that the 
perpetrator suffer for it…It takes no moral argument but merely conceptual analysis or 
moral intuition to ‘see’ that immoral…acts make the agent intrinsically deserving of 
painful sanctions.”10 Kant’s first argument is intended to demonstrate the 
appropriateness of the intrinsic desert thesis. I call this argument the ‘inner wickedness’ 
argument. Kant writes, 
This fitting of punishment to the crime, which can only occur by a judge 
imposing the death sentence in accordance with the strict law of retribution, 
is shown by the fact that only by this is a sentence of death pronounced on 
every criminal in proportion to his inner wickedness (even when the crime is 
                                                 
9 Hill, Thomas E., Jr. Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002, pp. 310-362. 
10 Ibid., p. 325 
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not murder but another crime against the state that can be paid for only by 
death). - Suppose that some...who took part in the recent Scottish rebellion 
believed that by their uprising they were only performing a duty they owed 
to the House of Stuart, while others on the contrary were out for their private 
interests; and suppose that the judgment pronounced by the highest court 
had been that each is free to make the choice between death and convict labor. 
I say that in this case the man of honor would choose death, and the scoundrel 
convict labor. This comes along with the nature of the human mind; for the 
man of honor is acquainted with something that he values even more highly 
than life, namely honor, while the scoundrel considers it better to live in 
shame than not to live at all.... Since the man of honor is undeniably less 
deserving of punishment than the other, both would be punished quite 
proportionately if all alike were sentenced to death; the man of honor would 
be punished mildly in terms of his sensibilities and the scoundrel severely in 
terms of his. On the other hand, if both were sentenced to convict labor the 
man of honor would be punished too severely and the other too mildly for his 
vile action. And so here, too, when sentence is pronounced on a number of 
criminals united in a plot, the best equalizer before public justice is death.  
(6:333-6:334) 
 
 Here we find Kant explicitly claiming that when considering the 
appropriateness, the proper amount, or the correct method of punishment, taking into 
account the inner character and motivation of the criminal is not only acceptable, but 
even necessary to ensure that justice is done. This view is consistent with statements he 
makes in his lectures on ethics, in which the inner wickedness argument also finds 
support. He is recorded by Vigilantius as saying, “In punishments, a physical evil is 
coupled to moral badness. … This link is a necessary one, and physical evil a direct 
consequence of moral badness” (27:552). 
 The idea that punishment is warranted by – and its proportion determined in 
accordance with – inner wickedness contradicts the nature of the relationship between 
the state and morality that Kant has previously established. The state exists in order to 
make possible the free, moral interactions of human beings (6:312), but it does not have a 
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direct role in shaping the character of its citizens (8:290-291).11 There are several reasons 
for this: assessing another’s moral character is virtually impossible, changing another so 
as to bring about a more moral character is almost as difficult, and even if these things 
could be accomplished, entrusting the state with the kind of power is dangerous. 
 Kant accounts for this by specifying the state’s realm of concern as the actions of 
its citizens. He does this by dividing right and virtue. The basis for this division lies in 
the permissibility of enforcement of one set of duties (duties of right, or juridical duties), 
but not of the other (duties of virtue, or ethical duties). Failure to perform duties of right 
may be punishable, but failure to perform duties of virtue is not. Another central 
component of the distinction between these two classes of moral duties is that an agent’s 
success or failure to satisfy duties of right is entirely independent of considerations 
about her or his motivations, maxims, or character. One with a wicked character could 
obey the law and be unpunishable, just as one with a good character could violate the 
                                                 
11 There is a partial exception in the case of educating children. Kant does have an account of the 
proper approach to moral education in children (See Kant, Immanuel. Education. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1960). For obvious reasons, this account involves more than mere 
rational discussion and appeals to the child’s humanity. Various other factors, from the use of 
examples, the expression of disapproval, and the cultivation of obedience and a “longing to be 
honoured and loved” (ibid., p. 87). These methods of educating, however, are only permissible 
because Kant views children as significantly distinct from autonomous adults. Indeed, he expressed 
doubt that adults are capable of being trained by the same mechanisms as children (Buchner, Edward 
Franklin. The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant. New York: AMS Press, 1971, p. 268). Further, Kant’s 
writings all describe education as a process that occurs between parents, tutors, or governesses and 
children; it is likely that he would have resisted the idea of the state taking over as the primary 
educator. Nevertheless, the case of the moral education of children might still be instructive. 
Assuming that his concerns about state-guided education could be solved by mediating education 
through particular teachers, then it is clear the state can, and indeed should, aim to instill certain moral 
values. It is only permitted to mold the character of children because they are not fully rational, 
autonomous citizens, however; once a person reaches adulthood, such efforts would be both 
ineffective and an intrusive violation of freedom. I will return to these questions in chapter six, in 
which I discuss rehabilitation. 
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law and, in retributive language, deserve punishment. Arguably, one’s character is 
determined more by her or his performance of duties of virtue than right, and failure to 
perform these duties is never sufficient to allow for the use of external coercion or force. 
Even a basic understanding of the concept of juridical duties shows that punishment 
cannot be based upon the inner wickedness of the criminal. The state’s right to coercion 
does not extend to the character of its citizens. Punishment is not a response to the moral 
character or intrinsic desert of the criminal. Rather, punishment is a response to 
unacceptable and impermissible behavior. 
 One might try to find such a basis in Kant’s writings on the subject of the highest 
good. Kant’s view of the highest good is typically described as a condition in which 
people enjoy happiness in proportion to their virtue, and ideally they would experience 
a perfect degree of both (5:110–111). There is some debate, however, over the question of 
whether the converse of this principle is also true of his highest good; should people also 
experience suffering in proportion to their vice? If so, then bringing about the alignment 
between viciousness and the suffering of the wicked, as a component of the highest 
good, could justify the state’s responding to character and moral desert. 
 This view, however, has two major problems. First, it is not clear that attaining 
the highest good requires the suffering of the wicked; the preponderance of scholarship 
on Kant’s conception of the highest good suggests there is no such linkage.12 Even if we 
were to grant the interpretation of the highest good that requires the suffering of the 
                                                 
12 For example, see Silber, John “The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant’s Ethics.” Ethics. Vol. 73 
(1962), pp. 179-197; and Wood, Allen W. Kant’s Moral Religion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. 
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vicious, however, this would still not serve as a satisfactory justification for punishment. 
The reason for this is simple: even if attaining the highest good does require that the 
vicious experience suffering for their wicked characters and deeds, there is no indication 
that it is the job of the state to bring about this congruence. This is what I refer to as the 
‘hard problem’ of retributivism. In order to account for the state’s authorization to 
respond to the moral deservingness of some to suffer, a theory must explain how such a 
permission fits within the overall purpose of the state. According to Kant, the state’s role 
is limited to the determination and preservation of each citizen’s innate right to their 
exercise of her or his external freedom, as well as whatever rights they can legitimately 
acquire through interactions with other citizens. It exists in order to establish and 
preserve a set of conditions in which citizens can experience a maximally reciprocal 
amount of personal freedom. It does this through the enforcement of duties of right. 
Although this arrangement – known as a rightful condition – is a necessary precondition 
for human beings to achieve the highest good, it is not itself the highest good. In other 
words, the state does not exist to address defects in the character of its citizens. Kant is 
quite clear about the fact that any government behaves illegitimately if it attempts to 
legislate based upon what will produce the greatest happiness or good for citizens 
(8:290-291).  Likewise, the state has no authorization to attempt to bring about the 
highest good by attempting to arrange it such that every citizen enjoys happiness and 
suffering in proportion to her or his virtue and vice. 
 In light of the failure of the inner wickedness argument, Kant’s support for the 
intrinsic desert thesis is left without a sound basis. Consequently, without the intrinsic 
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desert thesis, Kant does not offer a justification for retributive punishment; he never 
explains why the state is authorized to retroactively respond to moral desert with 
coercive force. Even if we allow for the existence of moral desert as analytically 
contained in the concept of immoral activity, and thus that wrongdoers deserve to be 
punished, this does nothing to demonstrate that the state can or should respond to such 
desert. Kantian retributive punishment, then, remains wholly unjustified.13 
 Kant’s second, negative argument, on the other hand, is much more consistent 
with both his more foundational practical philosophy and his other statements on 
punishment. In this case, however, he intends merely to show that any other justification 
would be morally unacceptable. This argument, which I will be calling the ‘second 
formulation’ argument, makes its central claim on the strength of Kant’s second 
formulation of the categorical imperative, the so-called Formula of Humanity. This 
argument appears in several different places in Kant’s writings, but perhaps its clearest 
statement reads, 
Punishment by a court…can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society…. For a human 
being can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another or 
be put among the objects of rights to things: his innate personality protects 
                                                 
13 Samuel Fleischacker tries to develop an account of Kantian retributivism that relies not on the 
analyticity of wrongdoing and desert for suffering, but rather on the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). 
(Fleischacker, Samuel. “Kant's Theory of Punishment.” Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 191-212). According to his approach, criminals should be made 
to suffer the results of the universalization of their maxims. Thus, the criminal who steals should be 
made to live in a world without the possibility of property, meaning that he or she will be reduced to 
surviving as a slave of the state. It does not seem clear, though, that all crimes would produce a 
reasonable punishment when the result of the universalization of its maxim is applied back to the 
criminal. Furthermore, this account seems like a very different version of proportionality than Kant 
describes elsewhere. The most significant problem for Fleishacker’s theory, though, is that it still does 
not answer the question of why the state is authorized to make criminals experience the 
universalization of their maxims. As long as this ‘hard problem’ of retributivism remains unanswered, 
there remains a gap between desert (or impermissible maxims) and punishment. 
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him from this…. He must previously have been found punishable before any 
thought can be given to drawing from his punishment something of use for 
himself or his fellow citizens. (6:331) 
 
 Although the last line indicates that some non-retributive side-effects of 
punishment are acceptable, punishing with only a deterrent or rehabilitative justification 
in mind is not, as doing so would be using the criminal as a means to achieve some other 
end. Our moral duty to respect the rational personhood of the criminal requires us to 
avoid using him or her as a mere instrument to accomplish some other end. In deterrent 
cases, criminals are used as a means to prevent future crime; in rehabilitative cases, the 
freedom of criminals as rational persons and ends in themselves is violated in the 
interest of improving the character or lives of the criminals themselves. Both of these 
might be admirable goals, in a sense, but to act on them is to fail to take seriously the 
value of the individuals being punished. In using criminals to accomplish social goals, 
the state reduces the value of free, rational beings to the instrumental value of a thing. 
The only way we can treat criminals as an end in themselves, Kant says, is to punish 
them only on the basis of their prior act of wrongdoing—in other words, retributively.14 
 It is worth noting, however, that the fact that a criminal’s punishment generates 
some deterrent force – that is to say, causes the criminal herself or others to be less likely 
to commit a similar offense in the future – is not a problem for Kant. He is fully prepared 
to recognize that such an effect is likely to follow from acts of punishment (6:331). As 
long as generating such effects is not the aim or purpose of the punishment, however, 
                                                 
14 In the third section of this chapter, I will show why deterrent justifications for punishment need not 
necessarily run afoul of the FHE the way Kant anticipates. 
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then the criminal is not treated as a means. Deterrence, then, is an acceptable by-product 
of punishment, but cannot be a justification. 
 Unlike the inner wickedness argument, the second formulation argument is 
internally coherent and well-supported by more foundational elements of Kant’s moral 
philosophy. It cannot be ignored or rejected; to do so would be to suggest that the state 
need not follow the most basic of Kant’s moral laws. Any successful interpretation of 
Kant’s theory of punishment needs to explain how the institution of punishment can 
avoid treating criminals merely as a means to an end. Despite its strength, however, the 
second formulation argument is still limited in what it can show. It works well as a 
negative argument – it imposes a constraint that any interpretation of Kant’s theory of 
punishment must accommodate – but it cannot actually justify the existence of 
punishment as an institution on its own. Kant still needs some positive account of why 
punishment is acceptable. 
 The positive and negative arguments are meant to work in tandem. The inner 
wickedness argument is intended to show why retribution is justified, and the second 
formulation argument shows why nothing else can take its place. Removing the positive 
argument, however, leaves the theory inert, unable to actually provide a reason why the 
state is justified in using coercive force against its citizens. In some abstract, moral sense, 
those who behave wrongly might deserve unhappiness, in the same sense as those who 
are virtuous deserve to enjoy happiness equal to their virtue. But this desert means little 
if Kant cannot provide any argument for why the state is entitled to answer these 
deserts. 
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 This is the motivation for exploring the possibility of a deterrence justification. 
The very idea of Kantian deterrence might sound necessarily contradictory, and most of 
these efforts are pursued explicitly as constructive, rather than strict interpretation. 
There is, however, good textual reason to think that, at one time, Kant saw state 
punishment as justified by deterrent interests. In the lecture notes recorded by Collins, 
Kant writes, 
All punishments belong either to the justice or the prudence of the lawgiver. 
The first are moral, the second pragmatic punishments. Moral punishments 
are imposed because a sin has been committed…. Pragmatic punishments are 
imposed so that a sin shall not be committed; they are a means of preventing 
crime…. All the punishments of princes and governments are pragmatic, 
the purpose being either to correct or to present an example to others. 
Authority punishes, not because a crime has been committed, but so that 
it shall not be committed. But every crime, in addition to this punishment, 
has a property of deserving to be punished, because it has taken place. Such 
punishments, which must therefore necessarily follow upon the actions, are 
moral in character. (27:286, emphasis added) 
 
 As a rule, we should be careful about allowing material from the lectures to 
trump Kant’s positions in published works. Kant takes a clearly retributivist position by 
1788 with the publication of the Critique of Practical Reason,15 and no later writings ever 
support the view from the lectures. Further, even though the Collins quotation appears 
to rule out the possibility of retributive punishment by states (the fact that wrongdoing 
generates moral desert is a precondition for the permissibility of state punishment, but it 
cannot justify state punishment), it is merely posited, with no arguments given to 
indicate how Kant thinks such a view should be supported. This passage, however, can 
                                                 
15 Although Kant does not discuss punishment or even political or legal philosophy at length in the 
Critique of Practical Reason, he does allude to moral desert and retributivism. See 5:37. 
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still serve as a useful as a window into what Kant takes to be necessary for a retributive 
justification to succeed. Namely, retributive punishment must be executed by a moral 
being, whose interest in punishing is explicitly a response to moral desert. Given that 
Kant never argues the state is a moral person in the traditional, natural law manner, and 
given that he has contrasted this with pragmatic, deterrent punishment, it would appear 
that the only option left to him is to justify punishment by reference to its deterrent 
value. 
 
4.2 Standard Kantian Deterrence 
 While it might be possible to construct a more stable foundation for Kant’s 
retributivism,16 the majority of the constructive efforts in Kant scholarship have centered 
on the possibility of a Kantian deterrent theory of punishment. This is due, in significant 
part, to Sharon Byrd, whose paper on Kant’s theory of punishment17 is referenced by 
most subsequent supporters of some version of Kantian deterrence. It seems 
appropriate, then, to address the ‘standard’ deterrence readings of Kant by focusing, at 
least in part, on her position. The hallmark of her approach to interpreting Kant is her 
division of punishment into a legal threat of sanction and the subsequent execution of 
                                                 
16 Arguably, the most promising way of defending Kant’s retributivism would be to construct a more 
contractarian account of his political philosophy. If the state could be shaped purely by what the 
contractors agree to, and one could successfully make the argument that agents would only agree to a 
state that punished for retributive reasons, then the result would be a deeply retributive theory of 
punishment. Both the first and second premises, however, would be very difficult to impossible to 
reconcile with Kant’s other foundational political commitments.  
17 Byrd, 1989. 
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the sentence.18 According to Byrd, the punishment for legal wrongdoing is threatened on 
the grounds that to do so deters citizens from committing crimes; once a crime has been 
committed, however, the punishment is carried out for retributive reasons.19 This way of 
dividing up Kant’s theory of punishment is not altogether dissimilar from my own 
approach, Kantian protective deterrence. As I will argue in the next section, the 
deterrent value of the threat of legal sanction is the best justification for the application 
of punitive coercive force that Kant has available. 
 The difference between Byrd’s interpretation and Kantian protective deterrence 
is located in how she justifies the state’s authorization to deter crime. She begins her 
account by focusing on the special status of the state: namely, that its existence is 
necessitated as a precondition for other moral ends. This grounds both the state’s right 
to force individuals to enter into and remain in civil society, as well as the individuals’ 
obligation to do so.20 This duty to enter civil society is grounded on the necessity of 
property ownership. Briefly stated, she skillfully interprets Kant in the following way: 
while it is possible to have real possession in the state of nature, ideal possession (i.e., 
ownership without physical detention) cannot be possible, as there is no means in the 
state of nature by which to obligate others to refrain from using the remotely-owned 
                                                 
18 Ibid., pp. 152-153 
19 Ibid., p. 153 
20 The duty to enter into states is a strange sort of duty. On the one hand, it cannot be a duty of right, as 
such duties are only possible in civil society. On the other hand, if duties of virtue cannot be coercively 
enforced, then it does not seem as though the duty to enter a state can be ethical, as entrance into the 
state can be coerced. The solution to this apparent puzzle is that the duty to enter into states is indeed 
a duty of virtue, and specifically, a perfect one. The right the state has to force individuals to enter, 
however, is not correlative with this duty; rather, the state’s right is entailed by the state’s right to self-
protection. In other words, when the state forces an individual to join, it is not enforcing the 
individual’s obligation to enter civil society; rather, it is only defending itself from a potential threat. 
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object without violating their freedom in the process. Yet, Kant establishes the possibility 
of ideal possession as a synthetic a priori truth: although we do not know it is possible 
analytically, we can come to know its possibility by recognizing that ideal possession is 
necessary for the existence of human free choice (itself known to be possible and, 
indeed, existent). Given that ideal possession is both possible and necessary for human 
free choice, we are obligated to bring it about. In order to do so, we must first bring it 
about that a state exists and we live as members of it.21 
 Given that the state alone can perform this special function, it is necessary for 
states to preserve themselves by eliminating any and all threats to their existence. Crime, 
according to Byrd, is necessarily a threat to the continued existence of the state.22 As 
such, the state has not only an interest in, but also an obligation to prevent crime from 
occurring. The deterrent force generated by the application of punishment to criminal 
wrongdoing is precisely the means of accomplishing such prevention. 
 She argues that crime is a threat to the continued existence in two different ways, 
each of which warrants taking steps to minimize criminal behavior. The first way in 
which crime threatens the state is very literal and tangible: when citizens commit crime, 
they are lost as members of the state. She lays out her argument in the following 
passage: 
 Society’s right to punish criminal violations lies … in its duty, as an 
expression of the common will, to maintain itself. Since one can force every 
other with whom one comes in contact to leave the state of nature and move 
to civil society, by the same reasoning one can also prevent anyone from 
leaving civil society and returning to the state of nature. Kant refers to 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 173-180 
22 Ibid., p. 181 
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commutative justice in the state of nature as the ‘condition of war.’ In moving 
from the state of nature to civil society one subjects oneself to the common 
will which legislates and judges. Its judgments are enforce-able through 
legitimate force to secure the rights it decides upon. Only distributive justice 
in civil society can maintain peace and universal freedom. 
 Crimes are violations of law that ‘make the actor incapable of being a 
citizen.’  Only public crimes are ‘criminally punishable,’ and public crimes are 
those that endanger the security of society.’23 
 
 Her argument is straightforward and clear. The state has a duty to maintain 
itself, which entails a related duty to prevent its citizens from leaving for civil society for 
the state of nature, as this would bring about the dissolution of the state. Further, the 
commission of a public crime results in the loss of the criminal’s civil personality. If the 
state does not prevent crimes from occurring, then it will be allowing citizens to leave 
the state, by way of their criminally-induced loss of civic personality. As such, Byrd 
thinks the state is authorized to threaten the use of coercive force as a way of preventing 
such an eventuality from coming to pass. 
 Justifying deterrent punishment by reference to its ability to keep citizens from 
engaging in behavior that will strip them of their citizenship is a very indirect approach 
to the issue. Kant does describe criminal violations of law as those that make the 
perpetrator unfit to be a citizen (6:331), but to suggest that preventing this loss of civic 
personality is the justification for punishment is to lose sight of the other effects of an act 
of crime. Every crime involves the infringement on the rightful freedom of one or more 
citizens. The state has a duty to maintain itself because it is meant to prevent such 
infringements. Justifying punishment by reference to its duty to maintain itself, rather 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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than to punishment’s ability to accomplish the state’s end of preserving the freedom of 
its citizens, introduces an unnecessary, extra step into the theory. 
 In addition, there might be deeper difficulties awaiting this strategy. For 
instance, it is not clear that preventing individual citizens from losing their citizenship is 
of great importance to Kant. After all, he describes a citizen as one who is fit to vote 
(6:314). In order to be fit to vote, one must be independent; Kant famously excludes 
‘dependents’ such as servants from voting, as they lack the necessary independence to 
truly exercise their own will, free from economic compulsion. While there are 
compelling readings of Kant that suggest the state’s economic policy ought to strive for 
granting independence and therefore citizenship to all subjects,24 Kant does state that 
any degree of inequality in wealth is consistent with justice (8:291-292). Further, it would 
seem as though the loss of citizenship that attends criminal action would be identical in 
the relevant characteristics to a subject’s loss of citizenship when he or she went from 
being a black smith to a woodcutter (6:314).25 Presumably the latter does not justify the 
state in interfering with the citizen’s freedom, so it is hard to see how the loss of 
citizenship alone would justify punishment. 
                                                 
24 See Williams, Howard. “Toward a Kantian Theory of International Distributive Justice.” Kantian 
Review. Vol 15, no. 2 (2011), pp. 43-77; and Wood, pp. 193-205. 
25 According to Kant, the black smith is independent because she owns the products of her labor. The 
woodcutter, on the other hand, does not; rather, he is hired to cut wood for a client, and thus sells his 
time. This indicates that he relies on others for his livelihood in a way that the blacksmith does not. 
There is plenty of room to question this distinction, but for our purposes it suffices to show that Kant 
conceives of many subjects of the state as lacking citizenship and that an individual could lose her or 
his citizenship by transitioning to one of these occupations. 
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 Arthur Ripstein stakes out a position that is explicitly allied with Byrd’s 
approach, and in particular, this second kind of argument she puts forward.26 Like Byrd, 
Ripstein’s aim is to defend a reading of Kant that holds punishment to be both 
retributive and deterrent. Also like Byrd, he posits that the way of defending such a 
view is by means of a justification for punishment that depends on the value and 
necessity of the state. He writes, 
Deterrence and retribution are united through Kant’s view of punishment as 
something that can only be done by a superior…. I will argue that the criminal 
exempts him- or herself from public law, and is liable to punishment simply 
because public law cannot permit unilateral exemptions. Punishment is the 
guarantee that public law is effective in space and time…. The threat of public 
law is…the announcement that public law will remain supreme.27 
 
 Ripstein differs from Byrd, however, on the question of why the state is valuable. 
For Byrd, the state serves an instrumental role: namely, it makes possible ideal 
ownership, which is itself necessary for our exercise of free choice.28 Outside of securing 
the prerequisites for right, the state has no intrinsic value. Ripstein disagrees with this 
view.29 For Ripstein, the state is good in itself, as its own end: 
To characterize something as a means or instrument suggests that it serves to 
achieve something that might exist apart from it. Where Byrd writes of means 
or instruments, I will argue that Kant posits an identity: civil society is the 
systematic realization of freedom, required a priori, ‘however well disposed 
and right-loving human beings might be.’ In turn, the criminal law is an 
integral part of civil society, for it is nothing more than the supremacy of 
public law against opposing individual wills, should there turn out to be any. 
The enforcement of its prohibitions is itself equivalent to the prohibitions 
themselves.30 
 
                                                 
26 Ripstein, pp. 302-303. 
27 Ibid., p. 302  
28 Byrd, pp. 153-154. 
29 Ripstein, p. 303 
30 Ibid. 
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 This description of the value of the state is right on at least one point: the 
purpose of the state could not be achieved in any other way. I believe Byrd would 
readily accept this. Where Ripstein goes wrong, though, is thinking that the necessity of 
a specific means to an end somehow makes the means no longer instrumental. Although 
Ripstein might be right that the state is constitutive of a rightful condition, the rightful 
condition is still only a means to an end. In order to illustrate this, imagine a world in 
which rational beings are completely independent and self-sufficient; they do not need 
one another to achieve whatever ends they set, and they are incapable of harming one 
another. In such a world, the state would be neither necessary nor valuable; indeed, it 
would represent only an impermissible constraint on the wills of the rational beings. 
This demonstrates that the state is not a thing of unconditional value – freedom is. While 
the state might be the only moral way to secure freedom for all, this does not mean that 
the state is constitutive of freedom. 
 Setting this issue aside, however, we see that the core of Ripstein’s interpretation 
of Kant’s theory of punishment is very similar to Byrd’s. According to Risptein, law 
allows for a community of separate persons to live together while retaining their 
independence; it does so by enabling the possibility of giving laws to ourselves.31 This is 
only possible through the institutions of a state.32 When an individual commits an act of 
crime, she wills in such a way so as to contradict both a particular law and the 
ominlateral, general will that created the law. Given that law is by definition 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 231 
32 Ibid., p. 309 
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authoritative, and crime threatens this authority, the state is justified in attempting to 
prevent such violations from occurring.33 The fact that crime infringes on another’s right 
is of no immediate significance; only its contradiction of the authority of law is. 
 Ripstein articulates this view explicitly, citing the example of theft: 
The ground for punishing theft, however, is not the fact that the thief chooses 
to violate the basic norm of property. Instead, the grounds for punishment 
reflect the fact that his choosing to do so must be understood as choosing to 
exempt himself from the authority of the law.34 
 
 Although Byrd does not explicitly make the same claim, her arguments align 
with Ripstein’s. By focusing on the way in which any and all crime threatens the nature 
of law and the authority of the state, Byrd and Ripstein both justify the deterrent 
application of punishment by highlighting the preservation of the state. Crime is 
understood only abstractly, as a threat to the state, stripped of all its particular details. 
As we will see, this account of crime cannot successfully justify punishment in any 
recognizably Kantian manner. 
 It might be tempting to respond to Byrd and Ripstein by claiming that the maxim 
of an individual criminal is no real threat to the state’s authority. After all, Kant writes in 
the Groundwork, 
If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that we 
do not really will that our maxim should become a universal law, since that is 
impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain 
a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception to it for 
ourselves (or just this once) to the advantage of our inclination.  (4:424) 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., p. 313 
34 Ibid. 
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 Impermissible maxims are not those that seek to destroy the power of the state; 
instead, they merely seek to exempt the criminal from its authority. This response 
cannot succeed, however, because it is precisely this exemption that endangers the state 
and its authority. As Byrd and Ripstein point out, the very concept of public law 
requires that it apply to all persons, without exception. By making exceptions of 
themselves, criminals pose as great a threat to the possibility of law as they would if 
they sought actively to undermine it. 
 This does not mean, however, that such a strategy can successfully serve as the 
justification for punishment. Holding that the state is justified in using punitive coercive 
force solely in order to maintain its own authority necessarily leads to serious obstacles 
for a Kantian theory of punishment. If crime is wrong because it threatens the state then 
all crime is essentially identical. Whether one vandalizes a building, steals from his 
neighbor, or murders a fellow citizen, the crime is punishable because it threatens the 
state’s supremacy and authority. This is especially true in Ripstein’s account, in light of 
the non-instrumental value he attributes to the state. Given that he views the state as 
good in itself, he cannot even reference the ways in which a particular crime wrongs 
individuals or undermines the aims or ends of the state. Rather, he can only explain why 
crime is impermissible by reference to it as a threat to the existence of the state. As we 
saw above, this is a matter that he recognizes and explicitly endorses.35 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
 149 
 
 The blanket uniformity of crime under the ‘preservation of the state’ style 
deterrence theories has several strange or undesirable outcomes. First, we must totally 
abandon Kant’s insistence that punishment be fitting or proportional to the crime 
committed. Although there are problems with a strict application of ius talionis, the 
importance of some relatively fixed proportionality between crime and punishment is a 
central theme in Kant’s theory of punishment. If our concern is truly to examine or 
develop a fully Kantian theory of punishment, we ought not reject proportionality 
unless absolutely necessary. Ripstein’s arguments for deterrence that focus on the 
preservation of state authority necessitate the abandonment of proportionality between 
crime and punishment, but do not give any direct reasons for why this is an 
interpretively acceptable move. 
 Perhaps Byrd or Ripstein might try to get around this problem by suggesting 
that the state could still punish proportionally based on the degree of threat that an 
action posed to the authority of the state. This proposal, however, cannot get off the 
ground; both Byrd and Ripstein are clear that the reason a crime threatens the state’s 
authority is that it involves the willing of a maxim by an individual that undermines the 
omnilateral nature of public law. In this way, a simple act of trespassing is as great a 
threat to the state’s supremacy as is a killing spree. Both ignore the nature of the law in 
the same way, and as such, both pose equal threats to the concept of law. 
 A second peculiar outcome of the Byrd/Ripstein position is that it seems to lose 
sight of the relationship Kant envisions between the state and the individual citizens. 
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Kant describes the rightful condition as arising entirely out of the concept of the external 
freedom of the individuals who seek to bind themselves together in a civil society 
(8:289). The laws that they create impose certain limitations and constraints on their 
freedom, but as these constraints arise from the wills of the citizens, they each remain 
free and autonomous. Establishing and preserving these conditions is the purpose of the 
state; any time it deviates – either by allowing some too much freedom at the expense of 
others or creating laws that abridge citizens’ freedom in ways they could not consent to 
(8:297) – it not only fails to achieve its purpose, but it actively works against it. The state, 
then, is not only an instrument to make possible the exercise of external freedom, it is 
one that is only morally justified when it functions properly. 
 It seems natural, then, to justify the prevention of crime in light of the state’s role 
in establishing and preserving the conditions that allow for citizens to live together 
freely. According to the ‘preservation of the state’ style arguments for deterrence, 
however, preventing instances of crime is only of indirect interest. Instead, proponents 
of this approach seek to justify punishment primarily as a means of preserving the status 
quo. Although both Byrd and Ripstein would likely argue that the continued existence 
of the state is necessary for it to fulfill its role in preserving the external freedom of the 
citizens, their position involves an unnecessary, extra step. Rather than justifying 
punishment as a means of preserving the state, which in turn allows for the protection of 
individuals’ external freedom, why not simply justify punishment as necessary for the 
protection of individuals’ external freedom?  
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 None of the outcomes of arguments based on preserving state authority is 
internally contradictory or untenable; a perfectly consistent theory of punishment could 
include such tenets. Attributing them to Kant, however, seems highly questionable. 
While Byrd and Ripstein are undoubtedly correct that every violation of law is a 
challenge to the authority of the state, to conclude that this is the sole justification for 
punishment is to radically alter Kant’s conception of the limited state. Preserving the 
authority of the state is necessary, but it is necessary for the sake of the state’s role in 
protecting the external freedom of the citizens. If punishment already accomplishes this 
– as I hope to show below – then it seems as though punishment’s effects on reinforcing 
the supremacy of the state are more of a happy side effect than the justification. Rather 
than a necessary instrument for coexistence that determines obligations via law and 
enforces sanctions against those who violate such laws, the Byrd/Ripstein Kantian state 
becomes an apparently self-justifying moral entity, whose citizens seem to exist so as to 
perpetuate the state. 
 In summary, the traditional approaches to Kantian deterrence have relied on 
very abstract arguments to justify the institution of punishment. These arguments have 
focused on the state and its legal authority, claiming that preserving these institutions 
and their supremacy can serve as a basis for punishment. Although Kant clearly holds 
that the state must preserve itself, to ground punishment in this obligation is to ignore 
key facts about the institution of punishment within the broader context of the state. 
Taken to its conclusions, this approach robs our ability to distinguish between crimes or 
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punish them in a way that is proportionate and fitting. Additionally, the importance of 
individuals and their right to the free exercise of their external freedom play only an 
indirect role for either Byrd or Ripstein. As I will show below, it is both possible and 
preferable to construct a theory of Kantian deterrence in which protecting the external 
freedom of the citizens is the primary force driving the justification of punishment, 
while preserving the state and its authority plays only an incidental role. 
 
4.3 Kantian Protective Deterrence 
 If Kant offers no substantial basis for retributivism, and the existing models of 
deterrence face their own obstacles, one might be tempted to conclude that Kant lacks 
the resources to explain the permissibility of the state’s use of punishment.36 According 
to this way of thinking, Kant has structured his basic political philosophy in such a way 
as to contradict the requirements of his moral philosophy; in turn, punishment (at least 
defined in the way that Kant does) is necessarily unjustifiable in a Kantian state. We 
ought to reject this conclusion, however, on the grounds that there is a viable, deterrent 
solution to this problem that remains firmly grounded in the fundamentals of Kant’s 
practical philosophy. I call this solution Kantian protective deterrence. Despite 
similarities to Byrd and Ripstein’s views, Kantian protective deterrence distinguishes 
itself by justifying the institution of punishment in an individual-focused, forward 
looking manner. In short, the state is justified in threatening punishment on the grounds 
                                                 
36 This argument is made in full by Murphy (1987). 
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that each act of crime contravenes the purpose of the state by violating a particular 
citizen’s right to the free exercise of her or his external freedom. Punishment is then 
carried out as a necessary means of preserving the efficacy of the threat of legal 
sanctions. Finally, Kantian protective deterrence avoids using criminals as a means by 
highlighting the role that rational consent plays in the Kantian legal framework. 
 In order to understand how this particular application of coercive force is 
grounded, it is first necessary to discuss how coercion of any sort is justified. As the 
section progresses, we will trace Kant’s argument from the innate right to freedom to the 
reasons for the foundation of the state, and finally we will arrive at coercion’s crucial 
role in grounding punishment as a necessary institution to preserve these reasons for the 
state’s existence. 
 Conceptually, Kant’s first discussion of coercion pertains to individuals in the 
state of nature. It is worth noting, that Kant did not take the state of nature to have been 
a literal, historical condition of humankind; rather, any discussion of people in the state 
of nature is a thought experiment designed to specify which kinds of rights arise purely 
from personhood and which arise only from the interactions of people as citizens of a 
state.37 The right to act coercively in the name of self-defense is, according to Kant, a 
right of the former kind. Vigilantius records Kant as stating that “Everyone can resist the 
freedom of another, so soon as it infringes that freedom of his own, which is able to co-
                                                 
37 For a clear discussion of what Kant means by the “original contract,” see Byrd and Hruschka, 2010: 
pp. 170-171. 
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exist with the freedom of everyone else” (27:524). He also describes the right to self-
defense in the Metaphysics of Morals: “It is not necessary to wait for actual hostility; one is 
authorized to use coercion against someone who already, by his nature, threatens him 
with coercion” (6:307). This indicates that even in pre-civil interactions, individuals act 
permissibly when they use coercion in to defend themselves from acts of hostility. 
 Although the right to self-defense might seem basic, Kant offers an explanation 
for it: the innate right to freedom that is held by all rational beings. According to Kant, 
this is the only right that exists independently of states. He describes the innate right to 
freedom in Theory and Practice (8:290), but his most relevant description of the right 
comes in the Doctrine of Right: 
Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar 
as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a 
universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his 
humanity.  (6:237) 
 
 The connection between every individual’s right to universalizable external 
freedom and coercive self-defense is also presented as analytic. Kant’s definition of a 
right, essentially, is the title to use coercion to bring about whatever it is the right entails 
(6:230). When another acts to limit our freedom against our wishes, her actions fail to 
accord with universal law.  As such, the innate right to freedom we all possess justifies 
us in the use of coercion in defending ourselves, even when such self-defense occurs at 
the expense of the aggressor’s freedom. I would even be justified in using coercive force 
to protect another from aggression by a third party, should I see such an attack 
transpiring or be aware of one to come imminently.  
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 There is a significant difference, however, between the right to personal or even 
collective self-defense against an aggressor and a state-enforced system of punishment, 
carried out against violators after the fact. Kant cannot claim that the right to punish is 
grounded solely in our use of self-defense; after all, the execution of punishment is 
carried out by other individuals, after a wrong has been committed. Unlike Locke, Kant 
does not claim that individuals have an unlimited executive right in the state of nature; 
the right to punish is one that can only exist within the state.38 In order to get from 
coercion in self-defense to coercion in state instituted punishment, then, Kant will need 
additional arguments. 
 He supplies these missing steps by articulating the purpose of the state and its 
role in preserving and promoting freedom. Kant famously argues that all individuals 
who must interact with other human beings are under an obligation to enter into a 
formal state. He writes, “From private right in the state of nature there proceeds the 
postulate of public right: when you cannot avoid living side by side with all others, you 
ought to leave the state of nature and proceed with them into a rightful condition, that 
is, a condition of distributive justice” (6:307). As we saw in Byrd’s account of state 
authority, this obligation is a result of the state’s unique capacity for creating exclusive 
rights to objects in the world. 
                                                 
38 Murphy, Jeffrie G. Kant: The Philosophy of Right. Macon: Mercer University Press, 1994. Pp 95-107. 
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 Although the state is the only means of guaranteeing the possibility of freedom 
through enabling the ideal ownership of property, its purpose is not merely limited to 
establishing the conditions that allow for property rights. Rather, the state has a 
motivating interest in protecting and promoting the external freedom of its citizens by 
guaranteeing that everyone behaves in a manner consistent with universal right.39 Each 
action that is not consistent with universal right represents the illegitimate abridgment 
of a citizen’s external freedom and represents a failure on the state’s part to achieve its 
purpose. All of its ends can ultimately be traced to establishing the conditions that will 
enable as perfect a protection of external right as possible. This protection of freedom 
takes two connected forms. First, the state must clearly articulate the kinds of behaviors 
that can coexist with one another under the universal principle of right; in other words, 
it makes determinate the obligations of citizens toward one another. It does this through 
enacting law, prescribing and prohibiting actions that will enable everyone to coexist in 
a rightful condition. The second aspect of the state’s protection of freedom is the other 
purpose of law: specifying sanctions, or the negative consequences that will result from 
refusing to use one’s freedom in a way that is consistent with the freedom of all other 
citizens. 
 It still remains for me to demonstrate how Kantian protective deterrence 
functions; in other words, how can a system of punishment preserve freedom by 
                                                 
39 Guyer, 2006: pp. 279-281. 
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deterring individual acts of criminal wrongdoing?  While discussing the state’s 
authorization to punish, Kant analytically connects the state’s role in preserving and 
promoting freedom with punishment: 
Resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is 
consistent with it. Now whatever is wrong is a hindrance to freedom in accordance 
with universal laws. But coercion is a hindrance or resistance to freedom.  Therefore, 
if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal 
laws (i.e., wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to 
freedom) is right. Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction 
an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it.  (6:231) 
 
 It is clear from this passage that Kant takes coercion to be justified in certain 
cases simply by the law of double-negation. If hindering a person’s freedom is bad, 
preventing someone from hindering another’s freedom is good. Accepting this double-
negation, however, does not get us all the way to a justification for punishment. The 
argument in this passage can go so far as authorizing direct intervention to prevent the 
hindering of a citizen’s freedom; if the police were to witness a crime in progress, they 
would be justified in stepping in to prevent the hindrance of the victim’s freedom. The 
argument, however, does not explain why the police would be justified in bringing a 
criminal to justice after the commission of a crime has been completed. After a crime has 
been fully committed, the act of punishing the criminal represents the use of a state’s 
power to coercively limit the freedom of the criminal; in other words, the state actively 
promotes a hindrance to a citizen’s freedom. If the state’s fundamental purpose is to 
protect freedom, such a hindrance seems difficult to justify. It seems then, that any 
coercion after the fact (i.e., punishment) cannot be justified on the same grounds as the 
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interference in a present, on-going hindrance to freedom. It does not follow analytically 
from the state’s role in protecting freedom – and therefore hindering hindrances to 
freedom – that the state is also permitted to issue punishment to the offender.40 Law as a 
system of threats is exactly the missing piece of this puzzle. 
 It might seem psychologically obvious that being punished for violating the law 
is an effective way at decreasing the likelihood that individuals will repeat the same 
offense. It might even seem obvious that such punishing will discourage others from 
committing the same offense. Both of these assumptions, however, depend on the 
condition that both the criminal and other observers know the reason for the 
punishment. In other words, deterrent effect depends upon an open and publicly 
announced causal link between a specific act of wrong-doing and some form of coercion. 
From here, it is only a short step to the concept of law and sanction; instead of merely 
announcing the link between crime and punishment after one has done wrong, the state 
declares such a link ahead of any particular instance of wrong-doing and reliably 
enforces it following any and all criminal actions. 
                                                 
40 Bernd Ludwig attempted to solve this problem simply by reference to the universal principle of 
right; see Ludwig, Bernd. Kants Rechtshlehre. Kant Forschungen, bd. 2. Hamburg: Meiner, 1988.  Pp. 96-
98. He argues that we can distinguish the freedom of the victim from the freedom of the criminal 
based on one’s compatibility with the universal principle of right and the other’s incompatibility. This 
idea is fairly straightforward; if the freedom of the criminal is being used in a way that is not rightful, 
then such freedom need not be preserved. We saw Kant making this very claim in his justification for 
self-defense. While this move is consistent with retributive readings of Kant, it does not actually solve 
the problem of why punishment is justified after a crime has been committed. It still gives us only a 
justification for intercession, rather than a fully-fledged institution of punishment. 
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 This solution provides Kant with a method of claiming that punishment is 
justified as the hindering of a hindrance to freedom, albeit in something of an indirect 
manner. By declaring that any hindrance of freedom that does not accord with the 
universal principle of right will be met by a specific punishment, the state can effectively 
deter crime before it occurs and thereby promote freedom. The actual act of punishing 
itself would not, in most cases,41 actually hinder any hindrances to freedom. Instead, 
punishment is necessary in order to support the system of threats that actually deters 
crime. If we did not punish, no one would believe the threats, and thus the laws would 
lose their deterrent efficacy. 
 This move is akin to Byrd’s division between the threat of punishment and the 
execution of punishment. It is the threat that deters crime, and so the threat is what is 
directly justified by the state’s forward-looking interest. But without actual sanctions, 
threatening legal sanctions would not give potential criminals any reason to refrain from 
illegal action. The sanctions, then, become instrumental, useful in order to insure the 
efficacy of the threat. One might raise concerns over this kind of account; it seems as 
though in punishing criminals, the state uses them as a means to achieve the deterrence 
force of the law. This concern, however, is defused by Kant’s requirement that law be 
                                                 
41 The only scenarios where this would obviously be the case would be situations in which the 
punishment itself necessarily prevents any future wrong-doing. Executing is an extreme example of 
this, but imprisonment (especially incarceration for the remaining duration of one’s life) can also be 
thought of as actively hindering any future hindrances to freedom. In both cases, however, we would 
need to know with certainty that the individual in question was going to commit crime in the future. 
Given the impossibility of this kind of knowledge, execution or incarceration might, potentially, be an 
act of coercion enforced on an individual who would never again hinder another citizen’s freedom. 
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willable by all citizens. If the state chose individuals at random in order to maximize the 
deterrent efficacy of the law, this would clearly be using citizens merely as a means. The 
law, however, specifies that only those who have engaged in crime may be used in this 
fashion.42 This arrangement is something that any rational citizen could accept, and as 
such the state essentially has the permission of the citizens to use them in such a 
manner. Thus, although the state uses criminals as a means to achieve deterrence, it does 
not use them merely as a means, as it has their rational consent. 
 Unlike Byrd and Ripstein’s positions, though, Kantian protective deterrence is 
squarely focused on deterring crime in order to prevent future violations of the citizens’ 
right to freedom. While the more abstract interest in preservation of the state and its 
supreme authority are also accomplished by Kantian protective deterrence, they are 
secondary ends. This might seem like too narrow an account of crime; after all, there are 
many illegal actions that do not directly interfere with any other citizen’s external 
freedom. Whether in cases of printing counterfeit money (6:331) or in an instance of 
trespassing in which no damage is caused, it is not clear that the perpetrator has actually 
violated another’s freedom. If I cannot explain the illegality of cases such as these, this 
would be a serious problem. 
 I do not think that this objection poses a real threat to Kantian protective 
deterrence. According to Kant, public laws are specified in order to establish the 
                                                 
42 This allows Kantian protective deterrence to capture much of the retributive character of Kant’s 
theory, yet contextualize it within a theory justified by deterrence. 
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boundaries of each individual’s external right. Even if I do not physically harm anyone 
or damage any property when I break a law, I still act in ways that infringe upon one or 
more persons’ right. The state has an interest in preventing such behavior, as it must 
protect the system of right, even if no individual citizen lodges a complaint. This 
response is still distinct from Byrd and Ripstein’s views, as they would highlight the 
incompatibility of the maxim with the state’s authority, whereas Kantian protective 
deterrence focuses on the incompatibility of the maxim with others’ rights to external 
freedom as specified by a system of public law. 
 In addition, Kantian protective deterrence has the advantage when it comes to 
questions of proportionality. Unlike Byrd and Ripstein’s ‘preservation of the state’ 
approach, which cannot explain why we ought to punish different crimes with different 
sanctions, my position can easily account for proportionality. Given that Kantian 
protective deterrence focuses on the individual violation of one or more others’ rights 
involved in instances of crime, it can easily justify the application of sanctions of varying 
severity. An act of trespassing is a much less serious infringement of another’s right than 
is an act of murder, and the punishment should reflect this. The ability to capture this 
key element of Kant’s theory of punishment is one of the major strength of Kantian 
protective deterrence. 
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 Conclusion 
 Kant’s reputation as a retributivist is grounded in the indisputable: despite minor 
deviations in his lectures, all of his published writings explicitly and consistently defend 
the view that punishment is justified solely as a response to a prior act of wrongdoing. 
The primary arguments he gives to support this position aim to show that – what is 
known as the intrinsic desert thesis. Additionally, he argues, any other justification for 
punishment would necessarily involve using the punished party as a means to some 
other end, whether it be deterrence or rehabilitation. 
 These arguments, however, are irreconcilably inconsistent with various elements 
of Kant’s most basic positions in moral and political philosophy. Even if we accept that 
wrongdoing analytically entails a desert to suffer, Kant lacks the means to show that the 
state is justified in answering this desert. In light of these difficulties, some interpreters 
of Kant propose reading Kant as offering – or able to offer – a deterrent theory of 
punishment. The predominant manner of justifying such a deterrent theory has involved 
the state’s duty to preserve itself and the omnilateral supremacy of law, both of which 
are threatened by the willing of any illegal action. This approach, however, cannot 
distinguish between different kinds of crime, and it runs the risk of making the effects of 
crime on individual citizens of only secondary or indirect significance. 
 Instead of founding punishment on the state’s duty to preserve itself, I propose a 
deterrent justification that focuses primarily on preventing violations of the citizens’ 
right to the use of their external freedom. This justification is supported by the state’s 
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role in establishing the conditions that allow for individuals to live together, each 
enjoying her or his innate right to freedom. By threatening punishment, the state 
actively hinders unjust hindrances to freedom and thereby fulfills one of its primary 
purposes. As we will see in the next chapter, however, this picture of deterrent 
punishment at times appears at odds with other explicit statements Kant makes with 
respect to punishment. Although there are significant challenges, Kantian protective 
deterrence is capable of reconciling most of Kant’s starkly retributivist statements with 
the deterrent justifications that underlie the most coherent interpretations of his theory 
of punishment.  
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5      The Liability of Punishment: All and Only the Guilty 
 
 In the last chapter, I argued that Kant’s commitment to retributivism is not 
supported by sound arguments. Instead, the most stable basis he has for constructing a 
full theory of punishment rests upon a deterrent justification. Even though Kant’s 
arguments in the Doctrine of Right fail to support a retributive justification for 
punishment, however, I do not contest that Kant himself was a staunch retributivist. 
Although there are a few telling passages in his lectures that indicate that, at least in his 
earlier years, he was possibly comfortable with a deterrent justification for punishment, 
there are numerous statements in his published works that are unambiguously 
retributive in character. We need only to look briefly at his most complete, published 
writings on the subject to see confirmation of this; Kant writes, “Punishment can never 
be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or 
for civil society. It must always be inflicted upon him only because he has committed a 
crime” (6:331).1 
 What ought my interpretation – Kantian protective deterrence – to do with 
statements of this kind? If these numerous claims are merely the products of an 
unworkable commitment to retributivism then the most obvious thing to do would be to 
reject everything Kant wrote on the subject of punishment. According to this approach, 
all of his statements about punishment are hopelessly corrupted by the fact that he relies 
                                                 
1 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. All internal citations refer to the standard Prussian Academy edition, volume and pages. 
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on an unstable and unsupported justification. To conclude, however, that everything 
Kant wrote on the subject of punishment is simply in error – conflicting irreconcilably 
with more fundamental aspects of his political philosophy – would place Kantian 
protective deterrence very much at odds with Kant himself. As I stated in the 
introduction to this dissertation, I am interpretively committed to conserving as much of 
Kant’s published position as possible, and so this kind of wholesale dismissal would 
represent a serious failure. 
While such outright rejection might be necessary in a few cases, in this chapter I 
will show that the majority of Kant’s retributive statements can be retained and 
accommodated within Kantian protective deterrence. Rather than rejection of the 
problematic statements, our approach ought to be one of reconciliation and 
rehabilitation. Specifically, I will show how it is possible to preserve many of Kant’s 
most retributive passages by understanding them as referring not to the justification of 
punishment, but rather to its liability. Recall that, according to my conception of what 
constitutes a theory of punishment, a theory can pick out various features of how the 
institution of punishment will operate that remain partially distinct from the 
justification. While they ultimately must accord with the justifying aim of punishment, 
they are not merely reducible to this aim. Among these elements is a specification of 
who should be punished.  
 According to the traditional, retributive interpretation of Kant’s theory of 
punishment, he selects as liable all and only those who have done wrong. In other 
words, he establishes a fully retributive liability. This selection is apparently made on 
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the basis of moral desert (6:333-334). To punish one who has not done wrong would be 
to act impermissibly, just as the state would act impermissibly if it failed to punish one 
who has wronged. If our aim is to preserve as many of Kant’s expressed views as 
possible, then these two conditions ought to be accommodated – Kantian protective 
deterrence ought to embrace a retributive liability, in which all and only those who have 
done wrong are punished. The basis for this liability, however, will have to differ from 
Kant’s own; rather than relying on moral desert, I will need to supply other 
considerations, in keeping with the deterrent justification of punishment. I will 
accomplish this with a mixture of principled and empirical arguments. 
 This chapter contains three major sections. First, I will make the case that many 
of Kant’s most retributive sounding passages can be reinterpreted as referring to 
liability, rather than justification. Further, I contend that adopting a retributive liability 
in this manner is perfectly consistent with a deterrent justification for punishment, 
provided that we use the correct understanding of a ‘mixed’ theory of punishment. 
Second, I will argue that Kantian protective deterrence can easily show that only those 
who have done wrong may be punished; the formula of humanity – coupled with the 
Kantian conception of legislation – prevents the punishing of innocents, regardless of 
any deterrent efficacy that such an act of punishment might generate. Third, I will 
address the more difficult subject of punishing all of the guilty. On the one hand, I will 
argue that Kantian protective deterrence has the means to support a policy of punishing 
all wrongdoers. On the other hand, I must concede that it cannot quite capture the full 
force of Kant’s claim that all of those who have done wrong must be punished. 
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Nevertheless, Kant does not effectively make a case for this claim and that his most 
compelling example is beset with numerous problems. 
 
5.1 Liability and Mixed Theories 
 Upon closer examination, many of Kant’s most famously retributive passages do 
not directly refer to the justification of the state’s use of punitive coercive force. Take, for 
instance, his claim that, “The right to punish is the right a ruler has against a subject to 
inflict pain upon him because of his having committed a crime” (6:331). 
 He expresses a similar view on the law of retribution, ius talionis:2 
Accordingly, every murderer – anyone who commits murder, orders it, or is 
an accomplice in it – must suffer death; this is what justice, as the idea of 
judicial authority, wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded 
a priori. (6:334) 
 
 And on the subject of granting clemency: 
 Of all the rights of a sovereign, the right to grant clemency to a criminal…is the 
slipperiest one for him to exercise…With regard to crimes of subjects against 
one another it is absolutely not for him to exercise it; for here failure to punish 
is the greatest wrong against his subjects. (6:337) 
 
 In each of these three passages, Kant expresses the strict necessity characteristic 
of his retributive view. While each described a different aspect of punishment, there is a 
common element to the retributivism expressed by them: it is of vital importance that 
punishment be applied to all and only those who are guilty of committing crime. While 
one might readily draw the conclusion from these quotations that Kant supports a 
                                                 
2 Ius talionis plays a significant role in Kant’s views on both the appropriate amount and method of 
punishment, and I discuss it at length in relation to these two issues in the next chapter. For now, 
suffice it to say that Kant sees the law of retribution as requiring that we punish those who have done 
wrong. 
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retributive justification for punishment, that view is actually not expressed. Even when 
Kant says that punishment is applied ‘because’ the subject has committed a crime, there 
is some ambiguity in his meaning. While it is natural to read this as specifying the 
justification for the punitive action, it is also possible to read it as picking out who is 
punishable. According to this reading, Kant is stating that the state can only punish 
those who have previously committed a crime. Although this is a retributive claim, it is 
not one that necessarily requires a retributive justification. 
 It might be tempting to view this distinction as ultimately insignificant. Even 
though Kant is referring directly to punishing those who have acted wrongly, it is clear 
that he thinks punishment is itself justified as a direct response to wrongdoing. Indeed, 
the Kantian picture holds that the underlying retributive justification for punishment is 
the basis for selecting a retributive liability, and it is possible that he does not recognize 
the distinction between these two things. This connection, however, is not strictly 
necessary. It is possible for a theory to support a retributive principle for specifying 
liability within the broader context of a deterrent justification. It is precisely this balance 
that will allow for Kantian protective deterrence to preserve many of the statements and 
much of the spirit of Kant’s retributive theory. 
 What would this coexistence look like? At its most basic, such a retributive 
liability would describe concrete rules of practice for the executive, judicial, and 
legislative branches of government; these rules would impose certain retributive 
constraints on the practice of punishment. Thomas Hill describes this division in his 
paper “Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment” in the following way: 
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“deterrence plays a role in the general justification of the practice of punishment, but 
this is compatible with retributive policies governing judges, juries, and even legislators 
operating within the framework of the practice.”3 In short, although deterrence provides 
the reason why the state is authorized to punish, the laws and practices of punishment 
are not set up solely to achieve the maximum amount of deterrence possible; the state’s 
practices achieve deterrence through means that are constrained by other concerns, 
specifically ones that appear retributive in character. 
If Kantian protective deterrence endorsed a retributive liability, this would entail 
several significant consequences for the manner in which crime is prosecuted. The 
judicial system, including both the executive branch’s investigation of crime and the 
judicial branch’s trying of cases, should arguably be conducted in the language and 
according to the guidelines of retributivism.4 When handing down sentences, for 
instance, judges would make reference to the crime committed, rather than directly 
justifying the sentence in terms of the need to preserve the deterrent efficacy of the 
threat that the law represents. While the law and its corresponding sanction are being 
designed, the penalty for its violation should be designed with deterrence in mind; once 
the law has been violated and the penalty must be imposed, however, it is not only 
possible but potentially desirable to do so in a manner with strong retributive elements. 
                                                 
3 Hill, Thomas E., Jr. “Kant on Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment.” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 
4 (Jul., 1999), pp. 430. 
4 In the next chapter, I shall argue that this retributive appearance need not – and perhaps should not – 
extend to the actual content of the penalty applied. It would still be possible to use retributive 
language during a trial and then adopt a rehabilitative framework while the sentence is carried out. 
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 There are two reasons for why a Kantian deterrence theorist might want to 
endorse policies of this kind. First, the use of a retributive liability is the only way that 
we can hope to capture any of Kant’s explicit retributivism within the framework of a 
deterrent theory. The passages quoted above – and more like them – could be preserved, 
rather than jettisoned. Although this marriage will be imperfect in one or two respects, it 
nevertheless represents the strongest, most Kantian option available. Second, there are 
significant pragmatic considerations: it might well be the case that utilizing the language 
of retributivism in a limited way during the practice of punishing might be most 
effective at deterring crime. This possibility is, to a degree, reminiscent of the so-called 
‘paradox of hedonism.’ As explained by Mill, Sidgwick, and others, if our goal is to 
attain happiness or pleasure, we must aim at some other good; if we intentionally 
sought only our own happiness, we would fail to achieve the greatest amount of 
happiness possible. In the same way, we might think that making punishment’s aim of 
deterrence explicit would actually decrease the amount of deterrent force that our penal 
practices can generate. Only by linking crimes and punishments in a direct, retributive 
manner could the state hope to truly convey a properly deterrent message to would-be 
criminals. 
 It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that the retributive fixing of liability would 
substantially support the overall deterrent justification of the institution or practice. This 
harmony between the deterrent justification and retributive liability of punishment is 
typical of mixed theories of punishment. A mixed theory of punishment is one that 
utilizes different, seemingly incompatible rationales at different levels of the theory. 
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While a classic retributive or deterrent theory is, respectively, retributive or deterrent in 
all of its various elements, mixed theories might include retributive, deterrent, and 
rehabilitative elements. Traditionally, Kant is interpreted as adopting an unmixed, 
retributive theory in which all questions – be they the justification, the liability, the 
amount, or the method of punishment – are settled by reference to retribution and moral 
desert. Kantian protective deterrence, on the other hand, will be a highly mixed theory 
that incorporates retributive and rehabilitative elements into a fundamentally deterrent 
theory.5 
 There is a different usage of the term ‘mixed theory’ that is occasionally 
employed in the literature on punishment. According to this conception, a mixed theory 
is one that supports multiple justifications for punishment. Jean-Christophe Merle 
employs this sense of mixed theories in his paper “A Kantian Critique of Kant’s Theory 
of Punishment.”6 A significant part of Merle’s paper is given over to criticism of Byrd, 
Hill, and others who have advocated Kantian deterrence. His criticism is largely 
founded on the claim that these efforts purport to be mixed theories, but are ultimately 
                                                 
5 Mixed theories are not without their weaknesses. While they have the advantage of capturing many 
of the various interests and expectations we have for a system of punishment, they are also prone to 
greater internal tension. While it might seem unproblematic to say that the justifying aim of deterrence 
is well-supported by a retributive liability, a deeper investigation threatens to reveal that the rationale 
behind the liability is either incorrect or misleading. In short, some express doubt that a liability could 
be adopted that would run counter to the general justifying aim of the practice. For a full treatment of 
mixed theories and some of their problems, see Kaufman, Whitley R. P. “The Mixed Theory of 
Punishment.” Honor and Revenge: A Theory of Punishment. Dordrecht: Springer Publishing, 2013. 
6 Merle, Jean-Christophe. “A Kantian Critique of Kant's Theory of Punishment.” Law and Philosophy, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (May, 2000), pp. 311-338 
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still employ an exclusively retributive justification. He goes on to advocate for a more 
truly deterrent position, albeit one that jettisons most of Kant’s original views.7 
 Although there is merit to the position he ultimately defends, Merle’s criticisms 
are based on several significant errors. First, he misconstrues the nature of Byrd and the 
others’ views. He lists a number of theses to which retributivist theories are or can be 
committed, focusing on the following four:  
(a) All criminals and only criminals should be punished. 
(b) The punishment of the criminal constitutes retribution for the crime 
committed. 
(c) The degree of punishment should be (ordinally, not cardinally) 
proportionate to the crime, i.e. the scale of punishments must correspond to 
the scale of crimes. By this I mean that a more serious crime should be 
punished more severely than a less serious crime, and that two equally 
serious crimes should result in punishments that are each as severe as the 
other. 
(d) The degree of punishment must be equal to the crime.8 
 
 Merle claims that these four theses remain intact under Byrd’s ‘mixed’ theory. 
On the other hand, he identifies deterrence as also committed to four theses. He lists 
them as well: 
i) Future crimes are deterred by the punishment of actual criminals. Contrary 
to the following two theses, this descriptive thesis does not belong to any 
theory of deterrence considered to be normative. 
ii) Future crimes should be deterred by the punishment of actual criminals. 
iii) Citizens should be punished in such manner as to provide the most 
efficient deterrence to the commission of future crimes. 
                                                 
7 Merle develops this line of thought further in his book on Kant, Hegel, and Fichte’s theories of 
punishment (Merle, Jean-Christophe. German Idealism and the Concept of Punishment. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009.) While his arguments against mixed theories remain mostly 
unchanged and, consequently, unconvincing, I will cite his thoughts on Kant’s rehabilitative elements 
in chapter six. 
8 Ibid., p. 316. 
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iv) Criminals and only criminals should be punished, and this should be in 
such manner as to provide the most efficient deterrence to the commission of 
future crimes.9 
 
 According to Merle, Byrd’s mixed theory accepts the first two, but rejects the 
third and fourth. Given that she retains all four of the retributive theses, he contends that 
her position is, in truth, deeply retributive, with only a descriptive veneer of deterrence. 
 This is an implausible reading of Kantian mixed theories for several reasons. To 
begin with, a number of Merle’s theses are questionable. For instance, the claim that 
criminals should be punished “in such a manner as to provide the most efficient 
deterrence” is not strictly entailed by all forms of deterrence. This is a specifically 
maximizing conception of deterrence, and while that version has a long history, it is not 
the only possible version.10 It is possible to support a version of deterrence that aims at 
achieving only a satisficing degree of deterrent force. Likewise, the claim that 
proportionality is built into retributivism as a justification is an unsupported leap. 
Although many retributivists also defend equivalence between crime and punishment, 
this is not strictly necessary. It is possible to be a retributivist who holds that criminals 
deserve to suffer punishment, but that this desert makes no reference to suffering 
something equivalent to the crime.11 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 317 
10 There are good reasons to be skeptical of the view that a deterrent theory must aim to punish so as to 
most efficiently generate deterrence. The terms being employed here are exceptionally vague: what 
makes deterrence ‘efficient?’ How reliably deterred must the criminal be? How does one balance the 
deterrence of the subject of punishment and the vicarious deterrence of third parties? I will further 
address all of the issues in the next chapter, but for now, suffice it to say that Merle’s very imprecise 
sketch of the commitments of deterrence theorists leaves much room for doubt. 
11 One version of this kind of view might approach moral desert in a positivist fashion. We might 
think, for instance, that violation of the law renders you deserving of punishment – specifically, 
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 In addition to positing objectionable theses, Merle also makes a mistake by 
assuming that a theory that accommodates more retributive theses than deterrent ones is 
necessarily retributive in its justification. Even if we accepted that Byrd’s theory 
supports all four retributive theses but only two deterrent theses, this is not a problem 
for Byrd. The entire point of a mixed theory is the ability to accommodate elements of 
another approach to punishment. Merle’s theses describe different aspects of a theory of 
punishment: some make reference to the justification, while others refer to the liability, 
and still others describe the amount or method of punishment. Byrd’s theory 
accommodates the deterrent theses that refer to justification; the fact that her theory does 
not support the deterrent theses that refer to liability or amount is not a sign that her 
theory is retributive in its justification. 
 In short, Merle has constructed his theses in such a way as to be incompatible 
with the very idea of a mixed theory. If we reject the possibility of mixed theories, then 
Merle’s argument begins to make more sense. If we accept that a theory can pursue 
retributive interests within a framework justified by deterrence, however, then his 
criticisms no longer carry any weight. 
 Merle’s critique also goes wrong in misunderstanding the kind of mixed theory 
that Byrd, Hill, and others are advocating. Merle assumes that either 1) a mixed theory 
must truly satisfy multiple justifications, or 2) that a theory’s justification is no more 
important that the principles of distribution it employs. If we correct for these mistakes, 
                                                 
whatever punishment is legally associated with such a violation. According to this view, we would do 
wrong by failing to punish or punishing in any other way, even if it more closely resembled the crime 
committed. 
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then it becomes substantially easier to conceive of how a mixed theory might be 
possible. Instead of multiple justifications, all at the same level of the theory, we should 
pursue a theory that offers a single justification for punishment, but allows other 
elements of the theory to be structured in different manners. In this case, what I and 
others propose is to read Kant as most plausibly able to defend a theory that is justified 
by deterrence, but that allows for retributivism to play an important role in organizing 
the way in which punishment is distributed. These principles of distribution must still 
serve the general aim of punishment – given by its justification – but they can do so in 
ways that are not dictated solely by immediate considerations of this aim. 
 Putting Merle’s interpretive errors to the side, I think there are additional good 
reasons to avoid this second conception of mixed theories. A mixed theory that truly 
allows for multiple justifications for punishment is identical to adopting pluralism about 
the justification of punishment. According to the central logic of pluralism about 
punishment, we have a number of radically different interests, concerns, and goals that 
we want an institution of punishment to address or accomplish. Any policy, institution, 
or act of punishment could conceivably be fully justified if it successfully accomplished 
one of these various ends. Thus, there is no single reason why punishment is 
permissible; there are a number of potential reasons, all of which are equally valid. 
 Pluralism, however, has difficulty resolving cases in which these various 
interests are at odds with one another. It seems uncontroversial to say that we regularly 
face cases in which our interests in retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation each 
incline us to punish differently. If any one of these three ends is sufficient to justify a 
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different course of action, then there is no rational basis on which to choose between 
them. Likewise, we cannot meaningful resolve a dispute over which one ought to be 
chosen. This is philosophically undesirable, but it has even more serious practical 
implications. If there is no single justification on which to ultimately fall back, then it 
becomes impossible to hold the criminal justice system accountable for certain actions. 
While rank abuse could still be denounced, on what basis could we object to inequalities 
in treatment, in which some violators are punished retributively and others 
rehabilitatively? In a truly pluralistic account, any of these incommensurate interests is 
sufficient to justify punishment, so it is not possible to say that an individual should 
have been punished according to some other justification. 
 A genuine, hierarchical mixed theory avoids these difficulties. It enables us to 
recognize and accommodate the various interests we have with respect to punishment, 
without giving up on a single justification. The presence of this justification provides 
guidance and settles matters of dispute. Likewise, it creates standards of evaluation that 
allow for judgments about the appropriateness of a concrete act or system of 
punishment. By incorporating a retributive liability into Kantian protective deterrence, 
many of the concerns that could be raised about a purely deterrent theory of 
punishment are satisfied.  
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5.2 Punishing Only Those Who Have Done Wrong 
 I have already discussed some of the advantages that can be reaped by 
incorporating within Kantian protective deterrence retributive practices of identifying 
the individuals who should be punished. In addition to the practical advantages, there is 
great interpretive value in this, as it allows us to consistently preserve much of Kant’s 
original writing on the subject of punishment. In order for this to be the case, however, 
Kantian protective deterrence must still account for why punishment must be applied 1) 
to only those who have done wrong and 2) to all those who have done wrong. As I will 
show, incorporating these two constraints into a fully deterrent theory would be 
difficult; only by endorsing retributive policies that are subordinate to the deterrent 
justification can the theory accomplish this goal. 
 Let us begin, then, by exploring how Kant could meet the criterion of only 
punishing those who have done wrong. This is a relatively straightforward task. The 
solution involves Kant’s underlying moral philosophy, specifically the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative. By coupling this conception of the moral law 
with what Kant says about the possibility of juridical law, we will see that Kant has 
ample resources to provide a reason for constraining punishment to be applicable to 
only those who have violated the law. 
This constraint also has the advantage of answering Kant’s second formulation 
argument, discussed in the previous chapter. Recall that alongside his flawed, positive 
argument that grounded the necessity of retributivism in moral desert, Kant also offers a 
negative argument that I called the second formulation argument. According to this 
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argument, any justification for punishment other than retributivism would be guilty of 
using persons as means to achieve some other personal or social goal. If Kantian 
protective deterrence can show that only the guilty will be punished, however, then the 
force of this objection is lost. 
The concern with punishing only the guilty is one that derives its force from 
critiques concerning the limitations of the deterrence tradition, and in particular its 
consequentialist underpinnings. Kant anticipates a debate that would hound the 
utilitarian approach to punishment in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
classical utilitarians uniformly supported punishing for the sake of deterrence, as the 
suffering of a criminal was itself a wrong that could only be justified if it promoted 
greater utility. Opponents of the deterrence theorists saw a potential danger, however, 
and sought to demonstrate the unsavory conclusions of such utilitarian thinking. Their 
argument runs as follows: if punishment is only justified for the sake of deterrence and 
the utility that such deterrence generates, then we ought to determine those who are 
liable for punishment solely on considerations of how to maximize utility. While we will 
often get the greatest utility by punishing criminals, there is no necessary link. 
Furthermore, the opponent of deterrence might state, we might be not only permitted, 
but indeed morally required to punish an innocent if such an act were in the interest of 
general utility. 
 The traditional defense adopted by deterrence theorists is an empirical, 
pragmatic one. While they must admit that there is no principled reason why the 
innocent are safe from punishment in a manner that is distinct from wrongdoers, they 
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argue that punishing the innocent is, in fact, an ineffective or otherwise defective means 
of generating utility. It is difficult to imagine that widespread punishing of the innocent 
would actually deter crime, as eventually people would begin to realize that they might 
be punished even if they did not commit crime, thus incentivizing the violation of 
certain laws. 
 The defense offered by the utilitarian deterrence theorists is relatively 
compelling. Although we would need to do empirical research to confirm their claims, it 
does seem plausible that a deterrence theory would not allow for punishing the innocent 
under normal circumstances. This prohibition does rest, however, on facts about the 
world; if some of these facts were to change, then it is possible the argument’s validity 
might also be affected. No doubt a determined philosopher could construct hypothetical 
situations in which it truly turns out to be a net gain for utility to punish those who have 
not done wrong. 
 Fortunately, we need not contemplate such increasingly speculative arguments 
about the possibility of various hypothetical scenarios. While the consequentialist camp 
of deterrence thinkers has no principled recourse to protecting the innocent, Kantian 
protective deterrence is fully capable of explaining why it is never acceptable to punish 
an innocent, even if such an action would produce the greatest utility for society. As we 
will see, the solution not only allows us to avoid the traditional criticism of deterrence, 
but it also provides an opportunity for reinterpreting some of Kant’s most retributive 
passages. 
  In the Doctrine of Right, Kant writes, 
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Punishment can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some other 
good for the criminal himself or for civil society.  It must always be inflicted 
upon him only because he has committed a crime.  For a human being can 
never be treated merely as a means to the purpose of another or be put among 
the object of rights to things: his innate personality protects him from this, 
even though he can be condemned to lose his civil personality.  He must 
previously have been found punishable before any thought can be given to 
drawing from his punishment something of use for himself or his fellow 
citizens.  The law of punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him 
who crawls through the windings of eudaemonism in order to discover 
something that releases the criminal from punishment or even reduces its 
amount by the advantage it promises.  (6:331) 
 
 As this quotation demonstrates, a large part of Kant’s reason for endorsing 
retributivism is his concern that any other justification for punishment must resort to 
using humans merely as means to some end, rather than as ends in themselves. In the 
last chapter, however, I argued that this way of thinking, although consistent with 
Kant’s moral philosophy, cannot on its own establish why the state would be justified in 
a deterrent manner. It is a sound argument, but it acts merely as a negative constraint 
upon whatever theory of punishment we wish to ascribe to Kant. 
 It is not difficult, however, for Kantian protective deterrence to meet this 
constraint. Even though punishment is justified by deterrence, the state could never 
punish one who has not violated the law; Kant is right to think that such a punishment 
would use an individual as a means to achieving deterrence in a way that is 
incompatible with the formula of humanity. The reason why such punishment would 
involve using persons merely as a means, however, is not because wrongdoers are 
deserving of punishment in any way the state can respond to, and the innocent are not; 
rather, the reason can be found in Kant’s writing on law and the limits of what a state 
can make a law. 
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 According to the Kantian protective deterrence, criminals can be punished for 
the sake of preserving the deterrent force of the law without running the risk of using 
their personhood as a mere means. This is due to their ability to consent to the laws that 
govern a juridical state. Although a thief might not actually consent to property laws 
and the penalties they prescribe for those who violate them, as a rational being he or she 
is not only capable, but required to give consent to such laws. In light of this, the thief is 
obligated to follow the law or suffer the consequences for refusal. Kant argues that 
although the thief does not, in fact, will the punishment that follows from his or her 
action, he or she can be said to recognize its necessity as a rational being: 
As a colegislator in dictating penal law, I cannot possibly be the same person 
who, as a subject, is punished in accordance with the law…Consequently, 
when I draw up a penal law against myself as a criminal, it is pure reason in 
me (homo noumenon), legislating with regard to rights, which subjects me, as 
someone capable of crime and so as another person (homo phenomenon), to 
the penal law, together with all others in a civil union. (6:335) 
 
 While Kant is careful to claim that the permissibility of punishment does not 
depend upon the criminal’s personal judgment, the fact that the rational humanity of the 
criminal recognizes the need for the punishment gives us all we need. This recognition 
allows the state to punish while still acting in a manner that is approved by all involved; 
it would be strange to suggest that the state acts inappropriately when it follows a 
course of action that the criminal herself must rationally will. 
Can criminals rationally will that they be punished for the sake of deterrence? I 
believe they can. Recall that the explicit purpose of the state is to determine and preserve 
the conditions of external right. One of the most effective and least intrusive means the 
state has to accomplish this goal is through threatening the use of legal sanction. What’s 
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more, this punishment must be connected to the activity that it seeks to deter if it is to be 
effective. Taking all of these considerations together, I posit that citizens, qua rational 
legislators, face no obstacle to consenting to their use to deter crime, provided that they 
have engaged in illegal action. The institution of punishing is still justified by deterrent 
interests, but it limits the pool of citizens that it can punish for deterrent reasons to be 
those that have previously committed crime. By committing crime, these individuals 
voluntarily place themselves within the group of citizens that can be punished so as to 
generate deterrent force. While any citizen’s unwilling use would indeed violate the 
formula of humanity, no one is being used as a mere means in this account.  
 These reasons do not, however, extend to the possibility of punishing the 
innocent. Kant is clear in One the Common Saying that “What a people cannot decree for 
itself, a legislator cannot decree for a people” (8:304). He elaborates on what conditions 
must be met for some policy to be that which people cannot decree for itself: 
If a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its 
consent to it…it is unjust; but if it is only possible that a people could agree to 
it, it is a duty to consider the law just, even if the people is at present in such 
a situation or frame of mind that, if consulted about it, it would probably 
refuse its consent. (8:297)12 
 
 Any law that calls for punishing the innocent, I contend, would fail this test; the 
citizens of a state could not possible consent to or will such a law. Given that the 
innocent have not violated the law, they have not ‘volunteered’ for use in the deterrent 
                                                 
12 If we take this limitation seriously and couple it with the state’s role in creating a maximally 
extensive scheme of equal external freedom for each citizen, then it appears that any law that infringes 
unnecessarily on even one citizen’s freedom would be not only a bad law, but an unjust, unwillable 
law. There is no obvious way around this conclusion. I return to this question in chapter seven. 
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system. If the state used coercive force against them, it would violate their freedom 
without any rational basis for believing that this action is meaningfully connected to the 
state’s interests and purposes. Thus, the rational nature of the citizens could not endorse 
this punishment in the way that it could for the punishment of criminals. To punish an 
innocent regardless of this would indeed be to use him or her as a means to an end, thus 
violating the moral law. Any legal policy that violates the moral law, thereby requiring 
one or more citizens to act immorally, could not be a possible law. We are left with the 
conclusion that punishing the innocent would violate the formula of humanity, and thus 
is always impermissible.13 
 This is why even a deterrent interpretation of Kant’s theory of punishment can 
still fulfill the condition of punishing only those who have done wrong. The limitations 
imposed by the nature of law and the formula of humanity rule out the possibility of 
punishing the innocent for the sake of deterrence; to do so would be to treat them 
merely as a means. The guilty, on the other hand, have rationally consented to their 
punishment in such a way as to allow for their punishment for the sake of deterrence 
without violating the formula of humanity. In this way, we capture the most important 
                                                 
13 We might worry about whether such punishments could nevertheless be carried out, provided they 
are not specified by law. That is, if the objection to punishing the innocent is that no law permitting 
such punishment could be legislated, then could this concern be sidestepped by the executive’s 
punishing the innocent in extra-legal actions? In one sense, such extra-legal action could not be an 
accepted part of any theory of punishment, for it differs in several key respects from Kant’s definition 
of ‘punishment,’ discussed in chapter three. Yet, it is not clear that Kant would characterize these 
executive actions as impermissible. I must set this issue aside for the time being, but I will return to it 
in chapter seven, which addresses revolution and punishing rulers who have abused their positions of 
authority. 
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elements of Kant’s apparent retributivism: no one is punished who has not done wrong, 
and no one is treated merely as means to achieve the goal of deterrence.14 
 
5.3 Punishing All Those Who Have Done Wrong 
 Moving on, now let us consider if and how Kantian protective deterrence can 
satisfy the condition of punishing all of those who have done wrong. Committing to a 
prohibition against punishing the innocent is by no means a guarantee that the state will 
also punish all the guilty. Indeed, the argument used to demonstrate the 
impermissibility of punishing the innocent does not work in this scenario; to allow a 
wrongdoer to go unpunished does not represent the direct violation of anyone’s right to 
the free exercise of her or his external freedom. 
 Nor is Kant’s own reasoning available to us. In explaining why all wrongdoers 
must be punished, Kant relies heavily on the concept of moral desert. He describes those 
who fail to punish as guilty of collaborating in the act of injustice. As we will see below, 
he holds there to be no exception to this. The absolute moral necessity of state 
punishment, however, can find no place in Kantian protective deterrence. We must 
remain committed to preserving the strict divisions that Kant draws between Recht and 
Tugend, and this requires some other basis for state punishment than moral desert. 
                                                 
14 A similar argument is developed in Scheid, Don. E. "Kant's Retributivism." Ethics, 93 (1983), pp. 262-
282. Scheid makes the following statement: “It is clear he regards some principle like…the jus 
talionis…as…required to guarantee that the individual within the system of legal punishment is 
treated with due respect. Now, given these retributivist principles, we may interpret Kant as saying, 
roughly, that it is permissible to ‘use’ a person so long as the treatment is consistent with these 
principles. The individual is being treated with the respect due him as a person, that is, according to 
what is justly due him - as established by the retributivist principles.” 
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 Unlike the question of how to explain punishing only the guilty, Kantian 
protective deterrence cannot give any objective or universally necessary reason for 
punishing all of the guilty. In this respect, it must fall short of Kant’s goal. This does not 
mean, however, that the theory would allow for the guilty to go unpunished as a matter 
of common practice. Instead, Kantian protective deterrence bases the need for all 
wrongdoers to be punished on claims regarding empirical regularities. 
What facts enable Kantian protective deterrence to prescribe punishing all of 
those who have been found to have committed a crime? If the state’s interest is in 
deterring any and all crimes, it would best achieve this end by showing that no violation 
of the law will go unpunished. Failing to punish a crime would serve to decrease a 
criminal’s confidence that she or he would be punished as a result of wrongdoing, thus 
decreasing the disincentives to breaking the law. This is true for both individual and 
vicarious deterrence: failure to punish a person’s criminal action would likely increase 
the odds that she would do so again, and learning that she has gone unpunished would 
likely have the same effect on others. Barring extreme circumstances, then, punishing all 
who have committed a crime is clearly the most sensible way to achieve the deterrent 
purpose of the institution of punishment. 
 This is, admittedly, an empirical claim, and it could be shown to be incorrect by 
facts about the world. Additionally, one might worry that this manner of response 
would fail when it comes to cases that involve unusual or rare crimes. We might think of 
particular crimes that are only possible under a rare or unique set of circumstances; 
there might be no possibility of recidivism or repeated offenses committed by others. 
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Regardless of the details, the concern that motivates this type of objection is that, due to 
the exceptional nature of the crime, the individual would never be inclined or even able 
to repeat her or his offense; furthermore, it is even possible that widespread, public 
knowledge of the unpunished crime could not produce copycat crimes, as no other 
citizen would be in a position to repeat the offense. In such cases, it might not appear 
that punishing actually deters anyone, and thus perpetrators of exceptional crimes 
should go unpunished. 
 This way of thinking is ultimately too simplistic to pose a real challenge to any 
reasonable deterrence theory, let alone our Kantian variety. To illustrate why this is the 
case, I think it will be useful to refer back to the ‘preservation of the state’ arguments 
developed by Byrd and Ripstein. While I argued in the previous chapter that their 
related approaches were too indirect to justify a robust Kantian deterrence theory of 
punishment, I think that they do a nice job – Ripstein especially – of highlighting the 
flaws in the ‘exceptional crime’ argument I presented above. 
 Recall that Ripstein’s interpretation of Kant’s theory of punishment justifies the 
state’s use of force as necessary for securing and preserving the authority of the law. The 
law, arising from the unified wills of all citizens, cannot allow criminals to unilaterally 
exempt themselves from the rules that bind all. As he puts it, “The threat of punishment 
is thus the announcement that public law will remain supreme.”15 Regardless of the 
shortcomings of this as the sole justification for punishment, Ripstein is right to suggest 
                                                 
15 Ripstein, Arthur. Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009. Pp. 302. 
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that the law – and indeed the possibility of a juridical state – is threatened by individuals 
seeking to exempt themselves from its authority. No state can achieve its purpose in 
securing and guaranteeing external freedom if its members constantly seek ways to 
undermine the rule of law. 
 It is precisely this danger that rules out the possibility of exceptional crimes 
going unpunished by a deterrent theory. In the case of widespread public knowledge of 
the criminal’s escape from punishment, the respect the public holds for the law and its 
authority will be greatly weakened. Even if they cannot commit a similar crime, they 
learn the lesson that the state is powerless to enforce its threats in special circumstances 
and might begin seeking out such situations in their own lives. In the case where the 
public is not aware of a crime’s having gone unpunished, the criminal will still be aware. 
While she or he might never have a reason or opportunity to repeat the offense, escaping 
penalty will still have the same detrimental effect of her or his respect for the law. Even 
in the case of exceptional crimes, then, punishment still serves a deterrent effect by 
reinforcing the supremacy of the law and the unfeasibility of exempting oneself from it. 
 Nevertheless, a defender of retributivism might point out that it is possible to 
create a hypothetical counterexample that shows the deterrence line of argumentation to 
be lacking; indeed, Kant has already done just this in his notorious ‘dissolving state’ 
example. In perhaps his best known statement on punishment, Kant writes, 
Even if a civil society were to be dissolved by the consent of all its 
members…the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be 
executed, so that each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt 
does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for 
otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation 
of justice. (6:333) 
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 This passage reveals two things. First, it demonstrates the true depth of Kant’s 
commitment to a retributive liability. Those who have done wrong – murdered, in this 
case – must be punished, regardless of even the most extreme of social, political, and 
legal circumstances. Second, it exposes the limits of Kantian protective deterrence’s 
ability to accommodate Kant’s retributive claims. There is no way to account for the 
necessity of punishment in this kind of scenario under a deterrent theory; after all, there 
is no future rightful condition for the state to preserve. Its interest in protecting the 
freedom of its citizens is ending, and the punishment of past violators does not serve 
that interest any more. As such, this passage cannot be accommodated within Kantian 
protective deterrence, and we are left with no option but to reject it as deeply 
incompatible with the best, most consistent elements of Kant’s practical philosophy. 
Despite these limitations, I have three responses to the dissolving state example. 
First, it should be noted that the dissolving state example is not, in itself, an argument. It 
is a claim meant to demonstrate the full force of Kant’s commitment to retributivism. It 
is conceivably meant to rule out the very kind of deterrent reinterpretation that I have 
proposed. However, we should not abandon our deterrent project in light of this claim; 
if the two are irreconcilably in conflict, then we should abandon the dissolving state 
example, rather than Kantian protective deterrence, as the latter enjoys strong support 
from Kant’s more foundational moral and political philosophy.  
 Even if we ignore its lack of reasoned support, there is much that remains 
unclear about the dissolving state example, and this imprecision leaves open some very 
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difficult questions. While Kant makes it clear that murders would need to be executed 
before the state fully disbands, he says nothing about those found guilty of other crimes. 
If he truly supports a full-fledged retributivist theory, then at a purely qualitative level, 
the strength of the desert should be equal regardless of the crime committed; either one 
deserves to be punished or one does not. Although the nature of the crime might matter 
in determining the amount and nature of the punishment, all offenses should result in 
the same kind of deservingness for punishment. If this is true, then there is no reason 
why Kant should single out murderers in the dissolving state example. All convicted 
criminals should be punished in the appropriate manner before the members of the state 
can go their separate ways. 
 If this is so, however, then it is not clear how Kant would handle the fulfillment 
of prison sentences. If a criminal is sentenced to ten years imprisonment, must the state 
wait ten years to dissolve? The law of retribution would forbid us from altering his or 
her punishment in light of the circumstances. This conclusion seems absurd, and it 
becomes even more so when we consider that the state would still be obligated to 
punish those who commit wrongs while waiting for the state’s dissolution to occur. 
These punishments could in turn prolong the waiting period, thus making the final 
dissolution of the state a practical impossibility. While Kant’s example might seem 
initially warranted within a retributive theory, it quickly becomes self-defeating when 
we broaden it to crimes other than murder. 
 Third, there is another reason to think that this is not, in truth, a good 
counterexample for Kant. At the risk of stating the obvious, the dissolving state example 
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describes a situation in which the members of a state have unanimously elected to 
dissolve the state and go their separate ways, dispersing throughout the world. This 
latter condition is important; Kant could not allow for the dissolution of the state if its 
members had no plans to leave their present location and each other’s company. The 
proximity of other humans and our inability to live without interacting with them are 
some of the fundamental contingent facts about human anthropology that make living 
within a state a necessity, indeed one that can be forced upon those who refuse. 
 Given contemporary facts about the size of the human population, the extent of 
human civilization across the surface of the earth, and the size of modern countries, the 
situation that Kant describes in the dissolving state example might no longer be possible. 
The possibility of acquiring the consent of every member of a state alone seems remote 
enough to render it virtually inconceivable. Even if such consensus was successfully 
reached, however, it is not clear that the state’s dissolution would still be permissible; 
the former citizens of the state might not be able to disperse in the requisite way. If even 
a small group of them remained behind, these individuals would be required to share a 
civil state with one another. While it might be possible for them to reform a new state in 
the absence of the others who have departed, this move seems far too close to secession 
or change of government, options that Kant clearly forbids (8:298-302). 
 My second and third points are, admittedly, practical objections to a theoretical 
hypothetical. The fact that it is not realizable does not change the nature of what would 
be required if it were. Perhaps, though, this should serve as a reductio of sorts on the 
extremeness of Kant’s own view; it might be absurd to think that any functional theory 
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of punishment could account for and explain a situation as bizarre and unrealistic as 
this. As I have shown, the dissolving state example is deeply unclear, beset by problems, 
and perhaps prohibited by Kant’s more fundamental political philosophy. Coupled with 
the weakness of Kant’s arguments for retributivism, we ought not concern ourselves that 
this thought experiment poses a serious risk to the Kantian protective deterrence. 
 Might it be possible to construct a different kind of case, one that articulates 
Kant’s retributivism while avoiding some of the difficulties that the dissolving state 
example faces? Quite possibly. In the face of such examples, Kantian protective 
deterrence can ultimately offer nothing more than the assurances that, in all ordinary 
cases, all of those who have committed a crime must be punished, if for no other reason 
than a failure to do so would diminish the efficacy of the law’s deterrent force. As strong 
as this likelihood is, it still remains a contingent matter; there is no principled reason 
why the state must punish all of those who have done wrong. As such, some of Kant’s 
commitments will be forever incompatible with the view I am developing. 
 From a purely interpretive standpoint, this is perhaps a slightly disappointing 
result. While previously I have had some success reinterpreting Kant’s more retributive 
sounding passages, in this case there will be some that simply must be rejected as 
inconsistent with the deterrence theory I am advocating. It would clearly be preferable 
to incorporate all of his statements on punishment in one consistent unity, but this 
simply is not possible. The principle of charity would plausibly lead us to preserve as 
many passages as possible within a coherent unity, rather than aim for complete 
retention beset by contradiction. 
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 Perhaps, however, we might find a silver-lining of sorts in this small 
inconsistency. The most prominent passage that will need to be jettisoned is also one of 
Kant’s most notorious: the dissolving state example has long sat uneasily with many 
readers of Kant. There is ultimately no way to align this claim with a deterrence theory, 
but given the lengths to which Kant scholars have gone in order to explain away his way 
of thinking in this thought experiment, perhaps it is not a claim that should be 
accommodated in a Kantian theory. Rather, perhaps Kant’s position will be 
strengthened by abandoning this difficult and controversial example and the 
philosophical commitments that are meant to support it. 
 Reading his retributivism as a specification of liability for punishment not only 
avoids these difficulties, it also enables the construction of a flexible, robust mixed 
theory of punishment. Many of Kant’s concerns about the dangers of a punitive system 
justified by and organized solely around an interest in generating deterrence are well 
founded. A theory of punishment that incorporates no significant ‘retributive’ 
constraints runs a serious risk of clashing with other, more fundamental elements of 
Kant’s practical philosophy. Although a purely deterrent approach to punishment 
might, as a practical matter, prescribe many of the same policies and practices that Kant 
views as essential – for example, punishing only the guilty – it would do so for reasons 
that Kant should ultimately reject as limited or misguided. According to Kantian 
protective deterrence, an interest in deterring crime might be what justifies that state’s 
use of punishment, but the application of this power should be meaningfully 
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constrained by the overriding concern for treating all citizens as ends in themselves. This 
interest can be best guaranteed by incorporating a retributive liability for punishment. 
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6     The Methods and Amount of Punishment: 
                                                  Ius Talionis vs. Rehabilitation 
 
 
 In addition to specifying why punishment is justified and who ought to be 
punished, a complete theory of punishment needs to identify the principles according to 
which punishment will actually be carried out. Knowing why we punish and whom we 
ought to punish is largely irrelevant without further specification of the form that 
punishment will take, or how much of it is warranted. It is in answering these concrete 
questions that a theory of punishment has its most palpable, practical effects. While 
these answer might be guided by considerations about the justification of the institution 
as a whole, the immediate experience of those who are punished by the state will be 
shaped primarily by the form and amount of penalty imposed. As such, these elements 
of a theory are of the greatest importance to the lives of the actual citizens who live 
within the state. 
 This chapter considers together the questions of what methods and amount of 
punishment are most consistent with the theory of Kantian protective deterrence. There 
are two reasons for addressing these two elements of the theory together. First, it is 
difficult to provide any strong specification of one without involving the other. Any 
answer as to the appropriate amount of punishment seems to require a specific 
conception of the form that this punishment will take, and vice versa. While it is possible 
to speak about equivalence between crime and punishment in only one respect or the 
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other in some very specific cases, most instances of punishment cannot be fully 
described without discussing the method and amount together.  
 The second reason for addressing the method and amount of punishment jointly 
lies in Kant’s own position on these questions. Kant famously argues in favor of the 
strict law of retribution, ius talionis.1 According to the principle of ius talionis, 
punishment ought to resemble the original crime as much as possible, both in form and 
in quantity. This sense of strict proportionality finds expression in the common saying 
“an eye for an eye.” For Kant, ius talionis serves as the basis for selecting both the 
method by which crime is punished and the amount of punishment that is applied to the 
criminal. For both principled and pragmatic reasons, Kant thinks that the purest, most 
just form of punishment is to do to the criminal what he or she has done to someone 
else. He writes, 
But what kind and what amount of punishment is it that public justice makes 
its principle and measure? None other than the principle of equality (in the 
position of the needle on the scale of justice), to incline no more to one side 
than to the other. Accordingly, whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon 
another within the people that you inflict upon yourself. If you insult him, you 
insult yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself. But only the law 
of retribution (ius talionis) – it being understood, of course, that this is applied 
by a court (not by your private judgment) – can specify definitely the quality 
and the quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and 
unsuited for a sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous 
considerations are mixed into them. (6:332)2 
                                                 
1 Traditionally, the law of retribution has been referred to by the Latin name of lex talionis. Kant’s 
decision to use ius instead of lex is not one that he ever directly explains or addresses, but the different 
shades of meaning between the Latin words ius and lex give some hints as to his reasons. While lex 
means law in a very literal sense – a mandatory edict promulgated by one with legally binding 
authority – ius has more abstract connotations. It refers broadly to the concept of law or legislative 
obligation, to the system of law in general, and to traditionally recognized rights and duties 
individuals have under the rule of law. Furthermore, ius is sometimes translated as ‘right;’ given 
Kant’s usage of recht and his focus here, his reliance on ius rather than lex is unsurprising. 
2 Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996. All internal citations refer to the standard Prussian Academy edition, volume and pages. 
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Analyzing the strict proportionality between crimes and punishments is simpler 
in some cases than others. Kant often uses the example of execution, as it is 
straightforward in both questions of method and amount: when a person murders 
another, execution resembles the crime in both respects. As we will see, however, this 
kind of strict proportionality is difficult or impossible to maintain in many other kinds of 
cases. Kant himself recognized some of these limitations, but he has no answer for either 
the full scope or depth of the issues caused by literal adherence to ius talionis. 
 I argue that Kant ought to abandon this literal understanding of the law of 
retribution. The obstacles to ius talionis are too great, even for a theory with a retributive 
justification. Trying to incorporate it into Kantian protective deterrence would prove 
impossible. Instead, I argue for the use of a metaphorical proportionality between crime 
and punishment that could serve as the basis for selection the method and amount of 
punishment. Unlike prior attempts at metaphorical proportionality, however, I contend 
that Kant ought to rely on rehabilitative methods. Not only do such methods of 
punishing provide a version of proportionality that avoids the difficulties facing ius 
talionis, they find interesting support from Kant’s lectures and from the Critique of 
Practical Reason. By specifying rehabilitative methods of punishing – and fixing the 
amount in a broadly deterrent manner – Kantian protective deterrence is able to provide 
a more complete, nuanced account of the way in which individual persons experience 
the institution of punishment.   
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6.1 The Methods of Punishment 
 Many of Kant’s statements on the topic of what methods should be used to 
punish criminals take the form of prohibitions against acts that would violate moral 
obligations to our fellow beings. These negative claims do not directly define the 
acceptable methods of punishing, but they do help to establish certain constraints. No 
matter the nature of their crimes, criminals retain their humanity, and as such they can 
never be treated as objects or as mere means to some other end. It is on this basis that 
Kant rules out the use of torture, mutilation, or other similar forms of punishment 
(27:552-553). Indeed, direct corporal punishment on a whole is ruled out on the basis 
that it treats the body of a person as an object.3 
 When it comes to the kinds of punishments that are acceptable, however, Kant 
provides less specific instruction. The guidance he does give is in the form of a general 
adherence to the principle of strict proportionality, as exemplified in retribution. 
According to this specific conception of ius talionis, the only way to proportionally 
answer a crime is to make the criminal experience an event as close as possible to the 
criminal action. If the criminal steals property, she should lose her property. If she 
                                                 
3 Whether Kant himself defended the view that all corporal punishments are unacceptable is a bit 
difficult to determine. On the one hand, he clearly supports the prohibition of punishment that would 
mutilate. On the other hand, he supports the use of very difficult labor as a penalty for some crimes. 
The line between this and corporal punishment is not easy to determine. Certainly, in both cases the 
body of the punished is used to accomplish some other end – namely, suffering. Kant seems to be 
drawing the line at any violence against the body of the criminal that would maim, incapacitate, or 
otherwise permanently harm him. Whether there is a good basis for drawing such a distinction, 
however, remains dubious. 
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murders, then she should die. He goes so far as to claim “All substituted means of 
punishment are lacking in proportion, and degenerate into mere arbitrariness” (27:555). 
There are several reasons behind Kant’s support for this literal interpretation of 
ius talionis. First, he maintains that this kind of strict proportionality is demanded by 
moral desert. A criminal simply deserves to experience the same thing as what she made 
another experience. Second, punishing via methods that resemble the crime is, in Kant’s 
view, a good way of ensuring that the amount of punishment also remains proportional. 
We will return to this issue below, but for now, suffice it to say that Kant thinks it will be 
easier to punish in the appropriate amount if we punish crimes in the same manner as 
they were committed. This is the sense in which he is speaking when he claims that any 
other method degenerates into “mere arbitrariness.” 
 From this, we can conclude that Kant imagines the appropriate method of 
punishment to be that which most closely resembles the crime committed, provided that 
this does not violate the moral dignity of the criminal. Thus, we know that murderers 
should be executed, but rapists may not be raped, and those guilty of bestiality should 
only be exiled (6:363). While perhaps not a perfect guide, this constrained ius talionis is at 
least clear in some instances. 
 Unfortunately, this conception of ius talionis has difficulties beyond what Kant 
recognizes. First, there are a number of crimes for which there is no clearly proportional 
penalty. It is easy to say that if I steal, I should have my property taken away. This 
becomes difficult, however, if I do not have any property. In punishing a property-less 
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thief or arson, then, the state would need to employ some other method. This threatens 
the literal understanding of ius talionis. 
Second, there are a wide range of cases in which it is not even clear what penalty 
could possibly resemble the crime. How ought I to be punished, for instance, if I 
threaten others with harm or property damage, but do not cause actual harm? 
Alternatively, what if I am guilty of jaywalking or trespassing? There are a wide range of 
legal offenses that do not seem to allow for any kind of reciprocal, proportionate 
punishment. Any punishment that the criminal could be made to experience will 
necessarily differ from the crime in significant respects. Ius talionis does not seem able to 
provide a clear answer about how to punish in these cases. 
 Third, within the set of crimes that do not seem to allow for a correlative 
punishment, there is a special group that deserves some attention. Consider cases in 
which one lies on an official form, cheats on his taxes, or smuggles illegal goods into the 
country. In each case, the violation at the heart of these crimes does not appear to be 
against any individual’s right to bodily integrity or ideal ownership over property, but 
rather against the state itself. While it is possible to explain the way in which such 
actions do infringe upon the particular freedoms of our fellow citizens – e.g., any 
damages against the state must be compensated by the rest of the citizen – to attempt to 
punish with strict resemblance in these cases seems a doomed enterprise. In addition, 
even a non-damaging criminal actions of this sort still threatens the authority of the 
state; as I argued in chapter four, while this is a poor justification for all legal sanctions, 
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deterring such threats is a sufficient reason to punish in this particular kind of case. 
Nevertheless, these crimes do no admit of any obvious parallel method of punishing. 
 On this particular worry, Kant has a partial answer. When discussing treason, 
Kant prescribes execution as the appropriate punishment (6:320). Although the state 
may not truly face a genuine threat to its continued existence, he characterizes treason as 
an action that aims at the ‘death’ of the state, and thus death is an appropriate response. 
In this way, he preserves the resemblance of crime and punishment. Even as ready as 
Kant is to suggest execution, it does not seem as though every crime that harms the state 
could be handled in this way. Trespassing on government property, for instance, 
presumably should not be punished by death. 
 Fourth, given that Kant’s version of ius talionis allows for such substitutions in 
certain instances, he has additional worries. When moral constraints or the impossibility 
of replicating the action in a penal setting renders substitution necessary, Kant faces a 
challenge in explaining why a particular substitute activity is more similar to the 
original criminal action than some other. Consider the case of my lying to some public 
official. Should I be fined, imprisoned, or required to perform some difficult labor? If ius 
talionis is our guide, then it seems as though there is no ready criterion to help us choose 
between these alternatives. None of them resembles my original action, and it is not 
clear that any of them resembles my original action any more than any of the others. 
 In light of these various concerns, it becomes clear that Kant so often relies on the 
example of execution because it is one of the few scenarios in which it is clear what 
penalty would most resemble the crime. In almost all cases, the method of punishment 
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looks very little like the original criminal act. If Kant is right that any substituted method 
lacks proportionality, then it would appear that proportionality is a lost cause. If we 
wish to preserve some semblance of proportionality, we must turn to a less strictly 
literal version than ius talionis.  
 Above, I demonstrated that Kant’s reasons for supporting ius talionis are 1) his 
understanding of the demands of moral desert and 2) his belief that resemblance in the 
method of punishment will help to ensure that the amount of punishment remains 
proportional. As I argued in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, this use of moral 
desert does not fit within the fundamental elements of Kant’s practical philosophy. 
According to Kantian protective deterrence, the state is not punishing in light of moral 
desert, but rather to accomplish deterrent goals, in service of its role in protecting its 
citizens’ free exercise of their external freedom. Without moral desert, the only reason 
for supporting ius talionis as the principle for determining the method of punishing is the 
belief that it helps to ensure the proportionality of the amount of punishment. Below, I 
will argue that this function of ius talionis is unnecessary and unhelpful – Kantian 
protective deterrence has better options available. 
 
6.2 The Amount of Punishment 
 If ius talionis has difficulty explaining what method of punishment ought to be 
used against a wrongdoer, it faces even greater difficulties in explaining the amount. In 
addition to specifying the form that punishment will take, a comprehensive theory will 
also need to explain how much punishment is appropriate. If the state determines that 
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imprisonment is the correct punishment for some offense, there remains the question of 
for how long the offender should be imprisoned. Some exceptions aside,4 any instance of 
punishing must include a specification of amount. In Kant’s traditional, retributive 
picture, this specification accords with the principle of ius talionis. 
 When applied to this issue, ius talionis tell us that the quantity of the punishment 
ought to be precisely equal to the quantity of the crime. The punishment should be 
neither more nor less severe than the crime itself. This kind of literal equivalence 
between crimes and punishments is relatively simple to work out for more basic 
violations. If I cause damage to another’s property, I must pay the victim an amount 
equal to the cost of the damage. The balance between crime and punishment is also 
straightforward in the case of murder. If I kill another, I in turn must be executed by the 
state. Although I will deal with the permissibility of execution more fully below, this is 
perhaps one of the clearest examples of equivalence in quantity between crime and 
punishment; both the victim and the murderer lose a life. 
 Unfortunately, not all crimes and punishments exemplify the clarity and ease of 
the law of retribution as well as murder. The picture of equivalence becomes fuzzier 
when dealing with many other kinds of crimes that are regularly committed. There are 
many types of criminal activity whose wrongfulness, damage, or harm are difficult to 
establish in quantitative terms. This applies both to so-called ‘victimless’ crimes and 
those that affect persons in some non-financial way. How are we to properly value the 
                                                 
4 Execution is the most obvious exception to this necessity. If a criminal is condemned to death for a 
crime, this obviously entails the amount of punishment as well. Barring failures in capital procedures, 
a person cannot be more executed. 
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wrongfulness of an assault or, even more difficult, the threat of assault? Such things 
seem impossible to quantify. 
 This difficulty sheds some light on why Kant is so committed to preserving 
equivalence between the crime and the method of punishing. Without it, it is not clear 
how we could ever make the criminal suffer an equal amount of harm. This is further 
complicated by an example that he frequently uses when discussing punishment. Using 
Scottish rebels as his example, Kant argues in favor of execution, on the grounds that 
this treats the honorable rebels fairly and the dishonorable rebels harshly (on the 
assumption that the latter would prefer life in prison, and the former would rather die) 
(6:334-335; 27:555). Here, Kant seems concerned with proportionality not between the 
crime and the amount of punishment, but between the inner character of the criminal 
and the amount of punishment. Trying to accommodate this element as well renders the 
possibility of achieving some kind of proportionality virtually impossible. Even setting 
aside the epistemic difficulties in the state assessing the inner character of an individual 
accused of criminal wrongdoing, the need to proportionately match the near infinite 
possible gradations in a person’s character makes such a policy infeasible. 
A further problem for ius talionis stems from its direct proportionality. Many of 
Kant’s predecessors in the early modern period explicitly rejected relying on ius talionis 
due to its inability to actually punish wrongdoers. Imagine a simple case: I steal $100 
from my neighbor. According to one literal interpretation of the law of retribution, my 
punishment ought to be $100. Clearly, this amounts to no punishment at all, regardless 
of whether one is an advocate of retributivism or deterrence. This seems to be a rather 
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uncharitable interpretation of ius talionis, however, and one that could be easily 
addressed. It would be perfectly reasonable for a proponent of ius talionis to argue in 
favor of both returning the original money, as well as paying an additional fine of $100. 
In this way, the criminal suffers the very thing she tried to inflict upon another. 
Even with this clarification, however, we might think that this kind of 
proportionality would fail to truly deter crime. When weighing the potential gains and 
losses, this low-stakes form of punishing might not convince some to abstain from 
committing impermissible acts. It might well be the case that many individuals would 
consider such crimes worth the risk. This also raises additional concerns about the 
possibility of the wealthy ‘buying’ the right to commit illegal actions – a concern that 
Kant takes seriously and attempts to prevent in the case of slander (6:332). The failure to 
deter crime effectively might be of no consequence to committed retributivists or 
adherents of ius talionis, but it certainly represents an additional reason for Kantian 
protective deterrence to be skeptical of the viability of ius talionis.  
 There are further problems for this strict proportionality that arise from the limits 
of punishing. If stealing $200 is punished twice as harshly as stealing $100, then we 
should expect to see this kind of increase in the amount of punishment for more serious 
crimes of all kinds. There are limitations to this, however. If a crime is to be punished 
with life in prison, then proportionality demands punishing a worse crime with a 
harsher sentence. Yet, adding more time to the prisoner’s sentence does not make the 
penalty worse. Likewise, if anyone who commits a murder must be executed, then it 
seems impossible to identify a proportional sanction for someone who commits two or 
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more murders. At some point, it seems as though we would reach an upper threshold – 
and, most likely, a lower one as well. 
 This leads us to the greatest difficulty for using a literal interpretation of the law 
of retribution as a means of determining the amount of punishment that is justified. Put 
simply, there are many crimes whose damage cannot be directly counted, weighed, or 
measured in a way that could be equivalent with a penalty. In some cases, this is due to 
the crime’s failure to result in any quantifiable harm, damage, or loss of external 
freedom for another citizen. If a person drives while intoxicated but does not get into an 
accident or fires a weapon in a public building but fails to hit anyone, it is not clear what 
the cost of her crime is. While such actions ought to be prohibited in light of the danger 
they pose or the rights they violate, the sanction attached to such laws remains 
mysterious. In some cases, it might be enough to punish based on the likely outcome or 
what was intended, rather than the criminal’s success; in this way, attempted murder, 
although it wrongs no one, would still be punished as seriously as actual murder. While 
this approach still faces difficulties – for instance, should we assume that my driving 
intoxicated will kill one or more people, or simply injure them? – it at least attempts to 
provide a means of quantifying hard cases. 
 But what of instances in which, although I intentionally break the law, I intend to 
do no harm? Imagine that while taking a shortcut to save myself time, I trespass on 
another’s property, but do no damage or cost the owner any expenses. Although I have 
violated the law, there is no clear way to make sense of what my punishment ought to 
be. Any number of public crimes could potentially be of this sort; while it is clear that 
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the rules exist for good reasons and their violation must be punished, the actual 
violations in question are not quantifiable in a way that would allow for an equivalent 
penalty. 
 Proportionality between crime and punishment is important. This insight has 
been shared by the majority of philosophers and theorists who have ever written on the 
subject. Whether this interest is supported by deterrent claims – disproportionate 
punishment is ultimately ineffective at deterring crime – or retributive claims about 
moral desert, it is clearly one that Kantian protective deterrence ought to try to 
accommodate. Ius talionis, however, is not a feasible way maintain this proportionality.  
 
6.3 Alternatives to Ius Talionis 
 Adherence to a strict interpretation of ius talionis is practically untenable. Simply 
put, there are too many implications of such a literal approach to proportionality that 
Kant could not accept within his theory. In an effort to preserve the proportionality 
between crimes and punishments, Kant interpreters have suggested employing non-
literal understandings of proportionality. These metaphorical approaches to 
proportionality come in several varieties, both retributive and deterrent. While they are 
improvements to the strict law of retribution, they still face many obstacles. 
 The first alternative to consider is a metaphorical understanding of ius talionis 
that arguably remains closest to Kant’s original literalism. Advocated by Jeffrie Murphy, 
this retributive interpretation holds that Kant should have argued that the sense of 
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proportionality that ius talionis requires is equivalent ordinal position, rather than trying 
to achieve some kind of cardinal equivalence. Murphy writes, 
P is proportional to C if and only if P, ranked on a scale of punishments from 
least to most severe, stands on the scale of punishments at the same point that 
C, ranked on a scale of crimes from least to most serious, stands on the scale 
of crimes.5 
 
 The basic argument here is straightforward: imagine that we develop a scale with 
ten crimes and ten punishments, each ranked from most severe to least severe. After we 
have these two scales, we can establish proportionality by linking the most severe crime 
to the most severe punishment, and so on down the list. 
 While this approach has the virtue of incorporating Kant’s concern for 
proportionality into a more workable system, I think that the ordinal ranking of crimes 
and punishments still faces serious problems. To begin with, we would need a strict 
ordering of all crimes and punishments. This would require a state not only to list every 
single crime and punishment possible, but it would need to establish a hierarchy for 
each list. The prospects of accomplishing this task seems inconceivable, especially in the 
case of crimes.  
For punishments, there is one way to avoid these difficulties and construct a 
system of penalties that could be ordinally ranked. This solution would require us to 
abandon systems that rely on a variety of different kinds of punishment (e.g., 
imprisonment vs. fines), instituting instead a system that exclusively utilizes a single 
form or method of punishment. For example, we could create a criminal justice system 
                                                 
5 Murphy, Jeffrie G. “Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 
(Apr. 1987), p. 530. 
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that punished through imprisonment or fines alone. In such a case, it would be relatively 
easy to ordinally rank penalties, for each additional day spent incarcerated or each 
additional dollar fined would represent a step up on the scale of punishment. 
 This would, of course, run counter to the concern that Kant expresses for 
proportionality in method of punishment as well. Murphy’s proposal focuses 
exclusively on proportionality in the amount of punishment, without reference to 
preserving the resemblance of crimes and punishments. So long as we want a Kantian 
theory to capture proportionality in both method and amount, this kind of solution 
would be unavailable. Murphy’s proposal, then, seems to face a dilemma: as long as 
there are different methods of punishing, weighing them against one another seems 
impossible; using only a single method of punishing avoids this problem, but it seems to 
sacrifice an important feature of the retributivism that Murphy is defending.  
 If creating an ordinal ranking of punishments is difficult, achieving a similar 
ordinal ranking of crimes is even less feasible. To do so, we would need to be capable of 
comparing any two crimes and determining which is worse. This would likely require 
the very kind of quantification of crime that proved difficult for the literal ius talionis in 
the first instance. One might try to answer this challenge by proposing some kind of 
consensus of Millian ‘competent judges.’ Clearly, it is uncontroversial to say that 
assaulting another person is worse than stealing an object of little value from another. 
There is a limit to this consensus, though, and to try to determine whether minor 
physical harm or serious emotional harm as a result of harassment, intimidation, and 
threats is worse is to engage in a hopeless enterprise. The very possibility of competent 
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judges seems unattainable, as these individuals would have to have experienced every 
possible crime. 
Even if we could solve for this problem, though, the actual equivalence between 
the ordinal ranking of crimes and the ordinal ranking of penalties in Murphy’s account 
does not seem guaranteed to resemble anything like what Kant suggests. To illustrate 
this point, imagine we live in a society in which there is a maximum fine for theft or 
property damage. We. It is quite likely that one could do damage in excess of this 
amount, meaning that this crime would be met by a penalty that is of a lesser 
quantitative value. For stealing $100 from my neighbor, I might only be fined $25, 
because this crime and punishment occupy the same position on our ordinal ranking. If 
this is the case, we have preserved the spirit of ius talionis in a way that seems to directly 
contradict the letter of ius talionis. 
 Murphy gives no defense of this version of proportionality; perhaps he merely 
sees it as the best of a group of bad options available to Kant. While he is right to suggest 
that we ought to preserve some kind of connection between the worst crimes and the 
worst penalties (a feature that Byrd and Ripstein’s theories cannot fully accommodate, 
as discussed in chapter four), the ordinal ranking system is simply too impractical to be 
a working alternative. It has the same fatal flaw that undermines the literal law of 
retribution: the damage or harm of crimes cannot always be satisfactorily quantified. 
 Rather than trying to preserve the spirit of ius talionis by proposing an ordinal 
ranking of crimes and punishments, a second alternative tries modifying it to take 
deterrence into account more directly. Altered in this way, the appropriate amount of 
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punishment would be determined by the amount that is necessary to deter crime. In this 
scenario, the proportionality is between a specific crime and the amount of penalty that 
is required to deter it. This alternative avoids some of the problems associated with 
Kant’s commitment to proportionality as necessitated by moral desert, and it seems as 
though it would be a good fit with Kantian protective deterrence. Unfortunately, 
deterrence alone cannot meaningfully preserve the kind of proportionality that we are 
seeking. As we will see, the shortcomings of a purely deterrent approach to 
proportionality can only be overcome by the introduction of some rehabilitative 
elements. 
 The first concern we might have regarding this deterrence view is that the 
proportionality might very well not track our expectations. According to this view, the 
proportionality between a crime and its punishment is not an equivalence between the 
harms of the two. Rather, the equivalence in question is between the punishment and 
the amount of coercive force it would take to discourage crime. In other words, harsher 
penalties would not be applied to worse crimes, but rather to those crimes that are 
harder to deter. Indeed, it seems at least possible that the state would begin punishing 
tempting, minor crimes – like jaywalking or speeding – more seriously than it punishes 
serious crimes that individuals are less likely to commit, such as murder. While this 
result is by no means contradictory or obviously incorrect, it does seem to stray 
dramatically from both the Kantian and traditional understanding of proportionality. 
 In addition, there are further obstacles specific to fixing the amount of 
punishment in a strictly deterrent way. First, it is not clear whether the deterrence we 
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seek is primarily individual or collective. Any deterrence theory is going to support 
achieving both kinds of deterrence, but which ought to be prioritized in cases of conflict? 
Suppose we discover that it takes less of a penalty to discourage a criminal from 
repeating her or his crime than it does to vicariously deter other potential violators. 
Indeed, it might even be the case that a penalty harsh enough to effectively achieve 
vicarious deterrence might even increase the likelihood of individual recidivism, as the 
individual’s future options are diminished. In this case, which amount ought we to 
prefer? 
 If we select the harsher penalty in favor of gaining the widest possible 
deterrence, we still have difficulties to consider. To start, what percentage of the 
population needs to be deterred by the punishment? Is a penalty that deters 50% of the 
population sufficient? Must it deter 90%? We might ask the same question about 
individuals; what likelihood of recidivism are we willing to accept? In addition to these 
questions, we can say with near certainty that different individuals are likely to have 
wildly different responses to threats. As Hill writes,6 imagine a situation in which there 
is some small minority of individuals who are especially difficult to deter, either 
vicariously or directly. How much punishment should we be willing to inflict to secure 
their deterrence? 
 Finally, there is an additional worry about proportional deterrence that is unique 
to Kant. If we return to the passage in which Kant first lays out his adherence to ius 
                                                 
6 Hill, Thomas E. “Treating Criminals as Ends in Themselves.” Jahrbuch fuer Recht und Ethik, Vol. 11 
(2003), pp. 30-31. 
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talionis, we can glimpse part of his motivation for selecting a strict law of retribution as 
his guiding principle. He writes, “All other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a 
sentence of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into 
them,” (6:332). It seems possible, then, that at least part of his concern is that any other 
means of establishing practical principles of punishment necessarily involve 
considerations about particular cases, considerations that, due to their variable nature, 
fluctuate in impermissible ways. Laws and their correlative sanctions, by Kant’s own 
definition, must be universally applicable, meaning that we should not accept a theory 
that allows for the methods and amount of punishment to vary on a case by case basis.7 
Whatever our alternative to ius talionis, it must be capable of providing a stable answer 
to the question of the appropriate amount of punishment; in this way, much of Kant’s 
reason for objecting would be negated. 
 Using deterrence to determine the amount of punishment that is appropriate 
might solve for some problems, but it does not, on its own, guarantee this kind of 
stability. As we have seen, if our aim is to deter individuals, then in some cases it might 
be necessary to sentence different criminals to different amounts of punishment. In 
order for deterrent proportionality to be a full alternative to ius talionis, it needs an 
additional constraint. 
                                                 
7 There are a few forms of flexibility that might potentially be consistent with the Kantian 
understanding of law. Flexibility in judicial sentencing, for instance, could conceivably be construed as 
permissible. In this case, however, the rationale would have to be that the law establishes a range of 
appropriate punishments, to be adjusted based on specific factors. In truth, the judge would not have 
flexibility in the sense that we use the term in the U.S. legal system; rather, she or he would still be 
required to issue determinate punishments in light of particular details. 
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6.4 The Formula of Humanity and Rehabilitation 
 I contend that the constraints needed to provide stability and a more traditional 
conception of proportionality to strict deterrence can be achieved through the 
introduction of rehabilitative elements into Kant’s theory. Although Kant’s strict anti-
paternalism seems dramatically opposed to rehabilitative efforts, these two concepts 
need not be working at cross purposes. Given the punishment is already the violation of 
a citizen’s external freedom, against her or his phenomenal will, for purposes the state 
deems necessary, the very institution of punishment represents one half of the 
paternalism that Kant loathes. The other half – and the one that punishment 
traditionally lacks – is that this state intrusion is motivated by a concern for the citizen’s 
wellbeing. Rehabilitative punishment ostensibly violates this second condition. If 
rehabilitative interests merely structure the methods of punishing and not its motivation 
or justification, however, then this would not be the case. Kant could not accept 
rehabilitation as a justification, but that is no obstacle to his accepting it as the means for 
selecting the appropriate method of punishment. 
 This is not to say that there are no obstacles. That punishment can deter enjoys 
the status of an accepted fact. Whether punishment can also rehabilitate is decidedly less 
accepted. Although efforts to reform and rehabilitate criminals have been characteristic 
of the modern penal reforms beginning in the nineteenth century, some might question 
the possibility of this project. Kant expresses this view in his lectures. Engaging in 
rational psychology, he claims that “[Punishments] invariably damage morality; the 
victim believes that if the law had not been there, he would not suffer the physical evil; 
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thus the law brings about an aversion towards it on his part, and he is thereby hampered 
from passing free judgments on the morality of his action” (27:556). 
 Is he correct? The psychological phenomenon he describes is not inconceivable; 
people might respond in the way he claims. They might not, however, and it is not at all 
obvious that an individual punished by the state will necessarily, in all cases, experience 
a degree of resentment that deforms the individual’s moral character and obscures her 
will. It is possible that the correct application of punitive force could serve to aid one in 
making better choices going forward. This is an empirical question, to be sure, and as 
such it seems prudent not to rule out either possibility without sufficient evidence. 
 Even within Kant’s lectures, this claim – that punishment can serve to 
rehabilitate – finds some support. Here, Kant is recorded as saying that “Rewards and 
punishments can indeed serve indirectly as a means in the matter of moral training,” 
(27:288). He even indirectly provides a picture of how this would work. When 
describing the role that external factors can play in affecting the functioning of our will, 
Kant states, 
In general, if the countermeasures are adequate to weaken the inclination, 
and enliven his sensory feeling by another contrary feeling in collision with it, 
we are then in a position to ensure that continuing habituation will weaken 
the power of inclination, and thereafter moral grounds have an impact, so that 
by removal of the obstacle he is thus made free, and can be brought, by this 
pathological expedient, to a recognition of his duty. (27:522)  
 
 The pathological expedient that Kant references can be any external incentive – 
includinghe threat or act of punishment. If it is balanced properly, then it can serve as a 
countermeasure to the inclinations that serve to distract us from what the moral law 
requires of us. While too strong a sanction might have the effect that Kant discusses 
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above – namely, causing one to resent the law – a properly balanced punishment could 
effectively rehabilitate a wrongdoer. Such a punishment would not interfere with the 
subject’s will, but rather remove obstacles that threaten to impair proper use of the will. 
 There is a further reason to think fundamental elements of Kant’s practical 
philosophy leave room for the possibility of rehabilitation. Kant is famously committed 
to the view that any person, regardless of past experiences, external circumstances, or 
apparent character, has the capacity to make moral or immoral choices (5:28-30; 6:50). 
We all have the capacity for acting morally – a claim that Kant holds to be self-evident – 
and any record of bad behavior can be potentially reversed. Given this radical freedom, 
we should conclude that all persons are capable of being rehabilitated. One method by 
which this could be accomplished is the properly balanced pathological incentive, 
discussed above. 
 All of this demonstrates that Kant could allow for the use of rehabilitative 
methods of punishing, but I still need to show why this would be desirable. The answer 
to this question lies in the best alternative to ius talionis. Rather than fixing the methods 
or amount of punishment by reference to the law of retribution, Kantian protective 
deterrence advocates making these specifications in accordance with a proactive 
understanding of the formula of humanity. Rather than a simple duty of non-
interference, we should read the formula of humanity as offering positive prescriptions – 
albeit, indeterminate ones. Respect for the rational, free personhood of others requires us 
to not only avoid using them as mere means, but also to attempt to foster in them the 
conditions necessary for their personhood. What this means will vary from case to case; 
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most typically, it will require us to help others pursue their ends, provided that these are 
not inconsistent with morality of the universal principle of right. This obligation must 
always stop short of the kind of paternalistic interference that actually diminishes the 
freedom of those we seek to respect. Even if a person believes he knows what is best for 
his friend, he is not free to make choices for his friend.8 As a practical point, both 
individual citizens and the state are rarely in a position to know whether an act of 
intercession would represent the violation of an individual’s freedom or the removal of a 
pathological impediment to her agency. In punishment, however, we find a unique 
situation: by engaging in a criminal action, a citizen demonstrates an inability to act in a 
fully rational and autonomous way.  
 Ordinarily, the state would not be justified in using coercive force to rehabilitate 
its citizens’ moral character. To do so would be to overstep its authority and contradict 
its purpose. In the case of punishment, however, these concerns are lessened or 
removed. According to Kantian protective deterrence, the criminal’s actions have 
already authorized the government to use coercive force against her to ensure the 
continued deterrent efficacy of the law. While this application of force must still be 
consistent with the individual’s status as an end in herself, the concerns about the state 
overstepping its purview by evaluating elements of a person’s moral character are 
answered. Further, in the same way that the rational consent of the criminal’s ideal, 
legislative nature can justify the coercive use of punitive force for deterrent ends, it does 
                                                 
8 As I discussed in chapter four, educating children is a special kind of case in which parents or 
guardians are not only permitted to make choices for children based on what they believe to be in the 
best interest of the child, they are obligated to do so.  
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not seem difficult to imagine that a person could rationally consent to undergoing 
rehabilitative training if he or she breaks the law. 
 By adopting rehabilitative methods of punishment,9 the state could select those 
practices that best express equal respect for the dignity of all persons, including both the 
criminal and the victims of the crime. It is important to note, however, that this 
rehabilitation does not aim simply at producing a specific outcome. If this were the case, 
rehabilitation could take the form of brainwashing. To ‘rehabilitate’ in this manner, 
though, would not demonstrate respect for the personhood of the criminal. Proper 
Kantian rehabilitation would aim to employ methods that engage the rational aspect of 
the criminal and provide training that would serve to counteract the pathological 
impediments to one’s acting rightly. Although this would likely result in a person being 
less likely to commit future criminal acts, it would be for the right reasons.10 
 In his paper “Treating Criminals as Ends in Themselves,”11 Hill has offers a 
rough, preliminary sketch of what kinds of changes to the criminal justice system would 
be necessitated by a more robust incorporation of the formula of humanity. Using this 
sketch as a starting point, I will offer a partial account of the sort of punitive strategies 
that express the appropriate respect for the equal dignity of all persons. Hill’s paper has 
a number of objectives, but the section I am most interested in sets aside Kant’s 
                                                 
9 At present, I am only defending the idea of using rehabilitative methods of punishing. I will discuss 
the obstacles to using rehabilitation to fix the amount of punishment below. 
10 Merle also defends the idea that rehabilitation could be the appropriate way of expressing respect 
for convicted criminals. See Merle, Jean-Christophe. German Idealism and the Concept of Punishment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
11 Ibid., pp. 17-36. 
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professed view of punishment, imagining instead what kind of theory we might expect 
if we knew only the basics of his moral and political thought. To this end, he writes, 
How much punishment is appropriate to various offenses? From the Kantian 
legislative perspective sketched above, this would be a very complex question 
because there are many relevant factors to consider. However, certain over-
simple answers are clearly ruled out. For example, we cannot seek answers 
by a consequentialist cost/benefit analysis that treats all values as 
commensurable. Nor can we suppose that offenders have a judicially 
discernible “inner desert” that can be rated on a scale proportionate to the 
severity of various punishments. The relative effectiveness of deterrent 
threats would be relevant, but it cannot be decisive by itself because this could 
authorize punishments that are too severe, or too light, from the perspective 
that reflects the equal dignity of all persons.12 
 
 Although Hill’s view is only the beginning of a full alternative, it does provide us 
with an intriguing possibility. In order to guide his deliberations about the appropriate 
methods of punishment, Hill focuses his use of the formula of humanity on the 
expression of respect. He considers the various pitfalls that practical policies, such as 
mandatory fixed sentences for crimes,13 would face in light of the way in which they 
succeed or fail to express respect for the “equal dignity of all persons.”  
 One might ask why this particular case is one in which he should strive to 
actively express respect. After all, the individual toward whom such an expression 
would be directed is a criminal. If one knew nothing of Kant’s established view of 
punishment, however, this might not seem so strange. When we punish, we inflict some 
harm in the interest of preserving the deterrent efficacy of the law. The fact that the 
person who will bear this harm has committed a crime is certainly not an irrelevant 
factor; a large portion of this chapter sought to establish that this fact plays an important 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p 30. 
13 Ibid., p 31. 
 219 
 
role. Nevertheless, the fact of this person’s criminality does nothing to diminish their 
moral worth as a rational being that is capable of setting ends. Given the situation, it 
does not seem unreasonable to suggest that an active expression of respect could go a 
long way toward decreasing the dehumanization of criminals, as well as their animosity 
toward the law. 
 This would also be in keeping with at least one understanding of Kant’s claim 
that punishment is itself a categorical imperative. According to Scheid, we should 
understand the claim that punishment is a categorical imperative as applying to fixed 
rules of distribution, rather than a strict need for retribution. Scheid offers the following 
explanation for Kant’s confusing and controversial claim: 
Some people have taken this to mean that punishment, as such, is imperative, 
apart from its consequences. Just before this passage, however, Kant claims 
the criminal's innate personality protects him against being manipulated 
merely as a means; and Kant urges against reducing the punishment in a 
particular case so as to gain some utilitarian advantage. What Kant implies is 
that the law governing legal punishment is a categorical imperative against 
using utilitarian considerations to adjust punishments in particular cases. It 
is clear from the full passage that Kant is talking about the allotment of 
individual punishments. Again, the point is that judges must not take 
utilitarian considerations into account when deciding sentences. Hence, the 
“categorical imperative” refers to questions of distribution or allotment and 
is addressed to the judges within the system of legal punishment.14 
 
 It is precisely this concern for expressing respect the equal dignity of all persons, 
I posit, that can serve as the rationale for using rehabilitative means of punishing. If we 
accept that persons have the capacity for moral improvement and that punishment, if 
properly balanced, can accomplish this improvement, then true respect for these 
individuals as ends in themselves should require us to facilitate this improvement. Note 
                                                 
14 Scheid, pp. 279-280 
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that this would not represent an interference with the free will of the criminal; it would 
merely be the balancing of one pathological incentive with another.  
 This display of respect for the dignity of the criminal’s moral nature by removing 
pathological impediments would not, however, extend to other citizens; the state’s 
acting in such a way would be far too great of a violation of individual freedom. For 
individuals who have committed crime, the state’s interests already require using them 
to further the deterrent efficacy of the threats of legal sanction – a use to which the 
citizens rationally consent, as colegislators. Given that they will be used in this way, the 
state has already begun making decisions on their behalf. It seems to be a better 
expression of respect for the dignity of the criminal to deter future crimes through 
rehabilitative efforts than to merely cause suffering as a way of frightening others. 
 These rehabilitative methods can also better express respect for the dignity of 
those harmed or wronged by the crime committed than retributivism. For the 
retributivist, the way of expressing respect for these persons is causing the perpetrator to 
suffer. With rehabilitative methods, however, punishment becomes a tool for 
eliminating the circumstances, motivations, and maxims that made the crime possible in 
the first place. While some victims might feel better respected by the state’s retributive 
harming of the guilty, this comes across more as an exclusive desire for vengeance.  
 By instituting an equal regard for the rational humanity of each criminal being 
punished, we could guarantee not only proportionality, but address some of the 
concerns about equality and stability that troubled the deterrent approach. Although 
their nature as biological humans might entail differences in their responsiveness to 
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threats – thus necessitating penalties of varying strengths – attention to these differences 
would be ignored. Focusing on such features might appear to offer a higher level of 
respect for each individual, but in reality the differences to which we would be 
attending are of no greater moral significance than mere inclination. The best way to 
show respect would be to institute a policy of equal punishments for the same crime, 
regardless of personal details.15 
 Throughout this section, I have been focusing on the appropriate means for 
selecting the method of punishing that will be employed. There still remains a question, 
though, of what amount of punishment is appropriate. Given that I have argued in favor 
of rehabilitative methods as the best way to express the kind of respect for persons as 
ends in themselves, it might seem natural to fix the amount of punishment 
rehabilitatively as well. According to this approach, the correct amount of punishment 
would be however much it takes to rehabilitate an individual. 
 While this has some appealing features, I think that this approach to determining 
and specifying the appropriate amount of punishment faces too many difficulties. Kant 
is heavily committed to a high degree of agnosticism or skepticism about our ability to 
understand the motivations and maxims of ourselves and others. Verifying whether or 
not an individual had been successfully rehabilitated would require an impossible 
amount of insight into an individual’s character and inner psychology.  
                                                 
15 Obviously, certain personal details might still be considered exculpatory. For instance, insanity 
might still be a reason for decreasing a sentence. This case, however, represents a special class of 
exceptions. Allowing for such exceptions need not be incompatible with prohibiting the practice of 
determining penalties based on one’s individual receptiveness to the deterrent force of threats. 
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 Instead of focusing on this rehabilitation of character, I posit that we should fall 
back to deterrence as the means for selecting the appropriate amount of punishment. 
Criminals would experience punishment designed to rehabilitate, but rather than 
specifying the appropriate amount as whatever produces a change in the criminals’ 
character, the amount would be that which deters further crime. These two amounts 
might ultimately be the same, but they need not be. We might worry that it is just as 
difficult to determine whether an individual has been successfully deterred as it is to 
determine if he has been successfully rehabilitated. I do not think this is so, for two 
reasons. The first is that deterrence has both individual and vicarious functions. Even if 
we have difficulties with the first, success at the second could still be an effective way of 
determining the appropriate amount of punishment. Second, it is easier to observe 
regularities in the amount of penalty that will be required to deter crime than it would 
be to try to create general policies about how much punishment it would take to 
rehabilitate. As long as some target percentage of the population was deterred, then we 
would know we had the correct amount of punishment. 
 This cooperation between rehabilitation and deterrence also has the virtue of 
capturing the spirit of Kant’s practical philosophy. The rehabilitative methods of 
punishing serve well to fulfill the justifying purpose of punishment, namely the 
deterrence of future criminal actions. It does so in a way that comports with the duty to 
express respect for the equal dignity of all persons that stems from the formula of 
humanity. Yet, at the same time, it refrains from overly paternalistic concern with the 
character of the citizens. So long as they are effectively deterred, the state’s interest in 
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punishing is satisfied; no further punishment is to reform their characters. As Kant 
writes, these policies should be sufficient to maintain a rightful condition, even amongst 
a nation of rational devils (8:366). 
 
6.5 Execution 
 Perhaps the most infamous aspect of Kant’s theory of punishment is his 
endorsement of the permissibility – indeed, the necessity – of capital punishment. Given 
the frequency with which Kant uses murder as his primary example of crime, one might 
mistakenly come to the conclusion that Kant favored executing criminals for all manner 
of offenses. While this is not the case, there are crimes other than murder that he believes 
merit execution, including – but not limited to – treason and the attempted or successful 
assassination of political officials (6:320). Although he does not suggest a method by 
which the condemned ought to be executed, it seems clear from his stance on torture 
that it ought to be swift and cause no more pain or suffering than is necessary. Death, 
rather than misery, is the sentence and the goal. 
 Kant’s support for capital punishment is based upon moral desert, as specified 
by ius talionis. Given the difficulties that led me to reject ius talionis as a suitable principle 
by which to fix the methods and amount of punishment, there is no reason why Kantian 
protective deterrence must hold execution to be strictly necessitated in the kinds of cases 
that Kant describes. Just because it is not required, however, does not meant that 
execution is always impermissible. In order to make some stronger claim about the 
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absolute prohibition of capital punishment, I will need to go beyond simply showing 
that Kant’s reasons for supporting it do not apply to Kantian protective deterrence. 
 In this section, I will endeavor to do precisely that. I will argue that execution is 
inconsistent with Kantian protective deterrence, on the grounds that executing fails, in 
almost every case, to respect the humanity of the target. Building off of the same 
arguments I employed above to defend rehabilitation, I contend that genuine respect for 
the autonomy and humanity of a person is incompatible with ending his or her life. 
Although I will consider a small class of cases in which it is possible to kill a person 
while still holding him or her as an end, I will argue that these cases are not of the right 
sort to ground even a limited legal use of capital punishment.  
 Given the deterrent justification of punishment I have been defending, the most 
obvious place to object to the use of capital punishment might be to cast doubt on its 
effectiveness at deterring future offenses. While capital punishment is inarguably 
effective as a deterrent against future crimes being committed by the one being 
executed, there are other ways to guarantee the same outcome without resorting to 
execution (such as lifelong imprisonment). Furthermore, capital punishment’s 
effectiveness as a vicarious deterrent is highly suspect, with numerous empirical studies 
demonstrating little to no effect on the commission of crime.16 Even if execution does 
                                                 
16 See Radelet, Michael L. and Lacock, Traci L. “Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of 
Leading Criminologists.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. 99, No. 2 (2009), pp. 48-508. 
There are opposing studies that do purport to show a deterrent effect; See, Dezhbakhsh, Hashem et al. 
“Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data.” 
American Law and Economics Review. Vol. 5, No. 2 (2003), pp. 344-376; and Ehrlich, Isaac. “Capital 
Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Evidence.” Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. 85, No. 4 (August 1977), pp. 741-88. 
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have some deterrent force, we might conclude that it is insufficiently effective to justify 
the loss of life. For all these reasons, a deterrent theorist might argue that empirical 
contingencies would prevent execution from being justified as an appropriate form of 
punishment. 
 Although these are all legitimate concerns, they are most likely insufficient to 
demonstrate the absolute impermissibility of execution as a punishment within the 
context of Kantian protective deterrence. Recall that I have been advancing a mixed 
theory. While deterrence serves as the justification, the other elements of the theory are 
not merely intended to maximize the deterrent force of legal prohibitions. Execution 
could be ruled out if it were directly counter-productive to the deterrent justification, 
but it is unlikely that this strong a claim could be empirically demonstrated and 
defended. Thus, even if capital punishment is not the most deterrent possible option, it 
could still be permitted. 
 Simple deterrence, however, is not the only possible reason to reject execution. 
Instead, we should focus on the act of killing itself and the mindset of the executioner. 
There is a substantial literature addressing the question of Kant’s commitment to capital 
punishment, representing a number of different points of view.17 Although there is no 
consensus, there is a common thread running through some of the scholarship: the act of 
                                                 
17 Altman, Matthew C. “Subjecting Ourselves to Capital Punishment: A Rejoinder to Kantian 
Retributivism.” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 247-264; Ataner, Atilla. “Kant on 
Capital Punishment and Suicide.” Kant Studien. Vol. 97, No. 4, pp. 452–482; Yost, Benjamin S. “Kant’s 
Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered.” Kantian Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2010. 
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killing – or a law requiring the same – seems to be impossible to morally carry out 
against anyone that the killer truly regards as a person.18 
 The basic points of this view are grounded in Kant’s moral philosophy. As a 
bearer of rationality and autonomy, a person should never be treated as a thing (4:228). 
Part of what this means is that the wills of others should have a direct or indirect effect 
on the way we behave; we ought not to behave in ways that could not be universalized, 
and we should not treat others in ways to which they could not morally consent. 
Furthermore, a person could never morally consent to her own death. Thus, the act of 
killing another must always be a moral wrong; to engage in it is to treat the victim as a 
thing, rather than a person. 19  
 One might be tempted to say that this argument would rule out the possibility of 
punishing in any way. After all, every time someone is punished, it is mostly likely 
                                                 
18 Self-defense seems like a necessary exception to this claim. In instances of self-defense, Kant holds 
that you could conceivable kill another person without acting in a way that fails to respect him as an 
end in himself. Doing so is only permissible, though, because it actively hinders a hindrance to 
freedom – namely, one’s own. In the case of execution, it is no longer the case that death is an active 
hindering to a hindrance to freedom. While the threat of capital punishment might be construed in this 
way, I find this too indirect an explanation. A person could consent to a law whose sanction threatens 
to use any violator – including herself – to deter others, but she could not consent to die for this 
purpose. 
19 There is also reason to think that Kant should object to execution on grounds of concern for its effect 
on the executioner. When considering whether we might have obligations to animals, Kant concludes 
that despite the impossibility of a direct duty not to harm non-rational animals, we nevertheless ought 
to refrain from needless violence, due to what such behavior does to us (27:710). He argues that 
wanton cruelty to animals can warp our moral sensibilities, making us more prone to violence. 
Evidence suggests that those who participate in executing convicted criminals are more prone to 
mental health issues, including violent behavior and suicidal tendencies. While engaging in activities 
that lead to such outcomes might violate a duty to oneself, I think there are ultimately much stronger 
and more obvious ways to demonstrate the impermissibility of suicide within Kant’s practical 
philosophy. For details about secondary trauma, see Gil, Amanda et al. “Secondary Trauma 
Associated with State Executions: Testimony Regarding Execution Procedures.” Journal of Psychiatry 
and Law. Vol. 34 (2006), pp. 25-36.  
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against his will. This is not the case, however; as I have argued above, criminals can and 
do will their punishment in a rational, hypothetical sense. Death, however, cannot be 
willed in this same manner. To understand why death is particularly something to 
which a person could never consent, we should look to what Kant writes in the 
Groundwork about impermissibility of suicide: 
If he destroys himself in order to escape from a trying condition he makes 
use of a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the 
end of life.  A human being, however, is not a thing and hence not something 
that can be used merely as a means, but must in all his actions always be 
regarded as an end in itself.  I cannot, therefore, dispose of a human being in 
my own person by maiming, damaging, or killing him. (4:429) 
 
 Kant’s reasoning is that any person who commits suicide destroys himself in 
order to achieve some end, and in so doing, uses himself as a means to that end. There’s 
good logical and textual reason to think that this is not always the case. Indeed, ending 
one’s own life can – in certain cases – be an expression of respect for autonomy. In 
Collins’s lecture notes, Kant discusses the case of Cato the Younger, who famously 
committed suicide in order to preserve his dignity and help protect republican Rome. 
Kant speaks positively of this decision, highlighting the fact that Cato was to be put to 
death by Caesar and that his choice to end his own life was taken only because of the 
great effect that his suicide would have in preserving the freedom of his nation (or, at 
least, so Cato hoped). While suicide to preserve the freedom of a nation is presumably 
quite rare, the fact that taking one’s own life might be permissible in certain cases 
indicates that it is conceptually possible to hold a person as an end even in the act of 
killing him or her. 
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 This possibility is connected to the reason that Kant takes life to be valuable. He 
states that “in and for itself, life is in no way to be highly prized” (27:372); preserving 
our lives, then, is foremost amongst our duties to ourselves for reasons other than our 
mere biological existence. Elsewhere in Collins’s notes, Kant gives us an indication that 
what we must preserve is our freedom (27:342-334). Suicide is wrong because it destroys 
all future freedom. Only by living, even through great hardship, can we show an 
adequate degree of respect for the rational autonomy of our person and act in 
accordance with the greatest freedom for all. This also comports with the example of 
Cato: in his case, his autonomy was greatly constrained, and he recognized that it would 
be extinguished altogether in the near future. By committing suicide, he did not 
eliminate any future freedom; instead, he made the last free choice that was available to 
him in the hopes that it would inspire greater freedom and autonomy.  
 To sum up, suicide is typically prohibited, as it involves willing the destruction 
of one’s own autonomy and humanity. While properly recognizing the value of these 
features of ourselves, it is impossible to also act in such a way as to end one’s own life. 
By willing death, one wills an abrogation of one’s freedom, which is both inconsistent 
with other universal goals of human beings and lacking in appropriate respect for the 
capacity that makes humans into moral persons.  Only in cases in which this freedom is 
already lost can a person permissibly will her or his own death. For instance, a person 
facing a drastic loss of autonomy might permissibly end her own life, if doing so was a 
final act of respect for her own humanity. Even if the fate of the republic does not hang 
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in the balance, the certain prospect of debilitating disease could serve as a sufficient 
reason to use the final exercise of one’s autonomy to end one’s own life.20  
 If this is right, then it has implications for the permissibility of execution. 
Executing another – like killing oneself – is typically inconsistent with the moral 
imperative to treat that person as an end in herself. The example of Cato or the person 
who kills herself in the face of debilitating terminal illness shows that it is sometimes 
possible to end the life of an autonomous being while still holding that being as a person 
worthy of respect. While this might carve out room for permissible instances of 
euthanasia, it is unlikely that it could ever be sufficient to ground capital punishment. . 
would be practically viable. There are numerous reasons why it seems wither  
 We can conclude, then, that capital punishment could not be established as a 
legal possibility within Kantian protective deterrence. This is another instance in which I 
am compelled to reject outright some of Kant’s own statements. These statements, 
though, are ones that seem deeply irreconcilable with the very foundations of Kant’s 
moral philosophy. Given his commitment to the view that all people are capable of 
reform, no matter how badly they have acted in the past, it seems unconscionable for 
anyone to execute another person. Doing so requires one to reject the status of the victim 
as deserving of respect.  
 
 
                                                 
20 This would also cover ending someone else’s life, under similar circumstances. While mercy killing 
would still remain impermissible, physician-assisted suicide would presumably become permissible. 
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Conclusion 
 There is a certain purity to the strict retributivism that Kant advocated in his 
writings on practical philosophy. As an advocate of deep retributivism, all the elements 
of his theory fit together with a kind of singular harmony. Once it becomes clear that 
Kant does not have the means to explain why the state would be justified in responding 
to this moral desert, however, the purity of this account becomes its own downfall. Ius 
talionis is compelling in its apparent simplicity, but upon closer examination, any 
number of fatal flaws undermine its viability as a principle by which a state could settle 
upon the appropriate methods and amount of punishment. Without Kant’s strict 
retributive justification, there remains no good reason to try to rehabilitate the literal 
understanding of ius talionis. 
 Instead, it is necessary to seek a less literal way to satisfy Kant’s concern for 
proportionality. Although the traditional way of solving these issues – the fitting of 
crimes to punishment based on their relative positions on the ‘scale’ – does not avoid all 
the problems, I have argued that there is hope. Specifically, by focusing on rehabilitative 
methods of punishing, proportionality in punishment becomes more focused on 
respecting the humanity of the criminal by committing to fostering the conditions of her 
rational agency. This commitment to punishment as a way of respecting the autonomy 
of the criminal by trying to foster within her the conditions for free and rational choice is 
a way of further constraining the dangers of run-away deterrence that Kant fears, and it 
is deeply harmonious with his Formula of Humanity. 
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7             Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: 
        Resisting and Punishing State Authority 
 
 The striking contrast between Kant’s personal enthusiasm for the American and 
French revolutions and his strict, near-authoritarian political philosophy has been 
extensively documented in recent years.1 While many of these papers focus on 
demonstrating the underlying consistency of his simultaneous condemnation of 
rebellion and praise of its effects, I intend to take a different approach. Given our focus 
on punishment, it is my aim to examine what role the institution of punishment plays in 
Kant’s prohibition of revolution or punishing former state authorities. While we have 
explored the legitimate ways in which that authority is meant to function and when it is 
authorized to coerce, we have yet to consider what remedies exist in Kant’s system for 
authorities that exceed or abuse these limits of legitimacy. This is an especially pertinent 
issue, as Kant explicitly connects the authority that such figures wield with the use of 
coercion and the determination of right in cases of legal dispute. 
 As such, it is worth asking: what of the legislative and executive authorities 
themselves? In what sense or under what conditions, if any at all, can their power be 
resisted? Does such resistance always merit punishment? Could there even be cases in 
which resisting a law is morally required of us? How can these authority figures be held 
                                                 
1 See Hill, Thomas E. “Questions about Kant’s Opposition to Revolution.” The Journal of Value Inquiry. 
Vol. 36, No. 2-3 (2002). pp. 283-298; Nicholson, Peter. “Kant on the Duty to Never Resist the Sovereign.” 
Ethics. Vol. 86, No. 3 (1976). pp. 214-230; and Reiss, H.S. “Kant and the Right of Rebellion.” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1956). pp. 179-192. 
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accountable by the citizens? Likewise, is it permissible for them to be held accountable 
by the leaders of other states? 
 This constellation of questions is unified by a central theme: namely, they all 
investigate the role that authority plays in the civil institution of punishment. Kant’s 
opinion on these matters is similarly unified. In the “Doctrine of Right,” he definitively 
states “There is…no right to sedition, still less to rebellion, and least of all is there a right 
against the head of a state as an individual person, to attack his person or even his life 
on the pretext that he has abused his authority” (6:320).2 The reason for his staunch 
denial of such rights is his commitment to the necessity of determinate answers in cases 
of conflict. The law exists, in part, due to the necessity of having some authority to settle 
matters of dispute between parties. In the state of nature,3 there is no possible 
mechanism for placing others under an obligation to respect our use of external objects, 
and thus we will perpetually come into conflict with others with whom we come into 
contact. We need the law to solve this problem, and the law only functions when it can 
give determinate answers in all cases of dispute. As we will see, Kant envisions both the 
executive and legislative as protected by variations of this argument. 
 In the foregoing chapters, I have focused on an interpretive reconstruction of 
Kant’s theory of punishment. Throughout, there has been an emphasis on building a 
Kantian theory of punishment that 1) is consistent with his most foundational 
                                                 
2 All internal citations can be found in Kant (1996).  
3 NB: Kant does not believe the ‘state of nature’ to be a historical state of human development. Rather, 
he envisions it merely as a hypothetical scenario, a useful tool for determining what kinds of institutions 
people would agree to. 
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philosophical commitments and 2) preserves as many of his statements about 
punishment as possible, where this does not violate 1). In this chapter, I apply this same 
methodology to some of the practical implications for how Kant imagines the institution 
of punishment will be instantiated in civil society. According to Kant’s thinking, the 
possibility of punishment requires both law and the possibility of enforcement; in other 
words, there must be a legitimate legislative power to create the laws whose violation 
creates the possibility of punishment, and there must be a designated executive 
authority that bears the sole right and responsibility to carry out such punishments. In 
one sense, we can be guaranteed of this division of government by the necessity of 
punishment; Kant thinks the state’s authority is irresistible for similarly necessary 
reasons. 
 I contend that in following Hobbes and the traditional currents of political 
thought so closely, Kant makes the converse of the mistake he made with respect to 
punishment. As we determined in chapter four, Kant’s support for a retributive theory 
of punishment fails to offer any successful, justificatory arguments. In that case, his 
radical aspirations were foiled by the underlying conventional foundations of his 
political philosophy. The problem with Kant’s absolute denial of the permissibility of 
civil disobedience, rebellion, or punishing previous rulers comes not from conventional 
underpinnings, but rather from his own moral philosophy; in this case, his conventional 
aspirations are foiled by the radical force exerted by his moral philosophy. Put plainly, 
while Kant can successfully argue against a legal right to civil disobedience, resistance, 
or revolution, his efforts to show a moral obligation to refrain from such rebellious 
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actions do not and cannot succeed. For similar reasons, his argument against the 
punishing of former authority figures is similarly unsuccessful. 
 In making this argument, I will be defending an interpretation of Kant’s legal 
philosophy that could be described as ‘constrained positivism.’ Like an orthodox 
positivist, Kant holds that the merits of a law are to be determined by their creation in a 
fixed legal procedure, rather than by an appeal to some external standard. Unlike a fully 
positivist legal theory, however, Kant takes there to be several strict limitations on what 
can become law. Significantly, if a proposed policy fails to satisfy the necessary 
requirements of law, this does not make it a bad law; instead, the policy is and can be no 
law at all. It is precisely this limitation that will enable a Kantian form of civil 
disobedience and active resistance to state power. While we are morally obligated to 
follow laws, we are permitted – and perhaps even required – to disobey, refuse, and 
resist policies that cannot be legitimately legislated. 
 
7.1 Opposing State Power 
 Throughout this section, I will be distinguishing three types of legal disobedience 
and resistance. The first is civil disobedience. I use civil disobedience to refer to a passive 
refusal to comply with a single law or small cluster of laws. Those engaging in civil 
disobedience do not resist arrest, and they do no break other laws in protest. According 
to this usage, staging sit-ins at a lunch counter in order to protest laws restricting access 
to such restaurants would be civil disobedience; staging a march without a license, 
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though, is only civil disobedience with respect to the law requiring permits for marches. 
The goal of civil disobedience is to change a law or set of laws or policies. 
 The second form of legal violation I will be discussing is resistance. Resistance is 
distinguished from civil disobedience in two ways. First, involves breaking a wider 
range of laws. Second, resistance involves a refusal to submit willingly to arrest and 
punishment. Resistance does not involve launching attacks on the police or other 
government officials, for it does not aim at the overthrow of the state. Instead, its goal is 
to bring about substantial changes to some agency or wide-sweeping set of policies.  
 Finally, Rebellion or revolution occurs when the aim is to replace the 
government with a new one. Rebellion involves actively attacking the forces of the 
government; it is essentially a war declared on the state as it currently exists. If a person 
or group is engaged in rebellious actions, they no longer accept any of the state’s laws or 
authority figures as legitimate. 
 Before proceeding further, I should say a word about the form of republican 
separation of powers that Kant supports, as the appropriate response to executive and 
legislative abuses of power might potentially differ.4 In some places, Kant provides 
passages that seem to blur the distinction between the various branches of government 
(such as a key example at 6:321 that I will be discussing shortly). This could be due to 
simple error, to an accidental confusion over his own terminology, or to a desire to avoid 
                                                 
4 Throughout this chapter, I will be addressing only the rights of citizens who live in a state that creates, 
previously created, or comes very close to creating a rightful condition. As a rightful condition can only 
be truly acquired and maintained under a republican government, my focus will be on citizens who live 
in republican states. 
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again angering Frederick William II, who had already censured Kant’s writings on the 
subject of religion.5 
 Regardless of whether the occasional lack of clarity is due to error or self-
preservation, it is clear from 6:313 in the Public Right section of the “Doctrine of Right” 
that he holds supreme sovereign authority to rest with the legislative branch of 
government. The legislature represents the united will of the people—the only possible 
source of political legitimacy. Legislative authority can rest with either a single law-giver 
or with a legislative body, such as a senate. These claims of legislative sovereignty are 
more or less in keeping with the post-Hobbesian social contract tradition, as well as the 
natural law tradition; in particular, the prioritizing of legislative power as an expression 
of the ‘general will’ has a distinctively Rousseauian character to it.6 
 This generality is the first of two conditions for legitimacy of a law that Kant 
outlines in the Metaphysics of Morals. Laws that arise from the legislative branch must be 
general in two senses. First, a law must be general in its content (6:316-6:317). Only 
policies that refer to the whole people or some broad group of citizens – rather than to 
particular individuals – and that are intended to serve as fixed, exceptionless rules that 
                                                 
5 Beck makes a compelling case against viewing any of Kant’s inconsistencies as strategically 
motivated. As he observes, “While it is not improbable that Kant was intimidated by the censor, I find 
it incredible, for Kant's actual response to the censor in 1792 was silence, not deception. In 1766, he had 
written Moses Mendelssohn, "Although I am absolutely convinced of many things that I shall never 
have the courage to say, I shall never say anything I do not believe." I think that was as true in the 
1790's as in the 1760's; and therefore, I must try to find some other way to explain the apparent 
inconsistency in Kant's attitudes.” (See Beck, Lewis White. “Kant and the Right of Revolution.” Journal 
of the History of Ideas. Vol. 32, No. 3 (1971), p. 411) 
6 See 6:314: “Therefore only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing 
for all and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative.” 
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do not conflict with other such rules can become laws. Second, laws must be general in 
the sense that they “involve the unity of and resolution of conflicts in accordance with 
universal laws.”7 Only when a policy can satisfy the requirements of universal law can it 
become a civil law, and policies that spring from the particular wills of individuals 
cannot be guaranteed to reach this standard. It is this second kind of generality that 
grounds the first; the only kind of law that can result from the subsuming of individual 
wills under the dictates of universal law are those that have a general content. 
 The second condition for legitimacy is rational or hypothetical consent. Only 
those policies to which all citizens could possibly give their rational consent can be made 
into law. It is possible for a law to still be legitimate if one or more citizens do not, in 
fact, give their consent, if their refusal is based on some irrational inclination. If even one 
citizen has a rational basis for rejecting a law, however, then this is sufficient to render 
the law illegitimate, and thus nullify it as a possible law. In “On the Common Saying”, 
he writes “What a people cannot decree for itself, a legislator cannot decree for a people” 
(8:304). The legislative does not merely act wrongly if it attempts to institute such a 
policy; it does that which it does not have the power to do. For an example of something 
that a person cannot will, we can look to the Doctrine of Right at 6:329-6:330 where Kant 
describes how a person cannot possibly will herself or himself into slavery. He writes, 
“Since we cannot admit that any human being would throw away his freedom, it is 
impossible the general will of the people to assent to such a groundless prerogative, and 
                                                 
7 Mulholland, p. 301. 
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therefore for the sovereign to validate it” (6:329). Thus, any law that relegates a citizen to 
a position of servitude would fail the second test and thus be illegitimate and beyond 
the power of the government to legislate or enforce. 
 The executive branch, on the other hand, is responsible for the implementation 
and enforcement of laws, the execution of punishments for any violations of the laws, 
and all other institutions involved in the day-to-day operations of the state (e.g., the 
recording of contracts, deeds, etc.). The executive head of state, to whom Kant refers as 
the ‘ruler,’ is the agent of the legislative; he or she has no authority except that which is 
derived from the power the legislative bestows upon him or her (6:316). The policies of 
the executive are ‘decrees,’ not laws, and as such they can and must be particular. It is 
important to note, though, that the executive has wide latitude in determining the 
parameters of how laws will be enforced; while the letter of the law and even the 
specific punishment warranted by its violation are spelled out by the legislature, all 
decisions about how to enforce the laws are determined by the executive; the legislature 
lacks the ability to directly check individual measures of the executive. As such, the 
executive could enforce a perfectly legitimate law in a way that violates the rights of the 
citizens.8 The only power the legislative has to curtail the decrees of the executive is to 
pass a new law or replace the executive with a new agent. 
                                                 
8 An example of such a scenario might be a law giving the police the power to search vehicles pulled 
over for routine traffic violations for illegal narcotics. While such a law might be legitimate, we could 
imagine a scenario in which the executive elects to only exercise such a power when dealing with certain 
racial minority groups. In such a scenario, we might think of the executive as enforcing a legitimate law 
in an illegitimate way. 
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 Taken at face value, Kant’s rejection of any right to resist that authority of the 
state does not seem to be in any way affected by this distinction between the sovereign, 
legislative power and the subsidiary, executive power. Although he recognizes the 
difference between these two branches, he holds that resistance to either one is strictly 
impermissible. Of the legislative’s imperturbable supremacy, he writes:   
The reason a people has a duty to put up with even what is held to be an 
unbearable abuse of supreme authority is that its resistance to the highest 
legislation can never be regarded as other than contrary to law, and indeed as 
abolishing the entire legal constitution. For a people to be authorized to resist, 
there would have to be a public law permitting it to resist, that is, the highest 
legislation would have to contain a provision that it is not the highest and that 
makes the people, as subject, by one and the same judgment sovereign over 
him to whom it is subject. This is self-contradictory, and the contradiction is 
evident as soon as one asks who is to be the judge in this dispute between 
people and sovereign. For it is then apparent that the people wants to be the 
judge in its own suit. (6:320) 
 
 This is the core of his objection to resisting state authority. In Kant’s political 
philosophy, all rights are claims that citizens have against other citizens. These claims 
are guaranteed by the authority of the state. Put another way, if I violate another 
citizen’s right, the citizen is entitled to the state’s use of coercive force to recoup 
whatever losses were sustained as a result of my action. Given their connection to state 
enforcement, rights cannot exist outside of a rightful condition (6:311). While certain 
moral duties exist independently of a rightful or juridical state, these are exclusively the 
unenforceable ethical duties that we all have as free, rational persons. Rights, on the 
other hand, can only exist in a civil society that enjoys both the rule of law and a 
determinate power who has the authority to enforce the law. 
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 In order for citizens to have any legal right to actively resist the implementation 
of a law, there must be another law that extends this freedom to them and guarantees 
their exercise of it; they must have a legal claim that can be enforced by the state’s 
coercive power. Any law that extends to a people the right to disobey the law whenever 
they see fit is both highly impractical and, more importantly, contradictory. How could 
we make sense of a legal right that would require the state to defend, with force if 
necessary, a citizen’s entitlement to resist the power of the state? If this were the case, 
each citizen would have the power to command the state to alter or fail to enforce any 
law at any time. 
 The legal contradiction that Kant sees as prohibiting any constitutionally 
recognized right to insurrection is also grounded on a moral contradiction. Recall that all 
legitimate laws must be passed by legislative action that occurs in accordance with the 
general, collective will. In light of this, Kant claims that all laws that are passed by the 
legislative are ones that each citizen has individually willed. The law that requires me to 
respect my neighbor’s property is not an alien constraint, but rather one that originates 
within my own will. For me to break such a law clearly involves a contradiction, but to 
Kant’s mind, so too does my resisting any law. In resisting, I claim that I simultaneously 
will a law and do not will the law. Howard Williams writes, 
From a moral point of view the State represents the general will of the people, 
and the individual citizen must see himself as part of this general will which 
creates the law and brings into being the sovereign who it is his duty to obey. 
For the individual to rebel against the State is, therefore, from the moral 
viewpoint, for him to rebel against himself, and this, Kant argues, is 
impossible.9 
                                                 
9 Williams, Howard. Kant’s Political Philosophy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983, p. 200. 
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 Of course, this presumes that I have or could have, in fact, willed the law in 
question. I might privately disagree with what I could rationally will, but I do not have 
legal standing to dispute this, as there is no one to adjudicate this dispute. Thus, my only 
recourse as a citizen is to express my opinion through the legitimate, legal channels and, 
in the meantime, accept whatever answer the legislative authority settles upon. 
 Although he rules out any active resistance against the state, Kant does seem, at 
times, to allow for the citizens to passively refuse to comply with a law that would 
require them to engage in immoral behavior. He has been read this way by numerous 
interpreters,10 and there is some evidence for such a reading; after all, Kant does describe 
a people that always complies with any command from the executive as “corrupt” 
(6:322). Such readings, however, overlook that in both “On the Common Saying” and 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant is specifically referring to a right that the legislators 
retain. The legislators are the ones who are meant to refuse immoral commands of the 
executive, and any right to resist that the people have is conducted through their 
legislative proxies. In other words, Kant specifies that such passive resistance is afforded 
only to the citizens who are members of parliament (8:297, 6:322). If this is the correct 
reading, then it is the legislative branch that can passive resist the power of the 
executive;11 the people, in this case, have no legal right to resist the state’s authority. For 
individuals to do so would be for “each resistance [to] take place in conformity with a 
                                                 
10 See Williams and Reiss, H. S. “Kant and the Right of Rebellion.” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 17, 
No. 2, Apr., 1956. 
11 For support for this view, see Guyer, p. 289. 
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maxim that, made universal, would annihilate an civil constitution and eradicate the 
condition in which alone people can be in possession of rights generally” (8:299). 
 I think this is the correct way of understanding Kant’s position. Extending to the 
citizens a legal right to passively refuse to obey a law would result in the same problems 
Kant sees in recognizing a right to actively disobey or resist the law. As such, we ought 
to read Kant as prohibiting even a guaranteed right to civil disobedience.12 Pointing out 
this issue, Mulholland writes, “A right to do as conscience dictates would allow 
everyone to do as conscience dictates on all matters, including questions of conflict over 
rights, and even when the objective judgment is mistaken. Indeed, it would allow 
coercion of the state whenever conscience dictated that this would be the right thing to 
do. But such a right would make a civil condition impossible.”13 He goes on to assert 
that despite this lack of legal right, citizens should be morally entitled to a passive 
refusal to obey a law. I will return to this point a little later, arguing that the moral 
permissibility that Mulholland recognizes should extend considerably further than mere 
passive refusal. 
 The executive power, although merely an agent of the sovereign, is no less 
unassailable in its authority. Kant writes, 
                                                 
12 One might make an interesting case for the permissibility of civil disobedience in the same manner as 
Rawls does in his paper “The Justification for Civil Disobedience.” Rawls famously defends civil 
disobedience as an act of political speech, intended to address some injustice and bring about a change 
in policies or institutions (see Rawls, John. “The Justification of Civil Disobedience.” Collected Papers. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 181). Given Kant’s strong commitment to the importance 
of freedom of speech in a juridical state (see, for instance, 8:304), this might be an approach that could 
gain some traction with Kant’s underlying political philosophy. 
13 Mulholland, p. 339. 
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The sovereign has only rights against his subjects and no duties (that he can 
be coerced to fulfill). – Moreover, even if the organ of the sovereign, the ruler, 
proceeds contrary to law, for example, if he goes against the law of equality in 
assigning the burdens of the state in matters of taxation, recruiting, and so 
forth, subjects may indeed oppose this injustice by complaints but not by 
resistance. (6:319) 
 
 The executive, in other words, is also immune from opposition. Although the 
citizens have the right to work within the system to bring about changes in the 
executive’s leadership or policies, they cannot go beyond the established channels of 
registering their discontent. Despite the similarities, though, the reason for the 
executive’s irresistible power is slightly different from the reason why the legislative 
authority cannot be opposed. Instead of focusing on the contradiction that arises from 
allowing private wills to oppose the laws that are produced by the general will, Kant’s 
defense of executive irresistibility highlights the contradiction that arises from 
challenging the structure of legal right and coercion. He writes, 
Even the constitution cannot contain any article that would make it possible 
for there to be some authority in a state to resist the supreme commander in 
case he should violate the law of the constitution, and so to limit him. For, 
someone who is to limit the authority in a state must have even more power 
than he whom he limits, or at least as much power as he has; and as a 
legitimate commander who directs the subjects to resist, he must also be able 
to protect them and to render a judgment having rightful force in any case that 
comes up; consequently he has to be able to command resistance publicly. In 
that case, however, the supreme commander in a state is not the supreme 
commander; instead, it is the one who can resist him, and this is self-
contradictory. (6:319) 
 
 As we can see, Kant thinks the executive must be obeyed because of its 
connection to external right. In order for there to be a sovereign, there must be a single, 
determinate individual or office that holds the power to execute the law, through the use 
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of force, if necessary. If the citizens are capable of preventing the execution of particular 
laws, then each becomes sovereign in a very real sense. As Williams observes, 
A state which possessed a constitution which allowed the citizen always to 
criticize and overturn the acts of a sovereign would be thoroughly 
ungovernable. Depending on the way one wished to look upon it, it could 
either be said to possess two sovereigns or no one at all. Under such a 
constitution, both the ruler and the subject would be sovereign. This kind of 
constitution Kant describes as nonsense.14 
 
 While resisting the legislative branch would be disastrous in that it would 
eliminate the possibility of law, resisting the executive branch would also lead to the 
dissolution of the juridical state by making the enforcement of laws impossible. As both 
law and someone with the power to enforce it are necessary conditions of a rightful 
state, resistance of this sort would make a republican state unworkable. 
 We should not conclude, though, that the above quotations imply that the 
executive’s abuses must be tolerated by the legislative as well. While the people, as 
subjects, must respect and obey the executive’s authority, the legislative sovereign still 
has the power to revoke the executive’s power, remove her from office, and replace her 
with a new agent. As we will see in the next section, Kant holds that even in the event 
that such a replacement of the executive is necessary, this does not entitle the state to 
punish the former ruler. 
 In the event that the executive refuses such an order, on the other hand, then he 
loses the authority to act as the state’s ruler. Instead, the former executive would become 
an enemy of the state. The citizens would be entitled to resist the actions of such a rogue 
                                                 
14 Williams, p. 201.  
 
 245 
 
figure based on their right to self-defense. In all likelihood, the legislative would appoint 
a new executive figure, whose first order of business would be to subdue her 
predecessor. In such a case, it is possible that the citizens would be enlisted in the effort 
to pacify the former executive, but their actions would not be constrained as resistance 
or rebellion, as they would be acting in accordance with the decrees of the new head of 
state. 
 The case of the rogue executive gives us insight into the only possible case of 
morally acceptable resistance that Kant considers. Much has been made of Kant’s 
historical support (at least, initially) for the American and French revolutions, offered in 
correspondence and his earlier work. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant suggests that the 
initial actions of the French rebels during the revolution of 1789 were potentially 
justified, not by legality or even morality, but by necessity. The state had devolved to 
such a condition that it no longer represented an actual civil society; the citizens had, at 
some point, ceased to be members of a people and had instead found themselves 
plunged back into the state of nature. In any situation where the legislative can no 
longer make the claim that it is representing the united will of a body of people, it no 
longer has rightful authority over them. Note that this situation does not give the former 
citizens legal or even moral title to oppose or overthrow those exercising coercive power 
over them (the former authorities), but merely a right of necessity. This is presumably 
the same kind of right of necessity at work when a survivor of a shipwreck forces 
another survivor off of the plank of wood that can only support a single individual. 
Unfortunately, Kant gives us no clear guidelines for determining at what point the state 
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is so chaotic and divided so as to revert to a state of nature. We cannot be entirely sure 
what failures or tyrannical behavior on the part of the legislative it would take to 
remove their legitimate legal authority and open this right of necessity to revolt. Also, 
given that one can act in accordance with a right of necessity and yet still be described as 
acting impermissibly, it seems prudent to keep our focus exclusively on the legal and 
moral arguments Kant offers against revolution. 
 We have reached a largely complete picture of Kant’s position on resistance and 
rebellion. There can be no legal right of any kind to civil disobedience, resistance, or 
rebellion. As Thomas Hill sums it up, “Kant argues that trying to incorporate an alleged 
right to revolution into a constitution for a legal system would be incoherent because it 
would purport to be a legal authority to destroy the very source of legal authority. 
Someone cannot coherently claim legal authorization to overthrow the highest legal 
authority. This seems undeniable.”15 Furthermore, such actions are morally 
impermissible. Engaging in them violates our moral duty to obey the law (by 
contradicting our rational willing of the law) and threatens the existence of the juridical 
state to which we have an obligation to belong. 
 It is worth noting that this description of Kant’s rejection of resistance or 
revolution is largely drawn from the Metaphysics of Morals. In “On the Common Saying,” 
Kant offers a slightly different argument against revolution, which Kant’s interpreters 
have almost universally found unsatisfying. Rather than the formal arguments about 
                                                 
15 Hill, p. 189. 
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contradictions that Kant uses later, in “On the Common Saying” he defends his position 
by reference to the impermissibility of revolution motivated by a concern for happiness. 
He writes, 
Thus if a people now subject to a certain actual legislation were to judge that 
in all probability this is detrimental to its happiness, what is to be done about 
it? Should the people not resist it? The answer can only be that, on the part of 
the people, there is nothing to be done about it but to obey. For what is under 
discussion here is not the happiness that a subject may expect from the 
institution or administration of a commonwealth but above all merely the 
right that is to be secured for each by means of it, which is the supreme 
principle for which all maxims having to do with a commonwealth must 
proceed and which is limited by no other principle. With respect to the former 
(happiness) no universally valid principle for laws can be given. (8:298) 
 
 Kant’s claim, then, is that revolution can never be justified because it is 
motivated by a desire to secure laws, authorities, or institutions more efficient at 
producing happiness for the populace, and such a concern for happiness is never 
sufficient grounds for disrupting the rightful condition of the state. This argument is 
clearly insufficient, however, as we need not endorse Kant’s apparent claim that 
revolutions are always motivated by a concern for happiness. If the citizens are instead 
motivated by a concern to correct for unjust laws, this argument would do nothing to 
explain why they act wrongly.16 Kant needs the formal arguments from the “Doctrine of 
Right” to explain why even citizens motivated by justice cannot rebel against the state. 
For the remainder of the chapter, I will be focusing on the arguments from this later 
work, setting aside the happiness-based arguments from “On the Common Saying.” 
                                                 
16 See Guyer, p. 285, Williams p. 205. 
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 Once we move on from the obvious limitations and failures of his earlier 
arguments, I think that the legal prohibitions Kant establishes in the “Doctrine of Right” 
are fundamentally consistent and even necessary. His arguments against a legal right to 
resist the state or rebel are ultimately rooted deeply in his foundational political and 
legal philosophy. Given the ways he has defined ‘right,’ it would not be possible to 
speak of citizens as having a right that is, in practice and in principle, unenforceable. 
Active resistance against the state’s authority and even a passive refusal to obey a law 
would both threaten the possibility of a juridical state. As far as a legal right to resist the 
legislative authority itself, however, there is no way to make sense of how Kant could 
accommodate it.  
 There is a problem, though, when Kant attempts to draw a moral obligation out 
of this legal reality. As Hill notes, the Metaphysics of Morals goes to great lengths to 
divide ethical duties from juridical duties, and thus Kant needs further argumentation to 
bridge the gap between the two kinds of obligation.17 While consistency entitles and 
even requires Kant to argue against a legal right to resist if there is no authority that can 
decide in one’s favor, we need no such arbitration in order to consider an action morally 
permissible. After all, my actions can be moral or immoral prior to or outside of civil 
society, where no talk of ‘rights’ makes sense. If Kant wants to show that we have a 
moral obligation to obey the law – that civil disobedience, resistance, and rebellion are 
                                                 
17 Hill, p. 290-291. 
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morally impermissible – then he must give us some reason beyond their mere illegality. 
Failing to do so is a clear conflation of legal and moral obligation. 
 To this objection, a defender of Kantian orthodoxy might respond that the failure 
to preserve a distinction between legal and moral obligation is no failure at all. Kant 
clearly holds that the law creates a moral duty where none existed before. The reason for 
this has to do with the origin of the law as a product of the general will. By giving our 
rational consent to whatever the legislative branch legislates, we essentially give the law 
to ourselves. In doing so, we place ourselves under an obligation to follow the law, no 
matter what our feelings about it might be. This obligation is legal, but it is also moral; 
any legal duty to obey the law would entail a moral duty to do the same. 
 Such a response, however, cannot truly answer the objection for one important 
reason: although any law does create a moral obligation, policies that require immoral 
action or to which citizens cannot rationally consent cannot be laws. Recall that this is one 
of the two limitations that Kant imposes on the legislative’s ability to create laws. If the 
state attempted to pass a law instituting slavery, it would be one to which the citizens 
could not consent. As such, it could not be a product of their collective wills. Positing a 
moral obligation for the citizens to obey such a policy would entail creating a moral 
obligation for citizens to act contrary to what they or others could accept as moral 
agents. In effect, we would be morally required to act immorally. Even the authority of 
the sovereign cannot be sufficient to morally obligate an immoral action. This would be 
truly contradictory, and we would be left with no rational way to decide which 
obligation to obey. 
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 This way of thinking runs counter to the view of Kant as a legal positivist that is 
defended by Jeremy Waldron. He argues that Kant should be understood as staking out 
a positivistic legal theory, where the legitimacy of the law is derived from the procedure 
by which it is produced, rather than some external moral standard.18 He views Kant as 
refraining from basing the legitimacy of the law on some other, normative standard of 
evaluation in light of the fact of moral disagreement and the potential ‘calamity’ caused 
by such disagreement. Waldron explains that although Kant might be a moral 
objectivist, this does not rule out the possibility of individual’s experiencing strong 
disagreements about morality and how to effectively secure happiness.19 Furthermore, if 
steps are not taken to prevent this disagreement from occurring, the resulting 
disharmony can threaten the state itself, and thus destroy the rightful condition (and 
along with it, the possibility of property ownership). To negate this danger, Waldron 
sees Kant as resorting to a version of legal positivism. He describes his understanding of 
positivism as, 
the principle that an official should enforce the law even when it is in his 
confident opinion unjust, morally wrong, or misguided as a matter of policy. 
The enactment of the law in question is evidence of the existence of a view 
different from his own concerning the law's justice, morality, or desirability. 
In other words, the law's existence, together with the official's own opinion, 
indicates moral disagreement in the community. The official's failure to 
implement the law because he believes that it is unjust, or his decision to do 
some-thing other than what the law requires because he believes that action 
would be more just, is tantamount to abandoning the very idea of law.20 
 
                                                 
18 Waldron, Jeremy. “Kant’s Legal Positivism.” Harvard’s Law Review. Vol. 109, No. 70 (1996), p. 1541. 
19 Ibid., p. 1552. 
20 Ibid., p. 1539. 
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 It is fairly clear how Waldron sees this description as applying to Kant’s legal 
philosophy. The law is meant to take precedence over personal opinion, just as the 
moral law should trump our personal inclinations. This is a plausible account of how 
Kant envisions the interaction between the law and our own moral beliefs. 
 I agree with some of Waldron’s points. Contrary to some interpretations,21 Kant 
is not a natural law theorist. He clearly recognizes that the legitimacy of law as arising 
from way in which it was produced, rather than on its conformity with an independent 
standard of evaluation. Although he does confirm that our juridical duties are ethical, 
this should not be read as a claim that we have underlying moral reasons prior to the 
institution of the law. Rather, it is the fact of a positive law that gives us a corresponding 
ethical obligation. In Kant’s eyes, any number of different laws, policies, and institutions 
can be legitimate, even though some of these might be far less efficient, stable, or fairly-
balanced than others. Although Kant does have a progressive view of civil society 
(indicating an interest in seeing less-desirable laws be replaced by better laws), the 
inferior laws are still legitimate, provided they arise in the right way. 
 This last condition, however, is stronger than Waldron seems to acknowledge. 
The fact that a large range of policies are not appropriate subjects for law strikes me as a 
large difference from a purely positivistic picture. This limitation is based on Kant’s 
underlying moral philosophy; the state cannot pass laws to which even one citizen could 
not rationally consent, for to do so would be to violate the respect owed to this 
                                                 
21 See Mulholland, pp. 10-15 
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individual as a free moral being. It is for this reason that I claim Kant ought to be 
considered a ‘constrained positivist.’ While all laws that can exist are justified in 
positivistic ways, there are a wide range of policies that cannot be made into law for 
moral reasons. Returning to Kant’s example of slavery, given that individual citizens 
cannot will themselves to be made into slaves, and the legislative authority of a state 
derives its power to create laws from the collective will of the citizens, it also lacks the 
power to will a law that reduces any citizen to a condition of servitude. Although the 
state might attempt to pass such a law and even enforce its execution, the state would be 
defending an illegitimate policy.22 
 If this is correct and such immoral policies do not acquire the status of law, then 
citizens are under no moral obligation to obey them. This alone does not, however, 
extend to citizens a legal right to resist the state’s power, much less rebel against the 
state itself. All it shows is that such commands or decrees fail to morally obligate 
citizens. They can passively refuse to obey them without doing moral wrong. This 
refusal, however, does not extend beyond a right to civil disobedience. The citizens are 
not morally authorized to engage in resistance to the state’s power in other ways, as this 
would involve violating the duty to obey other, legitimate laws. Further, the citizens are 
not morally entitled to engage in all-out revolution over one immoral policy or a small 
number of such policies. Likewise, if the citizens resist punishment for their moral 
                                                 
22 NB: This does not mean, however, that the citizens are legally permitted to rebel against such a policy. 
Although it might, in fact, not be a law, there would be no one with the authority to make such a 
determination. As such, all the problems that prevent a right to rebellion would still apply. 
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refusal to obey, they would be acting impermissibly. At this point, then, citizens are 
merely authorized to engage in moral acts of civil disobedience aimed specifically at the 
problematic policies. 
 In some cases, however, the circumstances might be such so as to extend the 
moral authorization to disobey and resist further. If the state goes beyond merely 
attempting to pass and enforce a policy that cannot be law, enacting a wide range of 
illegitimate policies or radically expanding its own power, then the citizens might be 
morally permitted to engage in a more general strategy of resistance to the state’s 
power.23 There would still be no legal right to do so, but the general obligation that 
citizens have to follow the law might be eroded to the point that the state is propped up 
by powers to which the people could never rationally consent. 
 In other cases, there might even be a moral obligation to engage in this 
widespread resistance. We might consider the duty that all people have to contribute to 
the progress of humankind. Part of this progress is the development, maintenance, and 
protection of rightful conditions. If citizens belong to the kind of abusive state we have 
been considering, then might not revolution prove the appropriate way to contribute? 
Lewis White Beck warns against this line of thinking: our duty to promote the progress 
                                                 
23 There is no clear, fixed line that, once the state crosses, the citizens go from being morally authorized 
to engage in civil disobedience to being morally authorized to engage in resistance. Given that one of 
the major differences between the two is that resistance, if legitimate, involves the moral permissibility 
of resisting arrest and punishment, it seems likely that this shift would often involve increasing abuses 
of the state’s executive or coercive power. Still, I am not offering either necessary or sufficient 
conditions for the premise difference between these two types of disobedience. 
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of humankind is an imperfect duty, and is therefore secondary to the perfect duty that 
all citizens have to obey the law.24 
 While Beck is right to suggest that our imperfect duty to promote the progress of 
mankind cannot trump a perfect duty to obey the law, this still assumes that the policies 
in question are, in fact, laws. As I have argued throughout, such policies cannot meet the 
requirements Kant imposes on law; they cannot truly be passed by a legislature. As 
such, we can have no moral obligation to obey. We might, in fact, be obligated to resist 
either the particular law or even the state’s authority on the grounds of our imperfect 
obligation. 
 Could this duty to resist a state’s slide toward tyranny go so far as a moral 
authorization or even requirement to engage in revolutionary actions? Kant takes a hard 
line against this possibility, arguing that revolution necessarily results in anarchy. As 
Guyer describes his thinking, “The overthrow of an existing state, even if in the hope of 
greater justice and not merely greater happiness, can never be an immediate transition 
to a better-constituted state, but is always a reversion to a condition of lawlessness. From 
such anarchy a better state might arise, but then again it might not.”25 It would be 
contradictory, then, for us to revert to lawlessness under the motivation of our duty to 
promote juridical states. 
 This line of thinking only seems to work when we consider a state that is still 
functioning in a quasi-rightful manner, albeit badly. If we imagine that the state has 
                                                 
24 Beck, p. 420. 
25 Guyer, p. 287. 
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descended to the point of actively violating the rights of the people with great regularity 
and efficiency, there may be good reason to think that whatever state arises from the 
anarchy will almost certainly be better than the one we currently inhabit. Although we 
could never be truly certain about this, the worse our present state is, the more likely it 
becomes that whatever comes next will be better. Whatever obligation we have to the 
state would have eroded long ago, and at this point the state’s authorities would 
maintain their power through the sheer use of force, unconnected with any 
authorization arising from the general will. Although there could still be no legal right to 
rebel against a state, there could be a moral one if all other avenues of reform had been 
exhausted. 
 The moral permission to disobey the law is grounded in the impossibility of the 
state obligating its citizens to behave in immoral ways.26 Even if I am not personally 
affected by a law, I still have the grounds to object to it if it requires such immorality of 
anyone else. There can never be a legal right to disobey or rebel, but there is a moral 
permission in these specific circumstances. As the state strays further from a rightful 
condition, greater forms of disobedience become morally permissible. If the state became 
                                                 
26 In chapter five, I raised the question of whether any law that constrains freedom unnecessarily is 
unwillable and therefore not a policy that could be made into law. If this is the case, then any such law 
could be passively disobeyed. Based on the way Kant has set up the purpose of the state and the limits 
on what can become a law, this conclusion seems unavoidable. This would have the practical effect of 
morally licensing a large amount of disobedience, even if such disobedience was not legally permitted 
and could still be rightfully punished. One might think that this is a problem for Kant’s entire 
framework and project. I will remain agnostic on this question; for the purposes of this project, trying 
to construct an alternative that could avoid this issue would require the revision of far too much of 
Kant’s foundational commitments.   
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unjust enough, it might even be possible that the people could have an obligation to 
resist its policies and, finally, even rebel and replace it with a newer, better state. 
 
7.2 Punishing Former Authorities 
 Even if civil disobedience or revolution is permissible – or, in certain rare cases, 
morally required – it would be by no means the preferred method of resolving conflict. 
An authority figure might be engaging in activity that exceeds the limits of her 
sanctioned power, but we ought to try to remove this figure through established, legal 
means. Provided such efforts to replace an authority figure are successful – or provided 
that, should they fail, the citizens resort to removing the abusive figure through some act 
of passive civil disobedience or active resistance – we are left with the question of what 
happens next. What is to be done with those who previously held, and misused, 
authority? Kant has a very explicit answer for this: nothing. Punishment against former 
legislative or executive authorities is, in his eyes, impermissible. He goes so far as to say 
that the greatest crime that a people are capable of is the execution of a former monarch 
after ousting him or her from power. In describing this, he concludes that such an 
execution is “a crime from which the people cannot be absolved, for it is as if the state 
commits suicide” (6:322). 
 Now, some historical considerations: the horror that Kant feels—and that he 
assumes we share—is directed toward the execution of monarchs by their people 
following a forced abdication. The execution of Charles I and Louis XVI during the 
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English and French revolutions, respectively, are his paradigmatic examples. The 
scenarios we are likely to encounter in the world today are likely to be different, and it is 
not clear how Kant would feel about a more contemporary case in which the former 
official is tried by an actual court, not executed as a spectacle. It is also not clear how the 
elimination of capital punishment as a penalty for former rulers would affect his stance. 
While death seems to be at the heart of his visceral reaction, he still gives us an 
argument of sorts to demonstrate why he opposes any punishment against former 
government authorities. 
 In the “Doctrine of Right,” in a footnote, he writes the following, important 
sentence: 
The state never has the least right to punish him, the head of state, because of 
his previous administration, since everything he did, in his capacity as head 
of state, must be regarded as having been done in external conformity with 
rights, and he himself, as the source of the law, can do no wrong. (6:321) 
 
 Unlike his earlier statements regarding resistance to the power of a current 
authority, here Kant is speaking directly to the question of punishing past authority 
figures. Unfortunately, this passage is one of the clearest examples of Kant’s lamentable 
tendency to resort to occasional obfuscation about the republican separation of powers 
that he has previously established. It is not clear whether he is referring to an executive 
figure or legislative figure. He claims that the state cannot punish former rulers, because 
anything that the previous ruler did “must be regarded as having been done in external 
conformity with rights,” and that the previous authority is, herself, “the source of the 
law.” These two powers that Kant describes as belonging to the former head of state 
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actually belong to both the executive and the legislative branches of government. Rather 
than respecting the separation of powers that he champions elsewhere, here he seems to 
be discussing the ruler of a state in which both legislative and executive functions are 
fulfilled by a single person or office. 
 This directly conflicts with what Kant says at 6:317: “So a people’s sovereign 
(legislator) cannot also be its ruler, since the ruler is subject to the law and so is put 
under obligation through the law by another, namely the sovereign.” In other words, a 
single figure could not be both the ruler whose actions are always in external conformity 
with right and the source of the law itself. Given that he begins the statement with the 
term ‘head of state,’ I think it is appropriate to conclude that he has in mind the 
executive authority and that the elision occurring here is the attribution of legislative 
sovereignty to the executive. 
 To understand what Kant means when he says that the executive always acts in 
external conformity to right, we need to look briefly on what he has to say on the subject 
of the executive’s role in punishment. He holds that the head of state, as the chief 
executive, is immune from punishment; if there were anyone who could punish him, 
then he would not actually be the chief executive (a familiar, quasi-Hobbesian 
argument). On this basis, Kant holds that the executive is essentially free from all duties 
of right with respect to the citizens of the state. As Kant makes clear at 6:232, “Right and 
authorization to use coercion therefore mean one and the same thing.” As no one is 
authorized to use coercion against the executive, no one has any rights against her; put 
another way, she is therefore free from juridical duties. Given this, it is also accurate to 
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say of the executive that she cannot do wrong. Since one acts ‘rightly,’ or at least in 
conformity with external right, until such a time as one violates a legal duty, and the 
executive technically has no legal duties, the executive always acts rightly. 
 The fact that the executive authority always acts rightly, however, does not make 
her or him the source of the law. As we saw above, the executive is also obligated by the 
sovereign legislative authority, which Kant argues must be distinct from the executive. 
Further, given the particularity of the executive and generality of the legislative, they 
could not both be fulfilled by the same figure or office. Indeed, it is even perfectly 
reasonable to speak of an executive’s behavior as being counter to the law created by the 
legislative, even if such behavior is not ‘wrong’ in the sense that Kant employs in the 
“Doctrine of Right.” 
 Once we have recognized this conflation, we can set it aside as an error that Kant 
ought not to have made. If we respect the republican separation of powers, however, is 
there any reason to think that the legislative or executive authorities of a state cannot be 
punished after they are no longer in office? Kant himself clearly wants to preserve this 
permanent immunity; in the passage I quoted at the outset of this chapter, Kant writes 
that the head of state cannot be punished 
on the pretext that he has abused his authority. Any attempt whatsoever at 
this is high treason, and whoever commits such treason must be punished by 
nothing less than death for attempting to destroy his fatherland. (6:320)  
 
 Even if we accept the impermissibility of punishing a current authority figure, 
there are several difficulties involved in Kant’s efforts to secure for authority figures a 
permanent immunity against criminal prosecution and punishment. The most obvious 
 260 
 
and striking of these is the possibility that such punishment might not occur after 
forcible revolution or regime change, but rather simply after a state authority figure has 
left office. Imagine a scenario in which the current executive arrests her predecessor for 
abusing his authority and has him tried by a court. The current executive has an 
essentially unlimited right to punish; nothing she does constitutes a legal wrong. Yet 
according to Kant, the past executive is meant to be immune from such prosecution. If 
we take seriously Kant’s claim that any attempt at punishing a former ruler should be 
punished by death, we seem to arrive at the peculiar result that the current executive 
must be executed. This, of course, would directly contradict much of what Kant says 
elsewhere.27 
 This answer, however, might not be fully satisfying. To argue that former 
executive authorities can be punished by the current executive solely in virtue of the 
connection between the head of state and the dictates of external right runs the risk of 
perpetuating the very kind of potential for autocratic abuse that I argued against in the 
previous section. We can avoid this problem by considering an alternative possible 
reason for a legal and moral right to punish former authority figures. 
 This alternative makes use of both a negative and positive argument. On the 
negative side, it is not clear why the past protections enjoyed by the executive should 
continue once she is no longer the executive. The claim that the executive is 
                                                 
27 In addition to the obvious contradiction of saying that the executive can do no wrong but should be 
put to death for executing a punishment against a citizen, he also makes it clear that even if a government 
comes into being in an illegitimate way, it still commands the obedience of the citizens (6:318-6:319). In 
light of this, it is hard to imagine how a newly elected executive would deserve death for punishing the 
old executive, who has left office and is once more a mere citizen. 
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unpunishable refers to the fact that there is no one in a position to carry out the 
punishment, not, as Kant suggests by way of conflation, that whatever the executive 
does is transformed into a legally valid action. Given that the executive has no coercively 
enforceable duties, she has no legal obligations and thus cannot do ‘wrong.’ In this 
sense, her actions are always right. This does not mean, however, that the executive 
cannot be responsible for breaking a law that was created by the legislative. Even if her 
office protects her from any penalty for such an action, she only retains this office for as 
long as the legislative sees fit. Once removed, she is a citizen who can be held 
accountable for her actions, just like any other. 
 Kant might argue that criminally charging a former authority for something that 
she did while in office is tantamount to criminizaling behavior after the fact. It was right 
when the executive acted, and so it seems unfair to punish her now that it would be 
wrong for her to do it. This parallels the long-standing objection that liberal thinkers 
have to ex post facto laws. While there is a superficial similarity between these two cases, 
there are underlying differences. In the case of ex post facto laws, the guilty citizen had no 
legal or moral obligation to refrain from engaging in the action when he or she 
committed it; the executive, on the other hand, has unenforceable duties to obey the law 
by virtue of her membership as a citizen of the state. It seems, then, that not only would 
an executive act rightly when punishing his predecessor, but that such punishment 
could be morally justifiable as well. 
 A legislator, on the other hand, cannot be said to always act in conformity with 
external right. If a legislator takes bribes and is removed from office, for instance, then it 
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seems difficult to see what possible reason Kant could give for withholding punishment. 
Recall that the legislative power Kant ascribes to his vague, unpunishable figure in the 
quotation from 6:322 is being the ‘source of the law.’ This, however, only applies to the 
legislative body as a whole; the individual malfeasance of a particular senator or 
member of parliament does not take on legal status. Even if there is a single legislative 
figure, his will only becomes law under certain circumstances. For instance, it must be 
general and universally willed. If he chooses to accept a bribe in a specific instance, this 
does not amount to the sovereign willing a law that bribes are allowable in all cases. 
While it might be difficult to punish a legislative figure for a law that he or she created, 
it does not seem hard to recognize the difference between what the legislator does qua 
legislator and what he does qua individual citizen. 
 The negative argument, then, shows there is no good reason to extend 
permanent immunity to prior authority figures. The positive argument, on the other 
hand, has to do with the justification for punishment itself. Interestingly, Kant’s 
hesitance to punish the previous authorities of a state seems to run counter to his 
espoused retributivism. We might, perhaps, read him as thinking that the authorities 
deserve punishment, but that they are merely shielded from it by the formal structure of 
power with respect to their offices. If this were the case, however, why would such 
protection continue once the authorities no longer occupy the offices in question? It 
makes more sense to understand Kant in the manner that I have argued for throughout 
chapters four and five: namely, that Kant does not provide a means for authorizing the 
state to always – or possibly ever – act on moral desert. If the authorities can deserve to 
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be punished but escape for formal legal reasons, why should we think that the average 
citizen is punished for reasons of desert, rather than also for formal legal reasons? 
 In light of this, I think it worth our time to consider the case that Kantian 
protective deterrence could make for punishing former authorities. As we have seen, the 
reasons given by Kant for refraining from such punishment are not satisfactory, but this 
alone is not an argument in favor of punishing. If we reject retributivist reasons for 
punishing abusive authorities after their time in office, the mere fact that we can punish 
them does not tell us that we should. However, if we embrace a deterrent reading of 
Kant, of the sort that I have championed, it is not difficult to provide such an argument. 
Clearly there is great danger in executive and legislative misconduct or overreach. Such 
abuses are among the primary cause of the dissolution of republics into autocratic or 
anarchical states, to say nothing of the actual harm and loss of freedom that the citizens 
stand to suffer. It seems, then, that there would be ample reason to want to deter this 
kind of impropriety. If there is never any penalty for abusing one’s powers while in 
office, it is hard to imagine from where the deterrent force would derive. Although we 
might optimistically hope that our leaders are driven by a strong moral commitment to 
duty, we cannot rely on this alone; to do so would violate the Kantian determination to 
construct a state in which even a race of devils could live rightfully (8:366). 
 Kant even has a built-in mechanism for determining that the punishment of a 
former authority figure will happen in the proper manner: the judiciary. Kant talks of 
the judiciary as a separate branch of government (6:318), but I have not included it as 
such given that the interpretive consensus is that Kant’s judiciary is not, in fact, 
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independent. After all, the executive appoints all judges, and they serve the executive as 
agents (6:316-6:317). Given this, it seems more plausible to think of the judiciary as part 
of the executive branch of government. 
 Kant describes the role of judges quite eloquently: “A people judges itself 
through those of its fellow citizens whom it designates as its representatives for this by a 
free choice” (6:317). Like the laws created by legislative branch, the verdicts of the 
judiciary are meant to reflect the judgments of the people as a whole.28 Although it is left 
vague in what manner a judge ought to reflect on a case so as to ensure that his 
decisions are appropriately general, the sentiment of a people judging collectively 
through judicial representatives is both a compelling image and one that is especially 
well-suited to the subject of passing sentence on a former authority figure. 
 Rightful punishment of such a figure could be permitted under Kant’s political 
philosophy. His argument against it conflates the legislative and executive powers and 
relies upon a faulty assumption about a permanent immunity against prosecution. It is 
also motivated in large part by an image of ruler punishment that depicts a deposed 
figure being executed by mob rule. To avoid these issues, the citizens of a state must 
wait until 1) the abusive authority in question no longer occupies her former office and 
2) there is an executive authority in power who has appointed or can appoint a judge to 
                                                 
28 NB Although the judiciary reaches a verdict of guilty or not guilty, it is not the judiciary that decides 
upon the appropriate penalty to be imposed on a perpetrator who is found to be responsible. If the 
penalty is definitively articulated in the law – all murderers are to be executed, for instance – then we 
could say that the legislative is responsible to fixing the penalty. If, on the other hand, there is no 
determinate punishment called for by the law, then it is up to the executive to determine what penalty 
is appropriate. It is also worth noting that this division of powers is true both for Kant’s orthodox 
retributivist position and the Kantian deterrence view I have defended. 
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determine the innocence or guilt of the former authority. If a former executive is being 
tried, then a replacement must be in place; if it is a former legislator, then there is 
already the appropriate executive and judicial apparatus necessary for a fair trial. As 
long as these conditions have been met, then we should consider Kant as capable of 
allowing for the punishment of past authorities by domestic courts. 
 
7.3 International Punishment 
 Up to now, we have been focused on what rights, obligations, or powers the 
citizens of a state hold against the legislative or executive authorities of that state. It is 
also worth considering, however, what role Kant’s cosmopolitanism plays in his 
thinking about resisting the power of state authorities. Specifically, I am interested in the 
whether the authorities of a sovereign nation can rightly be coercively constrained, tried, 
and punished by the force of another state. There are, I believe, two distinct reasons for 
extending our thinking to the level of international politics. 
 First, Kant himself has a clear interest in the application of his political thinking 
to cosmopolitanism. Although his considerations of the ‘rights of nations’ is a relatively 
minor aspect of the Metaphysics of Morals, his influential essay Toward Perpetual Peace 
provides a more complete picture of Kant’s position on international and cosmopolitan 
law. Unlike the seminal political treatises of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and others – 
which stopped at a description of the appropriate way for states to interact with one 
another – Kant considers the future development of the international community. 
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Although there is considerable scholarly dispute over the exact nature of the form of 
international relations for which he advocates, it is clear that he sees his contemporary 
status quo as a temporary step along the way toward achieving the highest good. 
 The second reason for exploring the question of international punishment has to 
do with the traditional categories of just war described by the proponents of natural law. 
At least as far back as Grotius, and continuing through Pufendorf, Locke, Vattel, and 
Burlamaqui, the natural law tradition has recognized punishment as an appropriate 
cause for war. Note that this is distinct from self-defense; the legitimacy of a punitive 
war means that any nation would be justified in initiating conflict with another that has 
participated in violations of natural law. Given the prominence of punitive wars in the 
ius ad bellum literature and Kant’s unique foray into the genre with Toward Perpetual 
Peace, it is worth investigating whether he continues or breaks with the traditional 
categories. 
 Despite the significant historical precedent, though, the weight of evidence 
suggests that Kant would not support the international use of force for punitive reasons. 
Kant is not a natural law theorist, and so despite his affinity for Pufendorf, Achenwall, 
and others, we ought to be cautious about assuming that he continues to use their 
traditional categories of just wars. He indicates such a radical break in Toward Perpetual 
Peace, where he attempts to dispel the idea of a justified war and suggest steps that could 
be taken to the elimination of all war. This aim is partially at odds with Kant’s 
statements about the rights of nations in “Doctrine of Right,” in which he indicates that 
there are certain types of war that can be rightful, like self-defense (6:346). In this same 
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section, however, Kant declares that punitive wars are not among those to which nations 
can claim a right, so long as the nations exist in a state of nature together. His reasoning 
is analogous to the case for individuals: as I showed in chapter three, Kant does not 
recognize the institution of punishment as existing outside of civil society. Although 
there may be legitimate uses of violence (e.g., self-defense), such use of coercive force 
only becomes punishment when it occurs in accordance with established laws and 
recognized authorities with the power to enforce such a law. In situations in which a 
state of nature exists between nations, then, there can be no punitive war. The question, 
then, is whether Kant’s thoughts on cosmopolitanism and his ideals for international 
relations give us any basis for thinking that states may not remain in the state of nature 
with respect to one another, thus opening up the possibility that punishment could exist 
at the international level. 
 In Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant lays out three ‘definitive articles’ that, if followed 
by all nations, would lay the groundwork for a permanent international peace. The first 
of these is that all states should be governed by republican constitutions. Given that I 
have been focusing exclusively on republican states throughout the chapter, this article 
will make no substantial change in the way we think of authority. The second definitive 
article, however, is very important for our present purposes: it states that “The right of 
nations shall be based on a federalism of free states” (8:354). As we will see, the nature of 
this federalism is hotly contested among Kant scholars, and it will play an important 
role in determining the rights that states have to punish abuses and crimes that occur in 
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others. Likewise, the third definitive article – “Cosmopolitan right shall be limited to 
conditions of universal hospitality” (8:357) – will feature significantly in our discussion. 
 There is a general consensus that Kant’s call for a federation of free states is not 
intended as an endorsement of the establishment of a single world-state. Kant himself is 
relatively explicit about this; he writes, “here we have to consider the right of nations in 
relation to one another insofar as they comprise different states and are not to be fused 
into a single state” (8:354). His main reason for rejecting such a world-state is that it 
would require individual states to surrender their independence. While individual 
persons in a state of nature would be capable of joining together into a civil community, 
states that are analogously situated cannot bind themselves into a single political body. 
Doing so would be an act of the collective will of the people or community, and yet 
unlike the individuals who join together to form a nation, the community would be 
obliterated by the decision to join into a world-state. The old community would 
represent a transient intermediary; only the new community and the individuals would 
still remain. In light of all this, Kant does not think it possible for a political body to 
electively join a world-state and thus end its own existence. 
 It is tempting, then, to think of the federation of free states that Kant calls for as 
being comprised of totally independent nations. If this is the case, though, then it is hard 
to imagine in what sense any federation actually exists. Such a federation would have no 
authorization to pass laws, coercively enforce standards of any kind, or in any other way 
make its presence felt by the member states. The moment they choose to disregard the 
federation, they would be free to do so. Yet, Kant clearly thinks that this federation of 
 269 
 
free states is a necessary step toward perpetual peace, and he explicitly links the gradual 
inclusion of all states into the federation and the development of a lasting international 
peace (8:356-8:357). In light of the role that the federation of free states is meant to play 
in the promotion of such a peace, joining it becomes a duty of some form. 
 Byrd and Hruschka point out that this obligation – which parallels the one that 
enjoins individuals to enter civil society and authorizes the use of force to compel those 
who refuse – is also one that contains the authorization to resort to the application of 
coercive force against those who would reject it.29 In other words, a state can be 
compelled to join the federation of free states. This force is justified in light of the danger 
that proximity and interactions with a state that is not aligned with the federation could 
involve. As Byrd and Hruschka explain, “In a state of nature, the states cannot assert 
their rights through a ‘proceeding’ in court, because the state of nature is defined as a 
state without distributive justice, meaning for Kant there is no court with the coercive 
force needed to enforce its decisions.”30 
 Such a reading seems to directly oppose what Kant lays out in the fifth 
‘preliminary article.’ Here, he defends the view that “No state shall forcibly interfere in 
the constitution and government of another state” (8:346). Once again, there is a conflict 
between the independence of the state and the influence that can be exerted over it by its 
peers. In this case, however, the conflict is more easily resolved. We should understand 
                                                 
29 Byrd, Sharon B. and Hruschka, Joachim. Kant’s Doctrine of Right: A Commentary. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 194. 
30 Ibid. 
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Kant as holding the position that the coercion of states into the federation occurs as an 
act of self-defense. His prohibition against the reformation of the constitution or 
government of another nation, on the other hand, is aimed at aggressive wars, or those 
designed to bring about some result like religious conversion. While we are left with a 
possible question about the permissibility of altering a state’s constitution if it is the only 
way to possibly bring it into compliance with the requirements of the federation of free 
states (i.e., a republican constitution), this can be set aside for the moment. 
 So a state might be justified in bringing another into the federation of free states 
if the other poses some security risk, on the grounds that members of the federation will 
have a greater chance of attain peaceful relations. Other forms of aggressive war, 
including punitive war, are not allowed. Further, wars among the members of the 
federation are prohibited; the whole point of the association is to promote peaceful 
relations. Even if they were not, the federation does not establish any kind of law or 
have the authority to enforce regulations, so punitive wars among the members of the 
federation also appear to be strictly impossible. So far, there does not appear to be any 
Kantian grounds for international criminal courts or other forms of non-domestic 
punishment. 
 When describing the prohibition against international interference with a 
nation’s constitution, Kant does establish one important caveat. If the state in question 
should be engaged in a civil war, such that the international interference amounts to 
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aiding one side,31 then such an intercession is permissible (8:346). Either the state has 
dropped into anarchy and there is no national sovereignty to be violated by such an 
action, or the legitimate government is at war with a powerful enemy that is no longer 
controlled by its authority. In the latter case, aiding the legitimate government in its 
efforts to subdue its enemies would not count as a violation of its independence or 
sovereignty (provided it has the permission or consent of the legitimate government to 
offer such assistance). In both cases, this kind of intervention could be carried out by 
members of the federation if they observe a civil war reaching the crisis point in one of 
their peers. This fact would allow for the institution of international criminal courts in 
one highly specific kind of case: namely, that in which the international community 
arrests an executive who is at war with the legitimate, legislative power of the people. 
While it is possible to give reasons for why it would be better for the rogue figure to be 
tried by her own community, it might be possible that the civil war has eliminated one 
or more of the necessary conditions for domestic punishment of a former authority I 
discussed above. In this case, the federation of free states could punish the figure 
without committing any violation of autonomy or independence. 
 Short of such an emergency, however, a Kantian right to intercede in the affairs 
of another nation with the interest of punishing its rulers for abusive violations of power 
would be dubious at best. The tyrannical use of power by some authority figure in 
another country is, essentially, not a problem for the federation of free states. As long as 
                                                 
31 It would not be permissible, for instance, to interfere in a civil war with the aim of destabilizing the 
situation further. 
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this tyrannical figure maintains an orderly state, there would be no right to intercede. To 
ascribe such a right would tip the delicate balance of the federation of free states too far 
in the direction of a world-state. 
 This fact might seem dissatisfying, but I think we need not despair at the 
prospect. As I argued in the second section, the Kant’s prohibition against punishing 
former state authorities is not one Kantians need necessarily endorse. There are good 
reasons for thinking that such punishment is both permissible and desirable for its 
deterrent effects. While this might not lead to an immediate remedy to the problem of a 
tyrannical ruler, it does allow for progress to be made in the long run. Finally, if the 
abuses become too great for a people to bear, their resistance and eventual revolution 
can claim moral – if not legal – justification. 
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Conclusion:   The Future of Kant’s Theory of Punishment 
 
 
 According to some estimates, there are between ten and eleven million people 
currently incarcerated across the world.1 This represents an increase of 25-30% over the 
past fifteen years. The United States of America has one of the highest incarnation rates 
of any country, and when other legal sanctions – such as fines – are factored into the 
total, as many as two million American citizens will be punished by the criminal justice 
system each year—as many as 10,000 of whom may be innocent of the crimes of which 
they are convicted.2 Legal punishment is a reality of many people’s lives, and one that 
seems plagued by systemic racial, social, and economic injustices. Given the continued 
commission of crime, the high rate of recidivism, and the tragic punishment and even 
execution of those later exonerated, our criminal justice system seems deficient at 
achieving deterrence, rehabilitation, or even appropriate retribution. For all these 
reasons, there is a powerful and urgent need to seriously reexamine the traditional 
frameworks and theories that justify and guide the state’s use of punishment. 
 Immanuel Kant’s theory of punishment occupies a prominent place in this 
traditional canon. The orthodox reading of Kant’s theory is elegant and straightforward: 
the only morally permissible justification for punishment is retribution for a previous 
                                                 
1 All statistics about domestic and international punishment rates can be found in United States 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Prisoners in 2008.” United States Department of Justice, 2009; and 
Walmsley, Roy. “World Prison Population List (tenth edition).” International Centre for Prison Studies. 
2013. 
2 Huff, C. Ronald et al. Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy. Los Angeles: 
Sage Publications, 1996. 
 274 
 
wrong, and the form of this punishment ought to resemble the crime as much as 
possible. He was among the first Western philosophers to ever give a secular account of 
retributivism as the justification for punishment, and consequently he has come down 
through history as the grandfather of retributive theory. His support for retributivism 
went largely unchallenged for the better part of two centuries, at least partly because it 
fit within an easy narrative. Consequentialist moral and political theories were well-
known supporters of deterrence as the sole justification for punishment, and as the most 
significant philosophical alternative to consequentialism, Kant’s practical philosophy 
seemed to be a natural place to find retributivism.  
 As Kant’s political philosophy gained greater attention in recent years, this 
narrative came under serious scrutiny. The basis on which Kant grounds his 
retributivism has been questioned; in particular, the role of moral desert in his political 
philosophy seems problematic. In place of this retributivism, Kant’s interpreters have 
suggested deterrence theories, rehabilitative theories, and mixed theories. Even some of 
those who at one time defended the traditional reading of Kant as a retributivist 
eventually conceded that his arguments do not successfully support a retributive theory. 
While many generic treatments of punishment still list Kant as foremost among the 
philosophical supporters of retributivism, a significant portion of the scholarship about 
Kant has moved on from the traditional reading. 
 I concur with these assessments. Kant’s retributive theory of punishment has 
several insurmountable issues, and his practical philosophy is both capable of 
supporting and more consistent with alternatives that rely on deterrence for a 
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justification. Most fundamentally, Kant’s conception of the state and its purpose is at 
odds with the idea that the state is authorized to punish based on moral desert. Even if 
we accept that Kant holds that doing wrong makes one morally deserving of suffering – 
itself a contentious claim – this does not show that the state is justified in bringing about 
this suffering. In order to connect the state’s power to punish to moral desert, he would 
need to give an account of why the state has the power to respond to the moral desert of 
those who violate their juridical duties, as well as explain why the state is not authorized 
to punish – regardless of our moral desert – when we fail to satisfy our ethical duties.  
 Kant does have the resources available, however, to construct a theory with a 
deterrent justification. In particular, I have defended ‘Kantian protective deterrence’ – a 
mixed theory of punishment that incorporates retributive and rehabilitative elements. 
By separating out the liability, method, and amount of appropriate punishment from the 
justification offered for punishing, this theory is able to capture a number of the different 
interests and goals we have for punishment, all within a deterrent framework that is 
consistent with Kant’s variety of liberal political theory. Kantian protective deterrence 
departs from other efforts to construct deterrent or mixed Kantian theories of 
punishment in its focus not on deterring threats to the state’s authority, but rather 
deterring threats to the individual freedom of each and every citizen. 
 Kantian protective deterrence is not intended to accurately represent Kant’s 
historical views. At the same time, it is not merely a theory of punishment loosely 
inspired by the practical philosophy of Kant. Rather, I have sought to establish an 
alternative theory that is grounded firmly in his most fundamental commitments. In 
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addition, I have aimed to preserve as many of Kant’s original claim about punishment as 
possible; in the cases that this was not possible it was because such claims contradicted 
core tenets of his practical philosophy. As I have argued throughout the dissertation, 
this alternative not only avoids the hard question of the state’s connection to desert, but 
it also is more harmonious with Kant’s foundational practical philosophy in several key 
respects. 
 Removing Kant from the retributivist canon also changes the landscape of the 
contemporary debate about punishment. Without the ability to reflexively rely on 
deontology as a support, retributivists will need to be more explicit about the moral and 
political foundations of their view. In exploring the considerations that make 
retributivism untenable for Kant, we have also been exploring what it would take for 
any theory to provide a fully consistent account of a retributivist justification for 
punishment. Any retributivist working within the liberal tradition would face 
challenges in avoiding the same kinds of difficulties that I have described throughout 
the dissertation.  
 Going forward, there are profound practical implications of Kantian protective 
deterrence. Criminal justice – particular in the United States – is comprised of a 
patchwork of competing goals, interests, and ideologies, and this lack of theoretical 
consistency is reflected in the serious and systemic flaws in the execution of punishment. 
Adopting Kantian protective deterrence would require serious changes in the form that 
punishment takes, the kinds of laws and sanctions that are created, the way in which 
criminals are housed and treated, the length of sentences, and the goals associated with 
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punishing. In future work, I will explore the particular details of how our institutions 
and practices would shift in the event of this change. For now, I will simply say that 
truly adopting Kantian preventative deterrence would require laws that respect 
freedom, sanctions that are designed to deter crime, institutions that take individual 
responsibility seriously, and punitive practices that genuinely aim to rehabilitate the 
convicted. 
 The foundation for all these changes is Kant’s guiding focus on the incomparable 
value of each individual, autonomous person. Kant’s moral philosophy is an inspiring 
testament to the moral dignity of persons and the importance of freedom, and his 
political philosophy manages to represent these values while preserving the liberal 
principles of independence and tolerance. Kant deserves a theory of punishment that 
accurately reflects and compliments the strength and depth of his practical philosophy. 
Kantian protective deterrence is an effort to supply such a theory and to make Kant’s 
philosophy a viable solution to the contemporary world’s practical problems of 
punishment.
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